Doctrine of Judicial Review in India: Relevancy of Defining Contours
‘It is often found that courts do not realise their limits. Courts must realise that there are many problems before the country, which courts cannot solve however much they like. What stands out is his firm belief that courts cannot interfere with the government policy as a matter of routine. Judicial Activism does not mean judicial adventurism. Judges should never be activist as sometimes judicial activism is a useful adjunct to democracy.’
Justice Markandey Katju
Debate over ‘judicial Review’ has assumed great significance in recent years in the form of two conflicting philosophies: ‘Judicial Activism’ and ‘Judicial Self Restraint. ’Judicial Review in its most widely accepted meaning is the power of the courts to consider the constitutionality of acts of organs of Government (the executive and legislature) and declare it unconstitutional or null and void if it violates or is inconsistent with the basic principles of Grundnorm i.e. Constitution. Courts and judges play an indispensable role through its own route and mechanism viz. judicial process by providing justice or ‘just ends by just means’. Judicial Role is not merely ‘Jus Dicere’. Judges today, are neither ‘discusitized’ nor ‘la bouche de la loi’(mouth of law).
Judicial Review concept which evolved in Marbury v. Madison is an armour to check to check lawlessness – legislative as well as executive with a review to serve “legitimacy of power “and administrative efficiency. Judicial review is the power by which judiciary aims at activising herself in retaining her domain of judicial activity over the state inactivity .This judicial activism is a multifortiori as it makes action popularis not only popular through strategies of PIL vide pro bono public, but a rule of life for the lowly and lost ,little man, deprived ,underprivileged, destitute.
The definition of "judicial activism" is an intense ongoing debate. According to Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, judicial activism is "the practice in the judiciary of protecting or expanding individual rights through decisions that depart from established precedent or are independent of or in opposition to the supposed constitutional or legislative intent". According to Black's Law Dictionary judicial activism is "a philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usually with the suggestion that adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore precedent."Judicial activism describes judicial ruling suspected of being based on personal or political considerations rather than on existing law. It is sometimes used as an antonym of judicial restraint. Thus the phrase ‘judicial activism’ carries more than one connotation. The common law tradition conceives of courtroom litigation as an adversarial process where the onus is on the pleaders to shape the overall course of the proceedings through their submissions. In this conception, the role of the judge is cast in a passive mould and the objective is to dispassionately evaluate the arguments made by both sides. There has been a raging debate on the proper scope and limits of the judicial role especially of that played by the higher judiciary which consists of the Supreme Court of India at the Centre and the High Courts in the various States that form the Union of India. The terms of that debate have been broadly framed with respect to the considerations of ensuring an effective ‘separation of powers’ between the executive, legislature and the judiciary as well as concerns about the efficacy and legitimacy of judicial interventions in the long-run.
The place of ‘judicial review ’in Indian Constitution
In post-independence India, the inclusion of explicit provisions for‘ judicial review’ were necessary in order to give effect to the individual and group rights guaranteed in the text of the Constitution. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who chaired the drafting committee of our Constituent Assembly, had described the provision related to the same as the ‘heart of the Constitution’.1 Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India prescribes that the Union or the States shall not make any law that takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights, and any law made in contravention of the aforementioned mandate shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.
While judicial review over administrative action has evolved on the lines of common law doctrines such as ‘proportionality’, ‘legitimate expectation’, ‘reasonableness’ and principles of natural justice, the Supreme Court of India and the various High Courts were given the power to rule on the constitutionality of legislative as well as administrative actions to protect and enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. The higher courts are also approached to rule on questions of legislative competence, mostly in the context of Centre-State relations since Article 246 of the Constitution read with the 7th schedule, contemplates a clear demarcation as well as a zone of intersection between the law-making powers of the Union Parliament and the various State Legislatures.
Hence the scope of judicial review before Indian courts has evolved in three dimensions – firstly, to ensure fairness in administrative action, secondly to protect the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of citizens and thirdly to rule on questions of legislative competence between the centre and the states. The power of the Supreme Court of India to enforce these fundamental rights is derived from Article 32 of the Constitution. It gives citizens the right to directly approach the Supreme Court for seeking remedies against the violation of these fundamental rights.
This entitlement to constitutional remedies is itself a fundamental right and can be enforced in the form of writs evolved in common law – such as habeas corpus (to direct the release of a person detained unlawfully), mandamus (to direct a public authority to do its duty), quo warranto (to direct a person to vacate an office assumed wrongfully), prohibition (to prohibit a lower court from proceeding on a case) and certiorari (power of the higher court to remove a proceeding from a lower court and bring it before itself). Besides the Supreme Court, the High Courts located in the various States are also designated as constitutional courts and Article 226 permits citizens to file similar writs before the High Courts. With the advent of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) and dilution of concept of locus standi in recent decades, Article 32 has been creatively interpreted to shape innovative remedies such as a ‘continuing mandamus’ for ensuring that executive agencies comply with judicial directions.
Article 21: Expansion of fundamental rights
The emergency period and the infamous Habeas corpus constituted defining moment in history of judicial review in India. The strong criticism of the judgment gave solid base to judicial review and was followed by expansion of fundamental rights. Article 21 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” The narrow interpretation of this article in the early years of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan’s case was changed in Maneka Gandhi’s case. In that decision, it was held that governmental restraints on ‘personal liberty’ should be collectively tested against the guarantees of fairness, non-arbitrariness and reasonableness that were prescribed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court developed a theory of ‘inter-relationship of rights’ to hold that governmental action which curtailed either of these rights should meet the designated threshold for restraints on all of them. In this manner, the Courts incorporated the guarantee of ‘substantive due process’ of U,S.A into the language of Article 21. This was followed by a series of decisions, where the conceptions of ‘life’ and ‘personal liberty’ were interpreted liberally to include rights which had not been expressly enumerated in Part III. In the words of Justice Bhagwati:
“we think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms.”
In his work ‘Social Action Litigation: The Indian Express’ Justice Bhagwati observed “
Today, we find that in third world countries, there are large number of groups which are being subjected to exploitation, injustice and even violence. In this climate of conflict and injustice, judges have to play a positive role and they cannot content themselves by invoking the doctrine of self-restraint and passive interpretation. The judges in India have fortunately a most potent judicial power in their hands, namely the power of judicial review. The judiciary has to play a vital and important role not only in preventing the remedying abuse and misuse of power but also in eliminating exploitation and injustice.”
Notably, over the decades, the Supreme Court has affirmed that both the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles must be interpreted harmoniously. It was observed in the Kesavananda Bharati case, that the directive principles and the fundamental rights supplement each other and aim at the same goal of bringing about a social revolution and the establishment of a welfare State, the objectives which are also enumerated in the Preamble to the Constitution. Furthermore, in Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Justice Jeevan Reddy declared:
“The provisions of Parts III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and not exclusionary of each other and that the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part IV”.
This approach of harmonizing the fundamental rights and directive principles has been successful to a considerable extent. The Supreme Court has interpreted the ‘protection of life and personal liberty’ as one which contemplates socio-economic entitlements especially in public interest cases.
Milestones of Public Interest Litigation in India
One of the earliest cases of public interest litigation was reported as Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. State of Bihar. This case was concerned with a series of articles published in a prominent newspaper - the Indian Express which exposed the plight of undertrial prisoners in the state of Bihar. A writ petition was filed by an advocate drawing the Court’s attention to the deplorable plight of these prisoners. Many of them had been in jail for longer periods than the maximum permissible sentences for the offences they had been charged with. The Supreme Court accepted the dilution of locus standi and allowed an advocate to maintain the writ petition. Thereafter, a series of cases followed in which the Court gave directions through which the ‘right to speedy trial’ was deemed to be an integral and an essential part of the protection of life and personal liberty. Soon thereafter, two noted professors of law filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court highlighting various abuses of the law, which, they asserted, were a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. These included inhuman conditions prevailing in protective homes, long pendency of trials in court, trafficking of women, importation of children for homosexual purposes, and the non-payment of wages to bonded labourers among others. The Supreme Court accepted their locus standi to represent the suffering masses and passed guidelines and orders that greatly ameliorated the conditions of these people.
In another matter, a journalist, Ms. Sheela Barse, took up the plight of women prisoners who were confined in the police jails in the city of Bombay. The Court took cognizance of the matter and directions were issued to the Director of College of Social Work, Bombay to visit the Bombay Central Jail and conduct interviews of various women prisoners in order to ascertain whether they had been subjected to torture or ill-treatment. Based on his findings, the Court issued directions such as the detention of female prisoners only in designated female lock-ups guarded by female constables and that accused females could be interrogated only in the presence of a female police official.
Public interest litigation acquired a new dimension – namely that of ‘epistolary jurisdiction’ with the decision in the case of Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, It was initiated by a letter that was written by a prisoner lodged in jail to a Judge of the Supreme Court. The prisoner complained of a brutal assault committed by a Head Warder on another prisoner. The Court treated that letter as a writ petition, and, while issuing various directions, opined that:
“…technicalities and legal niceties are no impediment to the court entertaining even an informal communication as a proceeding for habeas corpus if the basic facts are found”.
In Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand, the Court recognized the locus standi of a group of citizens who sought directions against the local Municipal Council for removal of open drains that caused stench as well as diseases. The Court, recognizing the right of the group of citizens, asserted that if the:
"…centre of gravity of justice is to shift as indeed the Preamble to the Constitution mandates, from the traditional individualism of locus standi to the community orientation of public interest litigation, the court must consider the issues as there is need to focus on the ordinary men."
In Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, the Supreme Court accepted an application by an advocate that highlighted a news item titled "Law Helps the Injured to Die" published in a national daily, The Hindustan Times. The petitioner brought to light the procedural difficulties which came in availing urgent and life-saving medical treatment to persons injured in road and other accidents. The Supreme Court directed medical establishments to provide instant medical aid to such injured people, notwithstanding the formalities to be followed under the procedural criminal law.
The Supreme Court has met the changing needs of society by the extensive liberalization of the rule of locus standi which gave birth to a flexible public interest litigation system. A powerful thrust to public interest litigation was given by a 7-judge bench in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India. The judgment recognized the locus standi of bar associations to file writs by way of public interest litigation. In this particular case, it was accepted that they had a legitimate interest in questioning the executive’s policy of arbitrarily transferring High Court judges, which threatened the independence of the judiciary. Explaining the liberalization of the concept of locus standi, the court opined:
“It must now be regarded as well-settled law where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to approach the court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantaged position, some other person can invoke the assistance of the court for the purpose of providing judicial redress to the person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person does not go unredressed and justice is done to him.”
The unique model of public interest litigation that has evolved in India not only looks at issues like consumer protection, gender justice, prevention of environmental pollution and ecological destruction, it is also directed towards finding social and political space for the disadvantaged and other vulnerable groups in society. The Courts have given decisions in cases pertaining to different kinds of entitlements and protections such as the availability of food, access to clean air, safe working conditions, political representation, affirmative action, anti-discrimination measures and the regulation of prison conditions among others.
For instance, in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, a petition was brought against governmental agencies which questioned the employment of underage labourers and the payment of wages below the prescribed statutory minimum wage-levels to those involved in the construction of facilities for the then upcoming Asian Games in New Delhi. The Court took serious exception to these practices and ruled that they violated constitutional guarantees. The employment of children in construction-related jobs clearly fell foul of the constitutional prohibition on child labour and the non-payment of minimum wages was equated with the extraction of forced labour. Similarly, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, the Supreme Court’s attention was drawn to the widespread incidence of the age-old practice of bonded labour which persists despite the constitutional prohibition. Among other interventions, one can refer to the Shriram Food & Fertilizer case where the Court issued directions to employers to check the production of hazardous chemicals and gases that endangered the life and health of workmen. It is also through the vehicle of PIL, that the Indian Courts have come to adopt the strategy of awarding monetary compensation for constitutional wrongs such as unlawful detention, custodial torture and extra-judicial killings by state agencies.
An important step in the area of gender justice was the decision in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan. The petition in that case originated from the gang-rape of a grassroots social worker. In that opinion, the Court invoked the text of the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and framed guidelines for establishing redressal mechanisms to tackle sexual harassment of women at workplaces. The decision came under considerable criticism for encroaching into the domain of the legislature. It must be remembered that meaningful social change, like any sustained transformation, demands a long-term engagement. Even though a particular petition may fail to secure relief in a wholesome manner or be slow in its implementation, litigation is an important step towards systemic reforms.
Public cause litigation
However, over the years, the social action dimension of PIL has been diluted and eclipsed by another type of “public cause litigation” in courts. In this type of litigation, the court’s intervention is not sought for enforcing the rights of the disadvantaged or poor sections of the society but simply for correcting the actions or omissions of the executive or public officials or departments of government or public bodies. Examples of this type of intervention by the Court are innumerable. A recent example of this approach was the decision in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, where the Court sought to ensure compliance with the policy of supplying mid-day meals in government-run primary schools. There had been widespread reports of problems in the implementation of this scheme such as the pilferage of food grains. As a response to the same, the Supreme Court issued orders to the concerned governmental authorities in all States and Union Territories, while giving elaborate directions about the proper publicity and implementation of the said scheme.the apex cort has also championed the cause of pavement dwellers in Olga Tellis v.Bombay Municipal Corporation.
In the realm of environmental protection, many of the leading decisions have been given in actions brought by renowned environmentalist M.C. Mehta viz., strict liability for the leak of Oleum gas from a factory in New Delhi, directions to check pollution in and around the Ganges river, the relocation of hazardous industries from the municipal limits of Delhi, directions to state agencies to check pollution in the vicinity of the Taj Mahal and several afforestation measures. A prominent decision was made in a petition that raised the problem of extensive vehicular air pollution in Delhi. The Court was faced with considerable statistical evidence of increasing levels of hazardous emissions on account of the use of diesel as a fuel by commercial vehicles. The Supreme Court decided to make a decisive intervention in this matter and ordered government-run buses to shift to the use of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), an environment-friendly fuel. This was followed some time later by another order that required privately-run ‘autorickshaws’ (three-wheeler vehicles which meet local transportational needs) to shift to the use of CNG. At the time, this decision was criticized as an unwarranted intrusion into the functions of the pollution control authorities, but it has now come to be widely acknowledged that it is only because of this judicial intervention that air pollution in Delhi has been checked to a substantial extent.
Another crucial intervention was made in Council for Environment Legal Action v. Union of India, wherein ‘Polluter Pays’ principle was evolved. In S.Jagannath V.UOI the Supreme Court gave directions to tackle ecological degradation in coastal areas. In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken on the mantle of monitoring forest conservation measures all over India, and a special ‘Green bench’ has been constituted to give directions to the concerned governmental agencies to maintain judicial supervision in order to protect our ecological resources from rampant encroachments and administrative apathy.
In the interest of public the Supreme Court has given directions for parking charges, wearing of helmets in cities, cleanliness in housing colonies, disposal of garbage, control of traffic in New Delhi, made compulsory the wearing of seat belts, ordered action plans to control and prevent the monkey menace in cities and towns, ordered measures to prevent accidents at unmanned railway level crossings, prevent ragging of college freshmen, for collection and storage of blood in blood banks, and for control of loudspeakers and banning of fire crackers.
In recent orders, the Supreme Court has directed the most complex engineering of interlinking rivers in India. The Court has passed orders banning the pasting of black film on automobile windows. On its own, the Court has taken notice of Baba Ramdev being forcibly evicted from the Ramlila grounds by the Delhi Administration and censured it. The Court has ordered the exclusion of tourists in the core area of tiger reserves. All these managerial exercises by the Court are hung on the dubious jurisdictional peg of enforcing fundamental rights under Article 32 of the Constitution. In reality, no fundamental rights of individuals or any legal issues are at all involved in such cases. The Court is only moved for better governance and administration, which does not involve the exercise of any proper judicial function.
In its most activist and controversial interpretation of the Constitution, the Supreme Court took away the constitutionally conferred power of the President of India to appoint judges after consultation with the Chief Justice, and appropriated this power in the Chief Justice of India and a collegium of four judges. In no Constitution in the world is the power to select and appoint judges conferred on the judges themselves.
The PIL has proved to be a strong and patent weapon in the hand of the court enabling it to unearth many scans and corruption cases in public life and to punish the guilty involved in those scams. Hawala scam, urea scam, fodder scam in Bihar,
St. kit's scam, Ayurvedic Medicines scam and illegal Allotment of government Houses and petrol pumps and the recent prosecution of the Telecom Minister and officials in the 2G Telecom scam case by the Supreme Court have come to light through the public interest litigation, certain social organisation and public spirited individuals filed a writ petitions in the Supreme Court and High Courts by way of public litigation requesting court to inquire and punish those who are found guilty of by passing laws of the country and misusing their official positions in public life. In the 2G Licenses case, the Court held that all public resources and assets are a matter of public trust and they can only be disposed of in a transparent manner by a public auction to the highest bidder. This has led to the President making a Reference to the Court for the Court’s legal advice under Article 143 of the Constitution. In the same case, the Court set aside the expert opinion of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to sell 2G spectrum without auction to create greater teledensity in India. The Court is made the monitor of the conduct of investigating and prosecution agencies who are perceived to have failed or neglected to investigate and prosecute ministers and officials of government.
The Supreme Court has made an order even in a military operation. In 1993, the Court issued orders on the conduct of military operations in Hazratbal shrine, Kashmir where the military had as a matter of strategy restricted the food supplies to hostages. The Court ordered that the provision of food of 1,200 calorific value should be supplied to hostages. Commenting on this, an Army General wrote: “For the first time in history, a Court of Law was asked to pronounce judgment on the conduct of an ongoing military operation. Its verdict materially affected the course of operation.”
Even proceedings of Legislatures are controlled by the Court. In the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly case, the Supreme Court ordered the Assembly to conduct a Motion of Confidence and ordered the Speaker to conduct proceedings according to a prescribed agenda and not to entertain any other business. Its proceedings were ordered to be recorded for reporting to the Court. These orders were made in spite of Article 212 of the Constitution which states that Courts are not to inquire into any proceedings of the legislature.
Conclusion: A defence of ‘judicial activism’
The expansion of ‘judicial review’ (which is often described as ‘judicial activism’) has of course raised the popular profile of the higher judiciary in India.. There are two conceptual objections against the justifiability to enforce positive obligations or aspirational rights. The first is that if judges devise strategies to enforce the directive principles, it amounts to an intrusion into the legislative and executive domain. The articulation of newer fundamental rights is the legislature’s task within which the judiciary should refrain from intervening. Further these obligations were enumerated as directive principles by the framers on account of practical considerations of heavy cost. Therefore judiciary must exercise restraint.
However, the second objection to the reading in of positive obligations raises some scope for introspection amongst judges. The judicial inclusion of socio-economic objectives as fundamental rights can be criticised as an unviable textual exercise, which may have no bearing on ground-level conditions though the unenforceability and inability of state agencies to protect such aspirational rights could have an adverse effect on public perceptions about the efficacy and legitimacy of the judiciary. Also, a question arises whether poor enforcement is a sufficient reason to abandon the pursuit of rights whose fulfillment enhances social and economic welfare. At this point, one can recount Roscoe Pound’s thesis on law as an agent of social change. The express inclusion of legal rights is an effective strategy to counter-act social problems in the long-run. At the level of constitutional protection, such rights have an inherent symbolic value which goes beyond empirical considerations about their actual enforcement. The colonial regime in the Indian subcontinent periodically made legislative interventions to discourage retrograde and exploitative social practices such as Sati (immolation of widows), prohibition of widow-remarriage and child marriage. Even though there have been persistent problems in the enforcement of these legislations, in the long run they have played an important part in reducing the incidence of these unjust customs. In the short run even the coercive authority of law may not be enough of a deterrent, but in the long run the continued existence of such authority helps in creating public opinion against the same practices.
In the same way the inclusion of the whole spectrum of rights and entitlements such as ‘social equality’ and ‘religious freedom’ ,various civil liberties and protections against arbitrary actions by the state are now identified as core elements of citizenship and violations provoke a high standard of scrutiny both by the judiciary as well as civil society groups. The inclusion of entitlements such as universal adult franchise have greatly reduced the coercive power of casteist and feudal social structures and empowered political parties that represent historically disadvantaged sections such as the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) have played a major role in social transformation in India.
Even though practices such as untouchability, forced labour and child labour have not been totally eradicated, our constitutional provisions prohibiting the same are the bedrock behind legal as well as socio-political strategies to curb the same. The Supreme Court of India has further internalized the importance of laying down clear normative standards which drive social transformation. Its interventions through strategies such as the expansion of Article 21 and the use of innovative remedies in Public Interest Litigation (PIL) cases has actually expanded the scope and efficacy of constitutional rights by applying them in previously unenumerated settings.
Furthermore, the Courts allow groups and interests with unequal bargaining power in the political sphere to present their case in an environment of due deliberation. The Courts have come to recognize and enforce rights for the most disadvantaged sections in society through an expanded notion of ‘judicial review’.
The Court has for all practical purposes disregarded the separation of powers under the Constitution, and assumed a general supervisory function over other branches of governments. The temptation to rush to the Supreme Court and 21 High Courts for any grievance against a public authority has also deflected the primary responsibility of citizens themselves in a representative self government of making legislators and the executive responsible for their actions. The answer often given by the judiciary to this type of overreach is that it is compelled to take upon this task as the other branches of government have failed in their obligations. On this specious justification, the political branches of government may, by the same logic, take over the functions of the judiciary when it has failed, and there can be no doubt that there are many areas where the judiciary has failed to meet the expectations of the public by its inefficiency and areas of cases.
Justice Jackson of the U.S. has aptly said: “The doctrine of judicial activism which justifies easy and constant readiness to set aside decisions of other branches of Government is wholly incompatible with a faith in democracy and in so far it encourages a belief that judges should be left to correct the result of public indifference it is a vicious teaching.” The former Chief Justice of India, Justice Ahmadi has stated “Sometimes this Activism has the potential to transcend the borders of Judicial Review and turn into populism and excessive”. Activism according to him is “populism when doctrinal effervescence transcends the institutional capacity of the judiciary to translate the doctrine into reality, and it is excessive when a court undertakes responsibilities normally discharged by other coordinate organs of the government”.
Unless the parameters of intervention are strictly formulated by the Supreme Court and strictly observed, the concept of judicial review which is so necessary in India will become diffused, unprincipled, encroaching into the functions of other branches of government and ineffective by its indiscriminate use.
# Common Cause a regd Society v. Union of India ww.indiankanoon.org/doc/440148
# E.S. Crown-Essay on the Judicial Review in Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. VIII, P.457
# ADM Jabalpur V. Shivkant Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207
# A.K. Gopalan v. Union of India, AIR 1953SC27
# Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR1978SC 594
# Francis Coralie v.Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746
# Kesavanand Bharati v.State of Kerala AIR 1973SC1461
# Uni Krishnan v.State of Andhra Pradesh(1993)1SCC645
# (1978) 4 SCC 494
# Upendra Baxi (Dr) v. State of U.P., (1983) 2 SCC 308
# Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 SCC 96
# (1980) 4 SCC 162
# AIR 1989 SC2039
# AIR 1982SC149
# AIR 1984SC802
# M.C. Mehta V.UOI (1986)2scc 176
# Nilabati Behera v.State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746; D.K. Basu v.Union of India,(1997)1SCC417
# AIR 1997 SC 3014
# 2000(5)SCALE 30
# AIR 1986 SC 180
# M.C. Mehta V.UOI (1987)1scc 395
# M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395, M.C Mehta v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 471
# M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 750
# (1998)8SCC 648
# (1996)3 SCC212
# AIR 1997 SC811
# Swarnlata Barua V.UOI AIR 1963 Assam 117
# University of Kerala v.Council Principal’s College Kerala & Ors(2009) INSC 1016;www.liiofindia.org
# In Re Noise Pollution AIR 2005 SC 3136
# IN Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v .Home Secretary, Union of India &ors (2012)INSC 138: www.liiofindia .org
# In Re Presidential Reference Appointment and Transfer of judges case AIR 1999SC 1
# Common Cause a Regd Society v. UOI AIR 1997 SC 1886
# Centre for Public Tnterest Litigation V. UOI (2010) INSC 1093 :www.liiofindia.org
# Arjun Munda v. Governor of Jharkhand (2005)3 SCC 399
# Jeffrey Usman, ‘Non-justiciable Directive Principles: A constitutional design defect’, 15 Michigan State Journal of International Law 643
# Mark Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights and the forms of Judicial Review’,82 Texas Law Review 1895 (2004)
# S.B. Burman, ‘Symbolic dimensions of the enforcement of law’, British Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1976) at p. 204-217
# West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943)
# DR K.N Katju Memorial Lecture on ‘Separation of Powers and Judicial Activism in India’,NewDelhi,26 April 2007
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