Exceptions To The Principles Of Natural Justice
Now it is well established preposition of Law that the Principles of Natural Justice supplements the enacted statute with necessary implications, accordingly administrative authorities performing public functions are generally required to adopt “fair procedure” and in relation to a variety of different circumstances, we considered the content of the requirements of procedural fairness. A person may also have legitimate expectation of fair hearing or procedural fairness/treatment but as Natural Justice Principles is to be invoked in doing justice, where their observance leads to injustice they may be disregarded. There are several well established limitations on Principles of Natural Justice. Existence of certain circumstances deprives the individual from availing the benefit of principles of natural justices, authors in this research work undertakes to cover the circumstances in which judiciary admitted the exceptions to the observance of Principles of Natural Justice.
Principles of Natural Justice are ultimately weighed in the balance of fairness and hence the Courts have been circumspect in extending principles of natural justice to situations where it would cause more injustice rather than justice so, where a right to be fairly heard has been denied, it is more probably a case of bad decision than of true exception, then principles of natural justice can be discarded. Application of the principles of natural justice can be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication, subject to the provisions of Article 14 and 21 of the constitution. However, along with constitutional limitations in India Common Law exception are also preferred.
2. Common Law Exceptions to the Principles of Natural Justice:
The requirements of procedural fairness are on first appearance applicable to Judicial, Quasi-Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, however, the decision maker may be exempt from all or some of the procedural safeguards that would otherwise be required. Several factors may be identified as capable of excluding the normal procedural fairness requirements in Common Law Courts are:
(i) Exclusion in case of emergency,
(ii) Express statutory exclusion,
(iii) Where discloser would be prejudicial to public interests
(iv) Where prompt action is needed,
(v) Where it is impracticable to hold hearing or appeal,
(vi) Exclusion in case of purely administrative matters.
(vii) Where no right of person is infringed,
(viii) The procedural defect would have made no difference to the outcome.
(ix) Exclusion on the ground of ‘no fault’ decision maker. We shall examine them in turn.
2. (i) Exclusion in cases of Emergency:
In India it has been generally acknowledged that in cases of extreme urgency, where interest of the public would be jeopardizes by the delay or publicity involved in a hearing, a hearing before condemnation would not be required by natural justice or in exceptional cases of emergency where prompt action, preventive or remedial, is needed, the requirement of notice and hearing may be obviated. Therefore, if the right to be heard will paralyze the process Law will exclude it.
Therefore in situations where dangerous buildings is to be demolished, or a company has to wound up to save depositors or there is a eminent danger to peace or trade dangerous to society is to prohibited, dire social necessity requires exclusion of elaborate process of fair hearing. In the same manner where power theft was detected by officials, immediate disconnection of supply is not violative principles of Natural Justice.
The emergency power (defense) Act, 1934 authorized the Government, to make regulation under the Act “For the detention of a person whose detention appears to the secretary of the state to be expedient in the interest of public safety or the Defense of the Realm”. Repealing the contention that the legislation which encroached upon the liberty of the subject should be construed in favour of the subject, the House of Lords held that the legislation was war measure relating to the safety of the nation itself which required a drastic “invasion of the liberty of the subject”, the Lord Maugham Observed that Under the Statute and Regulation made there under the Secretary of the State was under no duty to give prior notice or opportunity to be heard. In the same manner in India also similar exclusion were created in emergency legislations, which is dealt under separate heading in succeeding part of this paper.
In cases of urgency or where the giving prior notice would defeat the very object the action, where the function is purely administrative in nature and the principle of prior hearing as required by natural justice does not apply, but prior hearing must be given where an administrative action will result in civil consequences to the party to the dispute.
In Swadeshi Cotton mills v. Union of India the Court held that the word “immediate” in Section 18AA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act cannot stand in the way of the application of the rules of the Natural Justice. U/Sec 18AA of above said Act the Central Government can take over an industry after investigation, but U/Sec 18AA(1) the Govt. can take over without any notice and hearing on the ground that production has been or is likely to be affected and hence immediate action is necessary the question was whether Sec 18AA(1) excludes the principles of Natural Justice the Govt. took the plea that since Section 18AA clause (1) relates to emergent situations, therefore Principles of Natural Justice are excluded. Furthermore it also contended that since Section 18A provides for hearing and Sec 18AA(1) does not provides for conduct of hearing, consequentially parliament has excluded hearing therein, Court rejecting these arguments held that even in emergency situations the competing claims of ‘hurry and hearing’ are to be reconciled, no matter the application of the Audi Alterm Partem rule at the pre-decisional stage may be a ‘short measure of fair hearing adjusted’, attuned and tailored to exigency of the situation.
2. (ii) Express Statutory Exclusion:
As we already analyzed in Liversidge v. Anderson exclusion can be made through “clearly and expressly” made Act of the parliament. An Act of Parliament may dispense with the requirements of fair procedures where they would otherwise be required. A statute may, for example, permit the exercise of powers without notice. In the interests of administrative efficiency and expedition, the requirements of fairness have been excluded by statutory provisions which, for example, enable decision makers to decline to conduct an oral hearing, or to entertain particular kinds of representations and objections.
However, any statutory exclusion of procedural fairness will be construed strictly. Thus, where a statutory provision did not expressly or by necessary implication exclude the right to legal professional’s privilege, the provision was interpreted not to do so. Subordinate legislation purporting to exclude a hearing or to hold a hearing or conduct an inquiry is conferred by a statute, a refusal to hold the inquiry may constitute a denial of natural justice if fairness plainly demands that a hearing be held. Ex .p Gurdian Newspaper Ltd (Written Submissions) in this case Court held that, an express statutory power to proceed without a hearing will not necessarily exclude the right to make informal or written representations, similarly, an express statutory provision excluding a duty to give reasons has been held not to exclude a duty to disclose the substance of the case so that an applicant for citizenship could make representation.
In a number of cases, the view has been expressed judicially that there is no question of invocation of natural justice, or hearing the affected party, when legislative action of an authority is brought under the scrutiny of the Courts.
In Defense of India Act, 1962 Rule 29 and 30 of the Act empowers the executive to make orders for externment for the maintenance of public order. No hearing was necessary for the purpose of making such Order to direct the removal, detention, externment, interment and the like of any person, if it is ‘satisfied’ that such order was necessary for the defense or efficient conduct of military operations and maintenance of Public order.
Also in Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P in this case SC held that notification of UP Govt. Sugar Cane (Control) Order, 1966 directing that no power-crusher of Khandsari unit in reserved area of a Sugar mill will work during the period Oct 9 to Dec 1st , 1980 is legislative in character hence Principle of Natural Justice attracted. In the same manner, Charanlal Shahu v. U.O.I, in this case the constitutionality of the Bhopal Gas leak disaster (processing of claims) Act, 1985 was involved. The SC held: “for legislation by parliament no principles of natural justice is attracted, provided such legislation is within the competence of legislature”.
In Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. SC held that no principles of Natural Justice had been violated when the Govt. issued a notification fixing the Prices of certain drugs. The Court reasoned that since the notification showed from a legislative act and not an administrative one so Principles of Natural Justice would not applied.
There are however, cases where the SC has adopted a somewhat liberal approach in the matter of procedural safeguards to the individual affected even tough prima facie administrative function could be characterized legislative in character. The judicial strategy in such cases is to hold the action of administration in question as administrative. Example, in State of Assam v. Bharat Kalabhandar, a notification issued by the executive under the defense of India rules 1962 notified certain employments as essential “for securing the public safety and for maintaining the supplies and services necessary to the life of the community, another notification relating to Order of payment of specific cost of living allowance to all workers drawing pay up to Rs 400 per month and also to worker employed on daily wages in essential services. No question about hearing in the case of the former notification was raised. However, about the later notification, which prima facie a large number of persons and could thus be characterized as legislative. The SC took the view that it was necessary to consult the interest affected before its issue as its effect was to disturb settled industrial relation whether based on contract or industrial awards. Tough, on account of the emergency the Court refrained from holding the order as quasi-judicial, yet the whole approach of the Court shows that it would have held so had the emergency not been there.
Where public policy demands that certain information in possession of state shall not be disclosed, as it is in the interest of security of the state. In Malak Singh v. State of Punjab and Haryana SC held that the maintenance of Surveillance Register by the Police is confidential document neither the person whose name is entered in the Register nor the any other member of the public can have excess to it. Furthermore, the Court observed that observance of the principles of Natural justice in such a situation may defeat the very purpose of surveillance and there is every possibility of the ends of justice being defeated instead of being served.
In S.P. Gupta v. U.O.I, where the SC held that no opportunity of being heard can be given to an additional judge of HC before his name is dropped from being confirmed it may be pointed out that in a country like India surveillance may provide a very serious constraint on the liberty of the people, therefore the maintenance of the surveillance Register cannot be so utterly administrative and non-judicial that it is difficult to conceive the application of the rules of natural justice.
Even Right to The Information Act, 2005 provides express provisions to protect certain information from discloser such as,
(a) Information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect their sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, strategic, scientific or economic interest of the State, etc
(b) information which has been barred by Court from disclosure.
(c) the information, the disclosure of which cause breach of privilege of parliament or the state legislature.
(d) Information relating commercial confidence, IPR etc.
(e) Information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship.
(f) Information which impair the process of investigation or prosecution of offenders.
(g) Information relating copy right etc.
2. (iv) Where prompt action is needed/ exclusion in cases of interim preventive action:
Desirably, it may be to allow a hearing or an opportunity to make representations, or simply to give prior notice, before a decision is taken, summary action may be alleged to be justifiable when an urgent need for protecting the interests of other persons arises. There are in fact remarkably few situations in which the enforcement powers exist. For example, interim anti-social behavior orders made without notice are not unlawful where it is necessary for the court to act urgently to protect the interests of a third party or to ensure that the order of the court is effective.
There are numerous illustrations of statutory provisions which for reasons of public safety or public health permit public authorities to interfere with property or other rights. For example: the destruction of infected crops; the prevention of the bus lank being carried on in a manner detrimental to the interests of the public or of depositors or other creditors; prohibition on entry to an airport; suspension of the license of a public service vehicle seizure of obscene works;
Seizure of food suspected of not complying with food safety requirements; local authorities may examine and test, drains and test sewers, drains and sanitary conveniences that it believes to be defective etc,.
In the same manner if the administrative authority passed a suspension order in the nature of a preventive action and not a final order, the application of the principles of natural justice may be excluded. In Abhay Kumar v. K Srinivasan, the institution passed an Oder debarring the student from entering the premises of the institution and attending classes till the pendency of a criminal case against him for stabbing a co-student. This order was challenged on the ground that it violates Principles of Natural Justice. The Delhi High Court rejecting the contention held that such an order could be compared with an order of suspension pending enquiry which is preventive in nature in order to maintain campus peace and hence the principles of natural justice shall not apply.
It was also in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India recognized that “where an obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action, especially action of a preventive or remedial nature, right of prior notice and opportunity to be heard may be excluded by implication”. In this case it is interesting to see that natural justice entails new meaning and place under Indian Constitution at the same time Court recognized the circumstance under which Principles of natural Justice can be discarded.
2. (v) Where it is impracticable to hold hearing or appeal:
It is one of the most convincing reason that the number of persons affected by a particular order, act or decision is so great as to make it manifestly impracticable for them all to be given an opportunity of being heard by the competent authority beforehand. This is the reason why representation may not be required for the making of regulation of a legislative character in absence of legislative requirement.
For example, In R v. Aston University Senate Ex.p the large number of applicants competing for scarce resource may make it impracticable to offer each applicant a hearing. If, for example, there are 1,000 applicants for 100 places available in University law department it may be impossible to afford interviews to many of those who, from the particulars supplied with their written applications, appear sufficiently meritorious or suitable to warrant fuller personal consideration. In this circumstance even if the court finds that a breach of procedural fairness has occurred, administrative impracticability may still be relied upon as a reason for refusing a remedy in its discretion.
In R V Radhakrishanan v. Osmania University, where the entire MBA entrance examination was cancelled by the University because of mass copying, the Court held that notice and hearing to all candidates not possible in such a situation, which had assumed national proportions, Thus the court sanctified the exclusion of the rules of natural justice on the ground of administrative impracticability.
In the same way the Supreme Court in Andhra Steel Corporation v. A.P. State Electricity Board held that a concession can be withdrawn at any time without affording any opportunity of hearing to affected persons except when the law requires otherwise or the authority is bound by promissory estoppels. In this case the electricity board had withdrawn the concession in electricity rate without any notice and hearing to the appellant. Therefore, where an order of extension was cancelled before it became operational.
In Union of India v. O. Charadhar, held that cancellation of panel, select, reserve, waiting, merit or rank lists, individual hearing to candidate is not necessary where the mischief in conducting selection was so widespread and all the mischief in conducting the result, that it was difficult to identify the persons unlawfully benefited or unlawfully deprived of selection. Thus even the consequent termination of service does not attract principles of natural justice.
Also in W.B. Electricity Regulatory Commission v. CESC Ltd., it opined that when a statute confers a right which is in conformity with the principles of natural justice, the same cannot be negativated by a Court on an imaginary ground that there is a likelihood of an unmanageable hearing before the authority or practical inconvenience. In this case the W.B. Electricity Regulatory Commission had contended that though Act requires consumers hearing before fixing tariff, yet giving hearing to 17 lakh electricity consumers would be a practical impossibility and inconvenience. Rejecting the contention, the Court observed that the Act does not give individual rights to every consumer and the same is regulated by Regulations, therefore, the question of indiscriminate hearing does not arise.
Subsequent fair hearing or Appeal: if the public authority to make decisions which do not comply fully with procedural fairness requirements if the person affected has recourse to another hearing or appeal which itself provides fairness. There are situations where the absence of procedural fairness before a decision is made can be subsequently and adequately be “cured”, for example on appeal a prior hearing may be better than a subsequent hearing, but a subsequent hearing is better than no hearing at all; and in some cases the courts have held that statutory provisions for an administrative appeal.
2. (vi) Exclusion in case of purely administrative matters:
Where nature of authority is purely administrative no right of hearing can be claimed, where a student of the university was removed from the rolls for unsatisfactory academic performances without being given any per-decisional hearing. The Supreme Court in Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B.S. Narwal held that the very nature of academic adjudication appears to negative any right of an opportunity to be heard. Therefore if the competent academic authorities examine and asses the work of a student over a period of time and declare his work unsatisfactory, the rules of natural justice may be excluded.
In the same manner in Karnataka Public Service Commission v. B.M. Vijay Shanker when the commission cancelled the examination of the candidate because, in violation of rules, the candidate wrote his roll number on every page of the answer-sheet, the Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice were not attracted, the Court observed that the rule of hearing be strictly construed in academic discipline and if this was ignored it would not only be against the public interest but also erode the social sense of fairness. However, this exclusion would not apply in case of disciplinary matter or where the academic body performs non-academic functions granting sanction of prosecution is purely administrative functions, therefore, principles of natural justice are not attracted. In the same manner cancellation of bid for failure to execute lease deed and to deposit security amount, held, would not attract principles of natural justice.
2. (vii) Where no right of person is infringed:
In some case it has been suggested that a claimant who is for some reason undeserving for certain claims (due to absence of right to claim) may forfeit the right to procedural fairness. Where no right has been conferred on person by any statute nor any such right arises from common law the principles of natural justice are not applicable, this based on the principle Ebi Jus ebi remedium and Injuria sine damano the earlier stands for ‘where there is right there is remedy’ and later stands for ‘there shall be legal right or interest to claim some interest or benefit’.
In J.R. Vohra v. Indian Export House (p) Ltd. The Delhi Rent Control Act makes provisions for the creation of limited tenancies, Section 21 and 37 of the Act provide for the termination of limited tenancies. The combined effect of these sections is that after the expiry of the term a limited tenancy can be terminated and warrant of possession can be issued by the authority to the landlord without any notice of hearing to the tenant. Upholding the validity of warrant of possession without complying with the principles of natural justice, the Supreme Court held that after the expiry of the period of any limited tenancy, a person has no right to stay in possession and hence no right of his is prejudicially affected which may warrant the application of the principles of natural justice.
In the same manner the Court in Andhra Steel Corporation v. A.P. State Electricity Board held that a concession can be withdrawn at any time without affording any opportunity of hearing to affected persons except when the law requires otherwise or the authority is bound by promissory estoppels. In this case the electricity board had withdrawn the concession in electricity rate without any notice and hearing to the appellant. Therefore, where an order of extension was cancelled before it became operational or the order of stepping up salary was withdrawn before the person was actually paid or the service of the probationer terminated without charge the principles of natural justice are not attracted.
2. (viii) The procedural defect would have made no difference to the outcome:
There are several instances where Court discarded principles of natural justice after satisfying that the outcome of the case could not have been different had natural justice been fully observed. These decisions have been sought to be explained on the ground that the relief sought was discretionary, or on the ground breach makes an order voidable rather than void. It is submitted that neither explanation is sufficient. As to the former, it is right to note that a refusal of relief on the ground that it would make “no difference” may be explained either as an exercise of the courts discretion as to the grant of relief, as a part of the consideration of whether the principles of fairness have in fact been infringed at all.
‘Useless formality’ theory is no doubt yet another exception to the application of the principles of natural justice but it should be used with great caution and circumspection by the Court otherwise it would turn out to be wheel of miscarriage of justice. It can only be used where on the admitted or undisputed facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not insist on the observance of the principles of natural justice because it would be futile to order its observance.
In R v. Haberdashers Aske’s School Governors , a decision by governors refusing to correct an inaccurate statement in a consultation paper, and refusing to extend the consultation period was held not unfair because the error in question could not have led a person reading the pamphlet to have reached a different Conclusion.
In Dharmarathmakara Rai Bhadur Arcot Ramaswmay Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Education Appellate Tribunal In this case a lecturer, who had been granted leave for doing M. Phil, in violation of leave condition, had joined Ph. D course. She was given notice and after considering her reply, wherein she had admitted joining Ph. D course, her service was terminated. She challenged the termination order before Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (discipline and Control) Act, 1975 subsequently it is appealed to HC where termination was held invalid, but SC held that opportunity to show cause was not necessary where facts are undisputed and the affected person could not fourth any valid defence.
Similarly in KSRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa, the Court opined that where the respondent had committed repeated acts of misconduct and had also accepted minor punishment, he is not entitled to benefit of principles of natural justice as it would be mere formality, that too, in the case of misconduct by a daily wager. Supreme Court remarked; “the question as to what extent principles of natural justice are required to be complied within a particular case would depend on fact situation obtaining in each case. The principles of natural justice cannot be applied in vacuum. They cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The principles of natural justice are furthermore, not required to be complied with, if it will lead to a mere empty formality.
In Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh, the SC held that in view of the binding nature of the award the Court will not insist on compliance with the principles of natural justice as it would be a mere empty formality unless factual position or legal implications under the award is disputed. In this case award was challenged on the ground that everyone in the constituency was not heard, therefore, no unilateral decision can be taken by banks without giving employees notice and hearing.
However ‘useless formality’ theory has still not been able to firmly established in administrative law because there exists a strong opinion which suggest that this theory is wrong as a Court cannot prejudge the issue and there is scope for abuse on the basis of self imposed assumptions of authority.
2. (ix) Exclusion on the ground of ‘no fault’ of decision maker:
Where alleged procedural unfairness is not the fault of the tribunal or other decision-maker is a claimant still entitled to have the decision quashed on the basis that he has not been accorded procedural fairness? Where, at a hearing on notice, the absence of procedural fairness is due to the conduct of, or a failure by, the other party to the hearing, it was at one time thought that the courts had discretion to quash the decision. Thus, where prison authorities failed to make known to a prisoner charged with an offence against discipline the existence of a witness to the alleged offence, the determination of the prison board of visitors was quashed on the grounds of unfairness, ambit that this was not caused by the tribunal itself.
Where an important prosecution witness on a charge of shoplifting deceived the Court as to his reason for resign from the Metropolitan Police (being in fact required to resign following disgraceful conduct including a conviction), it was held that his deliberate concealment constituted unfairness, so that the conviction should be quashed.
It has been suggested, however, that these decisions should be viewed not as resting on the principles of fairness, but as based upon the alternative principles that “fraud unravels everything”, or because the “process leading to conviction” has been distorted and vitiated as a result of breach of duty owed to the procedure court and to the defence prosecutor. The principles of fairness, in contrast, are “concerned solely with the propriety of the procedure adopted by the decision-maker”, but this approach are the responsibility of the prosecution or respondent, but which cannot be characterized as fraud or breach of duty.
In the same manner it may be futile to comply with the principles of natural justice would be where administrative action is perse illegal as an ineligible candidate has been considered for appointment. It has been held that the principles of natural justice may not be applied unless prejudice is caused and there is no prejudice if an ineligible candidate is considered for appointment. Likewise, as general rule, a person who has himself impeded or frustrated the service of notice of impeding action cannot afterwards be heard to complain that he did not receive actual notice. But where the mistake is due to the conduct of the applicant’s legal representative, the position is not entirely clear.
In R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the applicant had lodged an appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision to make a deportation order against him. Notice of appeal was sent to his solicitors, who misaddressed the letter when sending it on to the applicant, who consequently never received notice of the appeal. The appeal was therefore dismissed in his absence. On an application for judicial review of the decision to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the applicant had been denied a fair (or any) hearing, the House of Lords held that a party cannot complain of a denial of fair hearing where he failed to make use of an opportunity to have his case heard through the negligence of his legal adviser, even if he himself is not responsible in any way for that failure. But in India law on this issue is quite clear that it is good ground to reopen the hearing of case on the ground of negligence of Legal representative resulting injustice the party.
Authors are of the conclusion that the Courts both in India and England in relation to administrative proceedings created various exception to the requirement of Natural Justice Principles and procedure there off. However, these exceptions are all circumstantial and not conclusive, every exception to be adjudged admissible or otherwise only after looking into the facts and circumstances of each case. The main objective behind the reconciliation between the inclusion and exclusion of protection of Principles of Natural Justice is to harmoniously construe individual’s natural rights of being heard and fair procedure as well as the public interest. Larger public interest is to be allowed to override the individual’s interest where the justice demands.
** Lecturer, K.L.E. Society’s Law College, Bangalore, E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
** Lecturer, K.L.E. Society’s Law College, Chikkodi, E-mail: email@example.com
# I.P. Massey , Administrative Law, VII ed. 2008, ( Lucknow: Eastern Book Company), at. p. 263.
# Liversidge v. Anderson, (142) AC 206
# Neelama v. Harindeer, (1990) 2 SCC 746.
# AIR 1981 SC 818.
# (142) AC 206
# Re A (2006) EWHC 96.
# R v. Secretary of State for Home department Ex.p, (1998) 1 W.L.R. 763.
# AIR 1981 SC 873.
# (1990) 1 SCC 613.
# (1987)2 SCC 720.
# AIR 1967 SC 1766
# M.P.Jain and S.N.Jain, Principles of Administrative law VI ed. (2010),( Reprint 2011), (Gurgaon; Lexis Nexis, Butter Worths Wdhava Nagpur), at, p.267.
# AIR 1981 SC 760
# (1981) SC C87.
# Sec 8 and 9
# Harry Woolf, Jeffrey Joweell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, VI ed. (2007), (London Sweet and Maxwell Ltd) at,p.451
# Ibid, at, p.452
# I.P. Massey , Administrative Law, VII ed. ( 2008) ( Lucknow: Eastern Book Company), at. P. 267, see also AIR 981 Del 381.
# AIR 1978 SC 597
# (1969) 2 Q.B. 538.
# Supra 18 at, p. 266 and see also AIR 1974 AP 283.
# (1991) 3 SCC 263.
# (2002) 3 SCC 146.
# (2002) 8 SCC 715.
# Woolf Harry, Jeffrey Joweell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, VI ed. (2007), (London Sweet and Maxwell Ltd), at,p. 456.
# AIR 1980 SC 1666.
# (1992) 2 SCC 206.
# State of Karnataka v. Saveen Kumar Shetty, (2002) 3 SCC 426
# Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority, (1980) 1 W.L.R. 582
# AIR 1985 SC 475
# (1991) 3 SCC 263.
# High Court of Patna v. M.M.P. Sinha, (1997) 10 SCC 409.
# Woolf Harry, Jeffrey Joweell and Andrew Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, VI ed. (2007), (London Sweet and Maxwell Ltd), at 473
# I.P. Massey , Administrative Law, VII ed, (2008), (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company), at. p. 275.
# Supra note 34. at. p. 275
# (2006) 8 SCC 647.
# R v. Blundeston Prison Board of Vsitors (1982) 1 All E.R. 646.
# R. v. Knightbridge Crown Court, (1986) Q.B. 1
# Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54.
# (1990) 1 A.C. 876
The author can be reached at: Shivashk100@legalserviceindia.com