Origin And Development of Principles Of Natural Justice
“The principles of natural justice constitute the basic elements of fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the perverse of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men”.
Natural justice is another name for common sense justice rules of natural justice are not in codified form these principles imbedded or ingrained or inbuilt in the conscience of human being. It supplies the omission made in codified law and helps in administration of justice. Natural justice is not only confined to ‘fairness’ it will take many shade and colour based on the context. Thus natural justice apart from ‘fairness’ also implies reasonableness, equity and equality. They are neither cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in legal straitjacket. These principles written by nature in the heart of mankind, they are immutable, inviolable, and inalienable.
It is true that the concept of natural justice is not very clear and, therefore, it is not possible to define it; yet the principles of natural justice are accepted and enforced. In Ridge V. BaldwinCourt observed that “in modern times have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is as vague as to be practically meaningless. But I would regard these as tainted by the perennial fallacy that because something cannot be cut and dried or nicely weighed or measured therefore it does not exist”. The term natural justice signifies fundamental rules of judicial procedure and fair play in action. According to Lord Widgery “the principles of natural justice were those fundamental rules; the breach will prevent justice from being seen to be done”. Earliest expression of ‘natural justice’ could be found in philosophical expression of Roman Jurist (jus natural) and signified rules and principles for the conduct of man which where independent of enacted law or customs and could be discovered by the rational intelligence of man and would grow out of and conform to his nature.
In the recent fast counters of Principles of Natural Justice grew in a multidimensional way and become permanent part of any statue affecting individual’s right. For the clearer understanding of scope and relevancy of Principle of Natural Justice it is essential to understand the historical growth of Principles of Natural Justice in India and elsewhere. With these objectives authors have undertaken this research.
2.1. Historical Prescriptive of Principle of Natural Justice in India
Procedural fairness is part of our cultural heritage. It is deeply rooted in our law. It lies at the heart of the judicial function and conditions the exercise of a large array of administrative powers affecting the rights, duties, privileges and immunities of individuals and organizations. Though now it is believed that Principles of Natural Justice were systematized in ancient Rome, principles of natural justice are not new India. Principles of fair hearing and rule against bias were well recognized in ancient India.
In ancient India foremost duty of a judge was his integrity which included impartiality and a total absence of bias or attachment. The concept of integrity was given a very wide meaning and the judicial code of integrity was very strict, Brihaspati Says: "A judge should decide cases without any consideration of personal gain or any kind of personal bias; and his decision should be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the texts. A judge who performs his judicial duties in this manner achieves the same spiritual merit as a person performing a Yajna."Further, the judges and counselors guiding the king during the trial of a case were required to be independent and fearless and prevent him from committing any error or injustice. Says Katyayana: "If the king wants to inflict upon the litigants (vivadinam) an illegal or unrighteous decision, it is the duty of the judge (samya) to warn the king and prevent him.”
This is how independence and impartiality of judiciary is to be maintained by judiciary, even king was to adhere to the rules of dharma and he must above the worldly detachments in deciding the cases. The principle that justice is not only been done but manifestly and undoubtedly seen to be done is now considered to be fundamental principle up on which rule against bias has been based, this principle was also followed even in Epic age, Hon’ble Justice S.S. Dhavan gives following examples to substantiate this, Rama, the King of Ayodhya, was compelled to banish his queen, whom he loved and in whose chastity he had complete faith, simply because his subjects disapproved of his having taken back a wife who had spent a year in the house of her abductor. The king submitted to the will of people though it broke his heart. This example annunciates how perfectly principle of natural justice was practiced in ancient India.
Procedures relating to conduct of proceedings are also well established in ancient India and there was little chance to misuse the provision and decide the matter without giving sufficient opportunity of being heard, a cause of action arises when a person, being harassed in a way contrary to the rules of Smriti and usage, lodges a complaint. The judicial proceedings usually comprise four parts, namely complaint, reply, evidence and judgment. Replies can probably be of four kinds, and these are admission, denial, a special plea, relating to a former judgment. Three types of evidences are mentioned namely document, possession and witness. As regards the rules for summoning, it is evident that the opponent or the defendant,
(1) against whom the suit is filed, must be summoned to the Court.
(2) Even other persons connected with the defendant (in the suit) may also be summoned.
(3) When, however, some persons like soldiers, Agriculturists, cowherds etc. are fully occupied with their work, their representative may be allowed to appear before the Court, as held by the Narada Smriti.
(4) In serious matters, however, the persons are allowed to appear in person before the Court, particularly with proper safeguards,
(5) in more serious matters like Murder of Woman, Adultery with her, as held in the Mitakashara on the Yajanvalkay Smriti no representative is allowed. But in such matters, the concerned must appear before the Court,
(6) it should be noted that the presence of some persons like the deceased, very old (more than Seventy years old), persons in calamities, engaged in religious rites, in king’s duties, a woman whose family is in bad condition, is actually condoned.
(7) If, however after serving the summons defendant fails to come before the Court the King should wait for 30 days or 15 days and pass the Judgment in favour of the plaintiff.
(8) But if there is an invasion by enemy or famine, or epidemic, than the King should not fine the defendant who is thus prevented from coming to the Court
(9) However agents can be allowed to represent on behalf of his disabled Master.
Representation by lawyer: the question also arises whether in ancient India, the system of lawyers is allowed or not. The views of Narada, Katyayana and Brhaspati show that the skilled help was required in the litigations. The commentary of Asahaya on the Narada Smrti indicates that those who are well- versed in the Smriti literature could afford help for monetary consideration to the parties that have appeared before Court (which is also recognized in C.P.C -1908 Order III rule 2). Fees of such skilled persons were also fixed and he was appointed by parties not by Court.
Accordingly principles of natural justice i.e principle of fair hearing and rule against bias were practiced in India quite early than Rome and Greek.
2.2. Origin and development of Principles of Natural Justice in Common law System
It is said that principles of natural justice are of very ancient origin and was known to Greek and Romans. The notion of a natural justice system emerges from religious and philosophical beliefs about how we see ourselves with respect to nature. Kluckhohn’s (1953) analysis provides one of the most noted descriptions of the philosophical principles that govern our relationship with nature. He claimed that humans think of themselves as being 1) subjugated to nature, 2) an inherent part of nature, or 3) separate from nature. Each of these views shapes a particular natural justice belief and thus a distinct moral stance toward nature. Some cultures emphasize their submissiveness to nature and would tend to adopt a morality of divinity. Others emphasize their harmonious relationship with nature and would tend to adopt a morality of caring. Still others emphasize their control over nature and would tend to adopt a morality of justice.
The Principles were accepted as early as in the days of Adam and of Kautilya’s Arthashastra. According to the Bible, when Adam & Eve ate the fruit of knowledge, which was forbidden by God, the latter did not pass sentence on Adam before he was called upon to defend himself. same thing was repeated in case of Eve. Later on, the principle of natural justice was adopted by English Jurist to be so fundamental as to over-ride all laws.
The principles of natural justice were associated with a few ‘accepted rules’ which have been built up and pronounced over a long period of time. In the West, in the olden days of laissez-fair practice, when industrial relations were governed and administered by the unscrupulous and harsh weighted law of hire and fire, the management was in supreme command and at its best with the passage of time, notions of social justice developed and the expanding horizons of socio- economic justice necessitated statutory protection to the workmen. The freedom to hire men/women is embedded in the management philosophy and thinking and the liberty is restrained to firing them arbitrarily or at its own will. The passage demonstrates that the rule against bias, like the hearing rule, was treated as an expression of the natural law regarded by Roman legal scholars as 'that ideal body of right and reasonable principles which was common to all human beings'. Those principles are said to have emerged from Cicero's Latin renderings of Greek Stoic philosophy, written in the first century BC. They became the underpinnings of Thomas Aquinas's philosophy and were regarded as divine law informing creation and binding human beings.
The word ‘Natural Justice’ manifests justice according to one’s own conscience. It is derived from the Roman Concept ‘jus - naturale’ and ‘Lex naturale’ which meant principle of natural law, natural justice, eternal law, natural equity or good conscience. Lord Evershed, in Vionet v. Barrett remarked, “Natural Justice is the natural sense of what is right and wrong.” But Natural justice has meant different things to different peoples at different times. In its widest sense, it was formerly used as a synonym for natural law. It has been used to mean that reasons must be given for decisions; that a body deciding an issue must only act on evidence of probative value.
De Smith submitted as follows:
No proposition can be more clearly established than that a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the case against him. For this he gives following assertion,
Even God did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defense. Adam, says God, „Where art thou? has thou not eaten out of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou should not eat?
Accordingly even though person has committed a wrongful act he must be heard before sentenced, specially where decision affecting liberty or property is to be made fair opportunity of hearing must be provided, for this reason whatever the meaning of natural justice may have been, and still is to other people, the common law lawyers have used the term in a technical manner to mean that in certain circumstances decisions affecting the rights of citizens must only be reached after a fair hearing has been given to the individual concerned. And in this context fair hearing requires two things, namely, AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM and NEMO DEBET ESSE JUDEX IN PROPRIA SUA CAUSA.
2.2.1. Audi Alterm Partem –A Historical Prescriptive
The rules of procedural fairness, as rules of natural justice were derived from natural law as is demonstrated by English cases of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first limb to be considered in this connection is the so-called hearing rule.
The evolutions of hearing rule come into view in many cases in the Year Books. Chief Justice Coke, who played a leading role in its exposition and the development of the remedy of mandamus where it had been breached, inferred it from the provision of the Magna Carta that: No free man shall be taken or imprisoned ruined or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
It was in Bagg's Case (1615) audi alterm partem was considered in length the case concerned municipal misbehavior. The Mayor and Chief Burgesses of the Borough of Plymouth had removed one of their members, James Bagg, from the office of Chief Burgess on the grounds of his misconduct. They made a number of allegations against him. They said that he had called the previous Mayor, Mr. Trelawney, a 'cozening knave' and 'an insolent fellow'. They said that he had threatened to crack the neck of the current Mayor, Thomas Fowens. Worst of all they said that:
In the presence and hearing of … Thomas Fowens, … and very many others of the burgesses and inhabitants of the borough … and in contempt and distain of the said Thomas Fowens, then mayor, turning the hinder part of his body in an inhuman and uncivil manner towards the aforesaid Thomas Fowens, scoffingly, contemptuously and uncivilly, with a loud voice, said to the aforesaid Thomas Fowens, these words following, that is to say, ('Come and kiss').
Mr Bagg commenced proceedings in the Court of Kings Bench challenging his removal from office by the Mayor and other Burgesses. The Court ordered the Mayor and the Burgesses to either restore Mr Bagg to office or to show cause why he was removed. An answer was given referring to Mr Bagg's very bad behavior. However, the Court was not satisfied that the reasons given in the return to the writ justified his removal. On the question of how and by whom and in what manner a citizen or burgess should be disenfranchised, Coke CJ said: … although they have lawful authority either by charter or prescription to remove any one from the freedom, and that they have just cause to remove him; yet it appears by the return, that they have proceeded against him without … hearing him answer to what was objected, or that he was not reasonably warned, such removal is void, and shall not bind the party.
Bagg's Case was an early judicial expression of the hearing rule, although by no means the first. It was probably most notable as one of the first occasions on which mandamus was used as a tool for judicial review of administrative action. In justifying the issue of the writ, Coke asserted the jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench in sweeping terms as:
not only to correct errors in judicial proceedings, but other errors, and misdemeanors [sic] extra-judicial, tending to the breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects, or to the raising of faction, controversy, debate, or to any manner of misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either public or private, can be done but that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due course of law
In 1723, the Court of King's Bench issued mandamus to the University of Cambridge requiring the restoration to one Dr Bentley of the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor and Doctor of Divinity of which he had been deprived by the University without a hearing. Dr Bentley had been served with a summons to appear before a University court in an action for debt. He said the process was illegal, that he would not obey it and that the Vice-Chancellor was not his judge. He was then accused of contempt and without further notice deprived of his degrees by the 'congregation' of the University. The judgment of Fortescue J in the case is often cited as an example of the way in which the idea of natural law informed the concept of natural justice.
Fortescue J said: The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence.
After Dr Bentley's Case the hearing rule was reinforced in 1799 by Lord Kenyon CJ in R v Gaskin. It was Lord Kenyon who apparently coined the Latin term 'audi alteram partem' to encapsulate the rule, of which he said: It is to be found at the head of our criminal law, that every man ought to have an opportunity of being heard before he is condemned. This is how principle of Audi Alterm Partem evolved in common law system.
2.2.2. Nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa or Rule against Bias:
The second aspect of procedural fairness, the rule against bias, surfaced in 1610 in Dr Bonham's Casewhere Chief Justice Coke went so far as to say that the Court could declare an Act of Parliament void if it made a man as judge in his own cause, or otherwise ‘against common right and reason’. This was one of his grounds for disallowing the claim of the College of Physicians to fine and imprison Doctor Bonham, a Doctor of Physics of Cambridge University, for practicing in the city of London without the license of College of Physicians. The statute under which the College acted provided that fines should go half to the King half to the College, so that the College had financial interest in its own judgment and was judge in its own cause.
The character of the rule against bias as a kind of natural or constitutional limit upon parliamentary power, was also asserted by Lord Chief Justice Hobart in 1614 in Day v Savadge when he said that a statute 'made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in itself, for jura naturæ sunt immutabilia the laws of nature are unchangeable, and they are leges legum laws that apply to law. After Savadge it was In City of London v. Wood, Chief Justice Holt reaffirmed the rule against bias as an expression of the natural law. By that time, the idea that a person could not be a judge in his own cause was well established. Natural law as an emanation of the divine had taken its place alongside the theories of Thomas Hobbes in which it was treated 'not as traditional right reason, but rather as a mode of reasoning about the liberty of individuals in the state of nature'.
In this case the city of London sued Thomas Wood to recover a penalty imposed upon him for refusing to accept nomination as a sheriff. Anyone who refused to accept such a nomination could be punished by a fine. The fine was four hundred pounds. To nominate unwilling but wealthy individuals to the office of sheriff was used in the City of London as a way of raising revenue from those who were prepared to pay rather than to serve. The City brought its action of debt against Mr Wood in the name of the Mayor and others and brought it in the Mayor's Court, which consisted formally of the Mayor and the Alderman. The judicial functions of the Court had for a long time been carried out by the Recorder. This did not save the proceedings from invalidity. The Mayor and the commonalty and the citizens could not sue in a court held before the Mayor and the Alderman.
In so holding, Chief Justice Holt expressed support for Dr Bonham's Case saying: … it is a very reasonable and true saying, that if an Act of Parliament should ordain that the same person should be party and Judge, or, which is the same thing, Judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible that one should be Judge and party, for the Judge is to determine between party and party, or between the Government and the party; and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, although it may do several things that look pretty odd; for it may discharge one from his allegiance to the Government he lives under, and restore him to the state of nature; but it cannot make one that lives under a Government Judge and party.
Further in Dimes v Grand Junction Canal in 1852. The House of Lords in that case set aside a decision involving a canal company in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, who had presided, was a shareholder. There was no suggestion that he was influenced by his pecuniary interest in the case. The appearance of bias sufficed. Lord Campbell, after stating that no-one could suppose that Lord Cottenham would be in the remotest degree influenced by his interest took the opportunity to deliver a stern warning to all lesser dispensers of justice: This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an influence.
2.2.2. (a) Principles of Natural Justice after Dimes Case:
De Smith is of the opinioned that, in 1850 it was said that “no proposition can be more clearly established than that a man can not incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has had fair opportunity of answering the case against him, unless indeed the legislature has expressly or impliedly given an authority to act without that necessary preliminary”.
After Dimes it was in Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works decided in 1863. It extended natural justice to decisions interfering with property rights. The Board of Works demolished a building where the builder had not complied with a statutory requirement of seven days notice before commencing construction. The demolition was begun without the builder being given the opportunity of explaining his failure. The decision of the Board was held void because of its failure to provide a hearing and its demolition a trespass. In the course of his judgment Byles J, in a frequently quoted passage, said: a long course of decisions, beginning with Dr Bentley's case, and ending with some very recent cases, establish that, although there are no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature.
In Wiseman v Borneman Lord Guest said: … the courts will imply into the statutory provision a rule that the principles of natural justice should be applied. This implication will be made upon the basis that Parliament is not to be presumed to take away parties' rights without giving them an opportunity of being heard in their interest.
It was in the 1960s in the United Kingdom that natural justice, as procedural fairness, was brought out into the full sunlight initially by the Privy Council in University of Ceylon v Fernando and thereafter by the House of Lords in 1963 in Ridge v Baldwin. The House of Lords in the later case repudiated the confining requirement that decision-makers had to be characterized as acting judicially before attracting the application of the rules of natural justice. It reinstated the approach to the requirements of natural justice taken in Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works.
After Ridge V. Baldwin time onwards, the language of 'fairness' in decision-making gained prominence. It was not long after Ridge v Baldwin that the High Court in Banks v Transport Regulation Board (Vic) issued certiorari to quash the revocation of a taxi license. It is a fundamental and well established principle, not only in public administration but also in the procedure of courts that the decision-maker should be free from bias so that fair and genuine consideration is given to arguments advanced by the parties. Natural Justice is the source from which procedural fairness flows and in Ireland, natural justice was adopted under the title of “constitutional justice” in the case of McDonald v. Bord na gcon
Now ‘natural justice’ is recognized as ‘the duty to act fairly’ procedural fairness, as we have seen, is no longer restricted by distinctions between “judicial” and “administrative” functions or between “rights” and “privileges” this heresy was scotched” in Ridge V. Baldwin, the term “natural justice” has largely been replaced by general duty to act fairly, which is a key element of procedural propriety. In this case it was stated that the duty to observe the rules of natural justice should be inferred from the nature of the power conferred upon the public authority. It has been suggested that whether the nature of the power requires such an inference to be drawn may be determined by considering the following three factors: first, the nature of complinant’s interest: secondly, the conditions under which the public authority is entitled to encroach on those interest: and thirdly, the severity of the sanction that can be imposed. These factors offer some guidance as to which interests should be protected by fair procedures, but leave great deal open to speculation.
2.3. International Conventions: a new dimension to Principles of Natural Justice
One of the object behind establishment of United Nation Organization is to secure respect to Human Rights within its member States, this objectives of UN compelled to enact several international convention on the Subject of Human Rights which consists ‘Principles of Natural Justice within their ambit. Especially Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, Geneva Convention on Refugees Right, 1951 and European Convention on Human Right, 1998 gave new meaning to principles of natural justice.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and Principles of Natural Justice: Preamble of the UDHR declares that Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common. This international convention sought to protect ‘inalienable rights’ of individual to achieve this object it calls member States to pledge themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
UDHR declares that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him. Article 10 within its ambit includes components of fair hearing and also rule against bias, independent and impartial tribunal to hear the party is fundamental requisite of Art. 10.
In the same manner, International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, 1966 U/Art 14, inter alia, Guarantees Under this Article we can find clear wordings requiring observance of Principles of Natural Justice, as ‘fair and public hearing by competent, independent and impartial tribunal’ is wider and clear than Art. 6 of UDHR.
Apart from above mentioned safeguard we also find provision relating to,
Art 10(3) Guarantees, right to be informed of the grounds of arrest, adequate time for preparation of case, right of speedy trial, right of legal assistance (including free legal aid), right of cross examination, and even right to have interpreter in case of language difficulty to the accused. This Convention recognizes very wide verity of natural rights, and consequentially it widened the scope of Natural Justice.
Another important international convention containing principle of Natural Rights into it is European Convention on Human Rights, 1998 which U/ Art 6 declares that,
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
Art. 6(1) provides the procedural fairness protection applies only to the determination of “civil rights or obligations” or of a criminal charge: moreover, to engage Art.6, there should be a dispute, although, generally, this requirement is not interpreted too restrictively. The result of the proceedings must be decisive of the “civil rights or obligation” the mere fact that an official investigation makes findings detrimental to the applicant, where it is not dispositive of civil right or obligation, will not bring the investigation within the scope of Art. 6.
Incorporation of Art.6 of the ECHR into English law proved to be an important stimulus to the evolution of procedural fairness. In summary, Art.6 requires a ‘fair and public hearing within a reasonable time’ by an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law” for the determination of individual’s “civil rights and obligations”. International convention covering principles of natural justice made the concept very wide, comprehensive and transcended nationality.
Apart from Art.6 it is Art.2 which requires effective investigating in breach right to life,
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Art.2 requires a state to conduct an adequate and effective investigation, wherever there is a breach of the right to life through the use of lethal force. A violation of Art.2 may arise from the absence of procedural safeguards even where the applicant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to conclude that the deceased was intentionally killed by the state. Thus lack of state protection, rather than just direct state involvement, will trigger the Art.2 procedural duty, and where authorities are informed of the death, this in itself can give rise to an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death. The fact that a security situation exists in the country will not relive the state of its obligation.
This research work suggests that the principles of natural justice were not new to India, though they were not systematized or expressly proclaimed in ancient past. It is evident that judicial dynamism both in India and elsewhere are the reason d'etre for the multidimensional growth of this concept. Lastly it is also evident that the International Conventions has had profound impact on the growth of Principles of Natural Justice.
*** Shivaraj S. H , K.L.E. Society’s Law College, Bangalore, Efirstname.lastname@example.org
*** Kavita S. B - Lecturer, K.L.E. Society’s Law College, Chikkodi, Eemail@example.com
# Union of India V. Tulsi Ram, AIR 1985 SC 1416
# (1963) 2 WLR 935.
# S.S.Dhawan, ‘The Indian Judicial System : A Historical Survey,’ http://www.allahabadhighcourt.in/event/TheIndianJudicialSystem_SSDhavan.pdf
# 1985, 55LLJ QB, 39, at,p. 45
# De Smith, 2 at p. 158.
# HH Marshall, Natural Justice (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, London, 1959) at 18-19, esp fn 58.
# JC Holt, Magna Carta (2nd ed), (Cambridge: University Press, 1992) at 461
# (1615) 11 Co Rep 95b [77 ER 1271 at 1275].
# http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj07oct10.pdf at, p. 4-5
# Ibid, at.p. 1277-1278
# R v Chancellor of the University of Cambridge (Dr Bentley's Case) (1723) 1 Str 557 at 567 [93
# ER 698 at 704].
# R v Chancellor of the University of Cambridge (Dr Bentley's Case) (1723) 1 Str 557 at 567 [93
# ER 698 at 704].
# Ibid at, p,8
# Wade and Forsyth, Administrative law, IX Edn,(2004) (Noida: Sourabh Printer Pvt. Ltd),p. 443
# Supra note.17
# Wade and Forsyth, Administrative law, IX Edn,(2004) (Noida: Sourabh Printer Pvt. Ltd), p. 443
# http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj07oct10.pdf, at, p. 11
# (1852) 3 HLC 759
# Ibid, at, p. no. 820.
# De Smith’s, Judicial Review, VI Soutth Asian Edn, (London: Sweet and Maxwell 2007), at, p.no.322
# I.P.Massey, Administrative Law, VI Edn, (2008) (Luknow: Eastern Book Company), p.no. 219
# Supra,19 at,p.no 335
# (1964)AC 40
# De Smith’s, Judicial Review, VI Soutth Asian Edn, (London: Sweet and Maxwell 2007), at, p.no.340-343
# Supra 26
#  I.R. 217.
# Supra 26
# Article 1
# Article 10.
# Art 10 (3)
# Moreira de Azevedo V. Portugal (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 721 at para. 66.
# De Smith’s, Judicial Review, VI Soutth Asian Edn, (London; Sweet and Maxwell 2007), at, p.no. 372.
# Ibid.at.p 344.
# Supra note 38.
# De Smith’s, Judicial Review, VI Soutth Asian Edn, (London; Sweet and Maxwell 2007), at, p.no. 376
The author can be reached at: Shivashk100@legalserviceindia.com