: March 06, 2012 |
: Criminal law
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The Inherent Powers Of The High Court
The essential object of criminal law is to protect society against criminals and law- breakers. For this purpose, the law holds out threats of punishments to prospective lawbreakers as well as attempts to make the actual offenders suffer the prescribed the punishment for their crimes. Therefore, criminal law, in its wider sense, consists of both the substantive criminal law as well as the procedural criminal law. Substantive criminal law defines offences and prescribes punishments for the same, while the procedural law is to administer the substantive law.
Our legal system’s law of crime is mainly contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which has come into force from April 1, 1974. It provides the machinery for the detection of crime, apprehension of suspected criminals, collection of evidence, determination of the guilt or innocence of the suspected person and the imposition of suitable punishment on the guilty person. In addition, this Code also deals with the prevention of offences (Sections 106- 124, 129- 132 and 144- 153), maintenance of wives, children and parents (Sections 125- 128) and public nuisances (Sections 133- 143).
The Code also controls and regulates the working of the machinery set up for the investigation and trial of offences. On the one hand it has to give adequately wide powers to make the investigation and adjudicatory processes strong, effective and efficient, and on the other hand, it has to take precautions against errors of judgement and human failures and to provide safeguards against probable abuse of powers by the police or judicial officers. This often involves a “nice balancing of conflicting considerations, a delicate weighing of opposing claims clamouring for recognition and the extremely difficult task of deciding which of them should predominate”.
The Code has obviously tried to make itself exhaustive and complete in every respect; and it has generally succeeded in this attempt. However, if the Court finds that the Code has not made specific provision to meet the exigencies of any situation, the court of law has inherent power to mould the procedure to enable it to pass such orders as the ends of justice may require.
It has however been declared by the Supreme Court that the subordinate courts do not have any inherent powers. The High Court has inherent powers and they have been given partial statutory recognition by enacting Section 482 of this Code.
Background of Section 482:-
The power to quash an FIR (First Information Report) is among the inherent powers of the High Courts of India. Courts possessed this power even before the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) was enacted. Added as Section 482 by an amendment in 1923, it is a reproduction of the section 561(A) of the 1898 code. Since high courts could not render justice even in cases in which the illegal was apparent, the section was created as a reminder to the courts that they exist to prevent injustice done by a subordinate court.
“Nothing in this code shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”
Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is the exception and not rule – Inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be exercised :-
1. To give effect to an order under the Code.
2. To prevent abuse of the process of Court.
3. To otherwise secure the ends of justice.
According to Sec 26 of CrPC 1973 Offences below the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter the CrPC) are divided into:
1. Offences under Indian Penal Code (IPC) (triable by HC Sessions Court and other court shown in the 1st Schedule to the CrPC)
2. Offences under any other law (empowers HC when no court is mentioned for any offence under any law other than IPC to attempt such offences)
S482 deals with Inherent powers of the Court. It is under the 37th Chapter of the Code titled Miscellaneous.
It comes into action when the court acts judicially and passes an order. If order is passed by Executive officer of State in administrative capacity it has no application. Therefore persons aggrieved by such order cannot arrive to HC to exercise its inherent power under this section. As the Inherent powers are vested in HC by law within meaning of Art 21 of Constitution consequently any order of HC in violation of any right under Art 21 is not ultra vires.
Eg. Cancelling of bail bond by HC thereby depriving a person’s personal liberty.
Purpose behind its incorporation:-
This section makes it clear that the provisions of the Code are as intended to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Courts. Obviously the inherent power can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the section. This inherent power cannot naturally be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code. It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. It is only if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provision of the Code that Section 482 can come into operation, subject further to the requirement that the exercise of such power must serve either of the three purposes mentioned in the said section. In prescribing rules of procedure legislature undoubtedly attempts to provide for all the cases that are likely to arise; but it is not possible that any legislative enactment dealing with the procedure, however carefully it may be drafted, would succeed in providing for all the cases that may possibly arise in the future.
Lacunae are sometimes discovered in procedural law and it is for the purpose of covering such lacunae and dealing with such cases where such lacunae are discovered that procedural law invariably recognises the existence of inherent powers in courts.
Here it is extremely important to be noticed that it is only the High Court whose inherent power has been recognised by Section 482, and even in regard to the High Court’s inherent power definite statutory safeguards have been laid down as to its exercise.
It is only where the High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code would be rendered ineffective or that the process of any court would be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured that the High Court can and must exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of this Code.
It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases which may possibly arise.
It has also been held that Section 482 cannot be invoked in non- criminal proceedings such as those under the Customs Act.
“Inherent jurisdiction”, “to prevent abuse of process”, “to secure the ends of justice” are terms incapable of definition or enumeration, and capable at the most of test, according to well established principles of criminal jurisprudence. “Process” is a general word meaning in effect anything done by the court. The framers of the Code could not have provided all the cases that should be included within the meaning of abuse of process of court. It is for the court to take decision in particular cases.
Conditions for Use of Inherent Power:-
There are several conditions laid down by various cases that indicate the circumstances under which this inherent power may be used. These conditions may be enumerated as follows:
1. The jurisdiction is completely discretionary. The High Court can refuse to use the power.
2. The jurisdiction is not limited to cases that are pending before the High Court. It can consider any case that comes to its notice (in appeal, revision or otherwise).
3. This power can be invoked only in an event when the aggrieved party is being unnecessarily harassed and has no other remedy open to it.
4. The High Court, under section 482, does not conduct a trial or appreciate evidence. The exercise of this power (although it has a wide scope) is limited to cases that compel it to intervene for preventing a palpable abuse of a legal process.
5. The High Court has the power to provide relief to the accused even if s/he has not filed a petition under section 482.
6. This power cannot be exercised if the trial is pending before the apex court and it has directed the session judge to issue a non- bailable warrant for arresting the petitioners.
7. The power under Section 482 is not intended to scuttle justice at the threshold but to secure justice.
8. This power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, but cannot be held that it should be exercised in the rarest of rare cases – The expression rarest of rare case may be exercised where death penalty is to be imposed under Section 302 of IPC but this expression cannot be extended to a petition under Section 482 CrPC.
9. So long as inherent power of Section 482 CrPC is in statute, the exercise of such power is not impermissible.
10. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
11. Where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger when prima facie it appears to Court that the trial would likely to be ended in acquittal.
12. In proceedings instituted on complaint, exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same.
13. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
14. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provisions, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice.
“To prevent abuse of process of any court”
Ordinarily HC will not interfere at an interlocutory stage of criminal proceeding in subordinate court but, HC is under an obligation to interfere if there is harassment of any person (Indian citizen) by illegal prosecution. It would also do so when there is any exceptional or extraordinary reasons for doing so.
Test to determine whether there has been an abuse of any court are:-
1. See whether a bare statement of facts of case would be sufficient to convince HC if it is a fit case for interference at intermediate stage.
2. Whether in the admitted circumstances it would be a mock trial if case is allowed to proceed.
Reasons HC can interfere:
1. Long lapse of time
2. Failure or impossibility to supply to accused, copies of police statements and other relevant documents- grounds for other relevant documents- grounds for HC to quash proceedings against accused.
“To secure ends of justice”
Eg. When a clear statutory provision of law is violated- HC can interfere. It is of vital importance in the administration of justice, and ensure proper freedom and independence of Judges must be maintained and allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly without undue influence on anyone, even SC. At the same time Judges and Magistrate should act with a certain amount of justice and fair play.
The SC in Madhu Limaye v. Maharashtra, has held the following principles would govern the exrcise of inherent jurisdiction of the HC:
1. Power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in code for redress of grievances of aggrieved party
2. It should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice
3. It should not be exercised against the express bar of the law engrafted in any other provision of the code.
It is neither feasible nor practicable to lay down exhaustively as to on what ground the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised. But some attempts have been made in that behalf in some of the decisions of this Court.
The inherent powers contemplated by Section 482 has to be used sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself.
The Supreme Court has reiterated the nature of its power thus:
“The powers conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have no limits but more the power more the cases and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code, it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles of Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to.”
The following cases have been stated by the Supreme Court, by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or inherent power under Section 482 can be exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process of any court or to secure justice:
1. Where the allegations in the FIR/complaint, even if they are taken at their face value do not prima facie constitute any offence against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the FIR or other materials do not constitute a cognizable offence justifying an investigation by the police under Section 156(1) of the code except under an Order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations in the FIR/complaint and the evidence collected thereon do not disclose the commission of any offence.
4. Where the allegations in the FIR or other materials do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute a non- cognizable offence to which no investigation is permitted by the police without Order of a Magistrate under Section 155(2).
5. Where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or statute concerned (under which the proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the code or in the statute concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide intention and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to private and personal vengeance.
The Courts have been following these in dealing with requests for quashing criminal proceedings. The following principles in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
1. That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code itself for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
2. That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
3. That it should to be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
In most of the cases decided during several decades the inherent power of the High Court has been invoked for the quashing of a criminal proceeding on one ground or the other.
In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court considered the circumstances in which the High Court can, by invoking its inherent powers, quash the criminal proceedings in a subordinate criminal court. The Supreme Court observed:
“It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the al1egations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not.”
The law stated above is not affected by Section 397(2) of the new Code of 1973. It still holds good in accordance with Section 482.
Circumstances may arise where failure to exercise the inherent powers in case of interlocutory orders may occasion great hardship. To inhibit or deny the High Court’s power to provide remedies on such occasion may cause injustice for the removal of which alone the Court exists. This position has made the Supreme Court to observe thus:
“. . . . though the revision before the High Court under sub- section (3) thereof, the inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483 the High Court is justified in interfering with the Orders leading to a mistake of justice.”
Relief under Section 482 is not barred by any limitation since the power is conferred to secure the ends of justice. Hence, the mere fact that revision petition was filed at a belated stage cannot provide legality to an order which is patently illegal or suffers from the abuse of process of Court.
The High Court can in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction expunge remarks made by it or by a lower court in respect of any conduct of a person or official if it be necessary to do so to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to securre the ends of justice; the jurisdiction is however of an exceptional nature and has to be exercised in exceptional cases only.
In considering the expunction of disparaging remarks against persons or authorities the High Court will take into account:
1. Whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;
2. Whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and
3. Whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.
The Supreme Court has clarified that Section 482 could be invoked to award cost. Its observations are instructive:
“ In the result we hold that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court has the power to pass “such orders” (not inconsistent with any provision of the Code) including the order for costs in appropriate cases – to give effect to any order passed under the Code, or to prevent the abuse of process of any court, or to secure the ends of justice. As stated above, this extraordinary power is to be used in extraordinary circumstances and in a judicious manner. Cost may be to meet the litigation expenses or can be exemplary to achieve the aforesaid purposes”.
It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature and should normally not depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.
It has been categorically declared by the Supreme Court that the subordinate Courts do not have inherent powers. It has at the same time, explained the vitality of High Court’s inherent powers while locating its own residuary powers in Article 136 of the Constitution. It observed:
“ . . . though there is no provision like Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code conferring express power on this court to quest or set aside any criminal proceedings pending before a court to prevent abuse of process of the court, but htis court has power to quash any such proceedings in exercise of its plenary and residuary power under Article 136 of the Constitution”.
High Court has no power to review own order its under Section 482 Cr.P.C.:-
(a) Court cannot alter or review its judgment or final order after it is signed except to correct clerical or arithmetical error.
(b) As soon as judgment is pronounced or order is made by a Court, it becomes functus officio (ceases to have control over the case) and has no power to review, override, alter or interfere with it.
(c) Power of review is not an inherent power and must be conferred on a Court by a specific or express provision to that effect. (1971) 3 SCC 844 relied.
In the case of D. Venkatasubramaniam and Others v. M. K. Mohan Krishnamachari and Another, the respondent lodged FIR against appellants alleging commission of offences under sections 406 and 420 of IPC. Even while investigation was in progress respondent filed petition under section 482 of CrPC. The high court directed the police to expedite and complete investigation. Hence the issue in the present appeal was whether it was open to the high court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC to interfere with statutory power of investigation by police and if such a power is available with the court, what are the parameters for its interference. The high court cannot direct investigating agency to investigate a case in accordance with its views as that would amount to unwarranted interference. In the present case, the high court, without recording any reason whatsoever, directed police that it is obligatory on their part to record statements from witnesses, arrest, and seizure of property and filing of charge sheet. The high court interfered with investigation of crime which is within the exclusive domain of police. It was held in the present case that without realising the consequences, the high court issued directions in a casual and mechanical manner without hearing appellants. The order of the high court was held to be an order passed overstepping the limits of judicial interference and hence null and void.
In M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd v. Special Judicial Magistrate, it was held that no doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial.
In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, an interlocutory order was passed by a Court subordinate to the High Court against which Revision Petition was filed. It was contended that sub-section (2) of Section 397 barred exercise of revisional powers “in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or in any other proceeding”. Since the order was interlocutory in nature, revision petition was not maintainable. This Court held that even where an order cannot be challenged in revision, inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised by the High Court in appropriate cases.
Supreme Court bench comprising Justices P Sathasivam and Anil R Dave said, ‘While exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. It was stated:
“It is true that court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, otherwise, it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.
At the same time Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its closure without full-fledged inquiry.”
Section 482 CrPC has a very wide scope and it’s really important for the courts to use it properly and wisely. Many a time it has been observed that when there is an issue of money for eg. Any money matter then the petitioner instead of filing a civil suit files an FIR against the other person just to harass him. In such cases it becomes very important for the High Courts to quash such complaints as it leads to the abuse of the process of the lower courts. This section would enable the courts for providing proper justice and also should be exercised to stop the public from filing fictitious complaints just to fulfil their personal grudges.
The best explanation of the view of the courts, in my opinion, has been given by Justice Dhingra.
This is what he says:
“While exercising powers under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. the Court has to keep in mind that it should not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. This is a function of the Trial Court. Though the judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment but the Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances in consideration before issuing process under Section 482 lest the Section becomes an instrument in the hands of accused persons to claim differential treatment only because the accused persons can spend money to approach higher forums. This Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death”.
# 37th Report, pg 1.
# Akhil Bandhu Rayv. Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 258; Krushna Mohan v. Sudhakar Das, AIR 1953 Ori 281; Nagen Kundu v. Emperor, ILR 61 Cal 498. Also see District and Sessions Judge, In re, 1986 Cri LJ 1966 (Ker).
# A.S. Gaurava v. S.N. Thakur, 1986 SCC (Cri) 249: (1986) 2 SCC 709.
# Talab Haji Hussein v. Madhukar Purushottam Maondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376: 1958 Cri LJ 701, 703- 704; see also Dhirender Kumar Banerjee v. State of Bihar, 2005 Cri LJ 4791 (Jhar); Vishal Paper tech India Ltd. v. State of A.P., 2005 Cri LJ 1838 (AP).
# See State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, 2006 2 SCC (Cri) 272; see also observations of Popular Muthiah’s Case, (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 245.
# P.O. Thomas v. Union of India, 1990 Cri LJ 1028 (Ker).
# Edeyillon Kunhambu Nair v. State of Kerela, 1978 Cri LJ 107, 109 (ker). Also see State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, 2006 2 SCC (Cri) 272; see also observations of Popular Muthiah’s Case, (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 245.
# AIR 1978 SC 47
# Talab Haji Hussein v. Madhukar Purushottam Maondkar, AIR 1958 SC 376: 1958 Cri LJ 701, 703- 704
# Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1400; see also Simrikhia v. Doley Mukherjee, (1990) 2 SCC 437.
# State of Harayana v. Bhajanlal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 at 470: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
# Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (cri) 10, 14; 1978 Cri LJ 165.
# 1960 Cri LJ 1239: AIR 1960 SC 866.
# Ibid., at pp. 1241- 1242. See also B.S. Josh v. State of Harayana, (2003) 4 SCC 675.
# Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (cri) 10, 14; 1978 Cri LJ 165.
# Biswasnath Agarwalla v. Sate, 1976 Cri LJ 1901, 1903 (Cal); Madhu Laimaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (cri) 10, 14; 1978 Cri LJ 165; Raj Kapoor v. Sate (del. Admn.), (1980) 1 SCC 43: 1980 SCC (Cri) 72.
# Krishnan v. Krisnaveni, 1997 SCC (cri) 544 at 552L1997) 4 SCC 241.
# Enforcement Directorate v. Ajay Bakliwal, 2003 Cri LJ 1813 (1816) (del).
# Sate of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 549, 558; Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1.
# Sate of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 549, 558; Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1.
# Ibid., at 3521.
# R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan, (1975) 2 SCC 446: 1975 SCC (cri) 654, 657- 658, 1975 Cri LJ 1545;  Sate of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, AIR 1964 SC 703: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 549, 558.
# A.S. Gauraya V. S.N. Thakur, (1986) 2 SCC 709; 1986 SCC (Cri) 249:1986 Cri LJ 1074; but see observations of the Supreme Court in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310 at 316. Also see CBI v. Ravi Shanker Srivastava, (2006) 7 SCC 188.
# Delhi Judicial Services Assn. v. State of Gujrat, (1991) 4 SCC 406.
# Ibid., at 461.
# Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar Jain , (SC)
# 1998 A.I.R. (SC) 128.
# (1977) 4 SCC 551
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| Posted by Tejesvi on January 24, 2015
A false 498A case has been files against me a year back, after which I have filed a divorce and the female also has filed a divorce in her home town. In such a case can we try to get any once cancelled, can we go for Quash while the divorce is still Pending.
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