Definition Of Trade Secret
Virtually any useful information can qualify as a trade secret. It need not rise to the dignity of an invention; a discovery is enough, even if it is only a relatively minor improvement on a process already known to the trade. And the law extends beyond technology to cover business information, such as customer lists, financial projections and marketing plans. The key to understanding the expansive nature of trade secret law is that it can protect any process or information that is both private and useful.That is the good news. The difficulty with defining trade secrets in the abstract is that there are so many ways to go about it.In large part, this is a reflection of the fact that the law of trade secrets, unlike the law of patents or copyright, is a creature of the common law rather than of statute. In trying to impose a moral solution on cases of apparent breach of confidence, judges have juggled competing policy interests while trying to draw a line of protection that would lead to the result that they believed was right.That is not as cynical a view as it might sound. It merely reflects the reality that the primary source of trade secret law-the opinions of judges in particular cases is grounded on very fact situations that sometimes do not easily or accurately suggest universal principles. In other words, the development of trade secret law has been a bit chaotic, and it is possible to draw definitions and rules from individual cases that might be misleading out of context. Having said that, we now have over one hundred years of these decisions to consider, and consensus on the most important aspects can be identified.
The most accepted definition are as follows:-
First, under the Restatement of Torts, §757 (1939), “a trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving material, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.”
Second, trade secrets are defined under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act:
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process that: (1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being easily ascertainable by proper means, by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Third, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILCS 1065/1 et seq. (West 1993), provides that trade secrets are “information, including but not limited to, technical or non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, that:
(a) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy or confidentiality.
Fourth, the New Restatement of the Law Third, Unfair Competition defines a trade secret in Section 39 as follows:
§ 39. Definition of Trade Secret. A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.
In addition, it is well established that “a trade secret can exist in a combination of characteristics and components, each process, design and operation of which, in unique combination, affords a competitive advantage and is a protectable secret.” Also, “a trade secret need not be essentially new, novel, or unique; .... The idea need not be complicated; it may be intrinsically simple and nevertheless qualify as a secret, unless it is common knowledge and, therefore, within the public domain.”
Outside the fuzzy line delineating protectable trade secrets are the three primary categories of unprotectable information: that which is generally known, i.e. not a secret at all; that which is readily ascertainable from proper sources; and that which constitutes an individual’s personal or professional skills. The trade secret area is divided into two parts; business information is the larger part because for most industries it represents the larger volume of protectable data. Finally, within technical information there is a subset of knowledge that can qualify for protection under the patent laws. This area is not drawn to scale, and should be much smaller than the constraints of readable fonts has have allowed. Moreover, even within that area one should also consider that only a fraction represents issued patents, since many owners of patentable inventions either neglect or choose not to seek patent protection. That said, the patent option is a very important one. A major limitation of trade secret law is that, unlike that of patents, it does not protect against independent discovery; in fact it is possible to find oneself restrained from using one’s own secret method or machine that someone else took the trouble to patent.
Trade Secret In India
With the liberalization of the Indian economy, it is increasingly believed that adequate protection of intellectual property is a necessary element in encouraging foreign investment. With a weak patent law, the protection of trade secrets assumes great importance. The development of the law based on cases brought before the court on a particular point has created a certain understanding of how information is classified and why and the circumstances in which it is protected. Information can be classified as being confidential or public. Confidential information can be further classified as being a trade, government (for example the Spy Catcher cases in England), or personal secret (as between a husband and wife), or as know-how depending upon the number and the class of people who have access to such information.
Thus, the formula of Angostura Bitters may be known only to the four people of the Siegert family, while drawings, designs, methods, and techniques relating to the manufacture of a product might be known to a larger section of persons although still confined to the management and employees of a single firm. The skill, experience, and knowledge of technical persons may extend beyond a single firm but may still be confined to a specific trade. Each of the aforesaid categories of information may be confidential, which in some cases may be a trade secret and in other cases may be protectable know-how.
In the Indian law, there is very little by way of definition of confidential information, trade secrets, and know-how. Some cases have confused these three while others have merely relied upon English decisions.
Trade secrets, such as chemical formulae, product specifications, manufacturing techniques, drawings, diagrams, etc., are that part of commercial information which is inaccessible to all except those who have gone through an elaborate process, the results of which can only be available to a person who goes through the same process. The information may comprise several items, retrieved from the general body of information available to all, but its uniqueness lies in the fact that those items have been collected as a separate and identifiable collection. Matters of public knowledge or things which are generally known in an industry cannot be secret, although there is no requirement of absolute secrecy. Relative secrecy, where information is known to more than one person or more than one company or to several employees of a company, may be good enough to classify the information as confidential. Thus, apart from the proprietor of a business, the information may be shared with a team of employees,
subcontractors, and licensees, all of whom are pledged to secrecy. Therefore, to say that information is “public” does not have the same strict meaning as it would have under the patent law, where disclosure to even a single person may make the information “public.” Information which becomes completely disclosed from the goods cannot be secret. But one major limitation is that if a person gains knowledge of the trade secret independently, as by the independent development of a chemical formula, the owner of a trade secret has no remedy.
The leading Indian case Konrad Wiedemann GmbH v. Standard Castings Pvt. Ltd  relied heavily on Lord Green’s observations in the Saltman case. Lord Green stated:
The information to be confidential must, I apprehend, apart from contract, have the necessary quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be something which is public property and public knowledge. On the other hand it is perfectly possible to have a confidential document, be it a formula, a plan, a sketch or something of that kind, which is the result of work done by the maker upon materials which may be available for the use of anybody; but what makes it confidential is the fact that the maker of the document has used his brain and thus produced a result which can only be produced by somebody who goes through the same process.
In Suhner v. Transradio Ltd., Plowman, J. confirmed that the confidential nature of a document does not depend upon whether the information which it contains is available elsewhere but instead whether it contains useful information compiled by the plaintiff for a particular purpose, and, if it does, has been handed over to the defendant for a particular purpose. If these criteria are met, the document is confidential and the defendant is not entitled to use it for any other purpose.
The Delhi High Court, in Burlington Home Shopping Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajnish Chibber declared that a computer database consisting of a compilation of clients and their addresses was to be protected as a literary work under the law of copyright. The Plaintiff, a mail order company, had compiled a list of clients and customers over a three-year period, expending considerable time and money to do so. The Defendant, an ex-employee, obtained a copy of the database and was using it to contact plaintiffs customers and establish a relationship with them. The High Court held that the database could be protected as a literary work despite the argument that no skill was involved in creating it. The Court thus recognized the “sweat of the brow” theory as a valid reason to protect the database under the copyright law. The High Court also found that defendant had misappropriated plaintiff’s trade secrets.
More recently in Emergent Genetics v. Shailendra Shivam and Ors; Suit No. 50 of 2004 before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi the defendants were a group of ex-employees who allegedly stole germ plasm from the Plaintiff and came out with a new cotton hybrid variety with the same genotypic features as the one developed by the Plaintiff. Relying upon the principle of breach of confidentiality the court restrained the defendant from marketing and selling the said cotton hybrid seeds. The case is still pending.
In the case of Krishan Murugai v. Superintendence Co. of India Pvt. Ltd. case, in which the plaintiff carried on the business of inspecting merchandise to assess quality. The plaintiff developed its own techniques for quality testing and control and claimed that such techniques, as well as its clientele, were its trade secrets. The defendant was employed as a manager under a contract which stipulated that he would not join or run a competitive business for two years in the vicinity of his employment by the plaintiff. It was further stipulated that he would not reveal the secrets of the plaintiff to other parties. After termination of his service, the defendant started a business identical to the plaintiffs under a similar name. He joined with the plaintiff’s competitors, solicited the plaintiff’s clientele, and employed the same techniques learned during his employment with the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought a suit for an injunction entirely based upon the employment contract. The defendant alleged that the contract, being in restraint of trade, was void by virtue of Section 27 of the Contract Act. The court held:
1. Under the old Contract Act (i.e., prior to 1932), a reasonable restraint of trade was valid but the amended Section 27 of the Act provides for otherwise. It only provides for one exception, namely, the seller of goodwill of a business may agree to a reasonable restriction of his trade. There is no exception in the case of a master and servant relationship.
2. A restraint to operate a competitive business during employment is valid but if the restraint operates after the expiry of employment, it is illegal and void.
This case struck a distinction between a contract of service and a contract for the sale of business and clearly held that English law, inasmuch as it is inconsistent with the absolute terms of Section 27, is irrelevant. It went on, however, to analyze the situation assuming the principles of English law to be applicable. On the facts, the court held that the defendant was not doing any technical work, had no scientific background nor any specialized training and, in the circumstances, it could not be said that this was a case relating to trade secrets. As regards the customers list, the court held that this can only be protected if the defendant was shown to exercise some influence over the employer’s customers. Under the circumstances, the injunction was denied.
This case relied upon the Niranjan Shankar Golakari case. Commenting upon the above Supreme Court decision, the court held:
The injunction operating after the period of service was confined to the divulgence of trade secrets only. In the present case, no such trade secrets have been shown to be imparted to the defendant.
The court further held that “if any secrets as having been passed on to the defendant had been pleaded by the plaintiff and the facts pleaded could have shown that there were trade secrets, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a temporary injunction against the defendants ordering them not to divulge these trade secrets.”
This case went up on appeal to the Supreme Court. The majority of the Court, comprising Justice B.D. Tulzapurkar and Justice N.L. Untwalia, stated that the appeal raised two substantial questions, namely:
(1) whether a post-service restrictive covenant in restraint of trade as contained in clause (10) of the service agreement between the parties, is void under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act; and
(2) whether the said restrictive covenant, assuming it to be valid, is on its term enforceable at the instance of the appellant company against the respondent.
On the first question, they noticed the respective arguments of counsels, but, in the end, decided the appeal in favor of the defendant on the second question, stating that they did not propose to discuss or decide whether a post-service restrictive covenant in restraint of trade can ever be reasonable or must necessarily be void. However, Justice A.P. Sen in his separate opinion, held that under Section 27 a restrictive covenant extending beyond the termination of the service is void.
In Shree Gopal Paper Mills v. SKG Malhotra, A.N. Ray, J., noticed a distinction between cases of master and servant agreements on the one hand and cases relating to the sale of business on the other. Judge Ray stated that there is obviously more freedom of contract between buyer and seller than between master and servant, on account of which restraints are imposed more readily in the case of sale of goodwill than between master and servant. In this case, a suit for injunction was filed by the plaintiff to restrain the defendant, during the continuance of the agreement of employment, from giving his services or advice to any person other than the plaintiff or from competing with the plaintiff.The plaintiff was engaged in the manufacture of paper and trained graduates in this line on their agreeing to serve the plaintiff for a period of 20 years.
The court cited with approval Lord Parker’s dictum in Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby to the following effect:
The reason, and the only reason, for upholding such a restraint on the part of an employee is that the employer has some proprietary right whether in the nature of trade connection or in the nature of trade secrets, for the protection of which such a restraint is—having regard to the duties of the employee—reasonably necessary. Such a restraint has, so far as I know, never been upheld if directed only to the prevention of competition or against the use of a personal skill and knowledge acquired by the employee in his employer’s business.The plaintiff contended that the agreement was necessary to provide for unimpaired service of employees and stability. The court held that the restrictive covenant was too wide in terms and was unreasonable and was not meant for the protection of any trade secret or confidential information or to prevent employment with any rival firm. The plaintiff had no proprietary interest in the bare service of an employee and the negative covenant was not enforceable.The Supreme Court in the Niranjan Shankar Golakari case distinguished the above decision by saying that in that case the contract was clearly one sided and for a period as long as 20 years, giving the employer an arbitrary power to terminate without notice and the absolute discretion to decide whether the employee’s duties were unsatisfactory.
In V.N. Deshpande v. Arvind Mills Co. Ltd., the appellant agreed to serve in the exclusive employment of the respondent company for a period of three years and during the said term not to take the employment of anyone else as a weaving master in any part of India. After one year, the appellant left the company and joined Rohit Mills as a weaving master. In a suit for injunction, the court restrained the appellant from serving elsewhere in breach of the negative covenant contained in the agreement and held that the agreement was not unreasonably wide or in restraint of trade and was hence enforceable. The court held that an agreement of service containing a negative covenant preventing an employee from working elsewhere during the term covered by the agreement was recognized in India. The question whether a particular agreement was unreasonably wide had to be decided by the nature of the agreement, the qualifications of the employee, and the service he had to render along with the places where the employee could get alternative service of the same nature. Having regard to the fact that the defendant was a technical employee and it was difficult in the days of war to secure the services of technical men, it was a fit case for granting an injunction.
Their Lordship cited with approval the observations of Lord Shaw in Herbert Morris v. Saxelby.
Trade secrets, the names of customers, all such things which in sound philosophical language are denominated objective knowledge, these may not be given away by a servant; they are his master’s property, and there is no rule of public interest which prevents a transfer of them against the master’s will being restrained. On the other hand, a man’s aptitudes, his skill, his dexterity, his manual or mental ability, all those things which in sound philosophical language are not objective but subjective, they may and they ought not to be relinquished by a servant; they are not his master’s property; they are his own property; they are himself.
In Taprogge GmbH v. IAEC India Ltd., the plaintiff, a German company, entered into an agency contract with an Indian company, which was to sell its goods in India. There was a negative covenant restraining the Indian company from selling competing products for a period of five years after the termination of the contract. In a suit for an injunction, the Bombay High Court, relying upon the Kirshan Murugai case, held that since the negative covenant operated after the termination of the contract, it was void. The court further held that there was no conflict between the Niranjan Shankar Golikari case and the Krishan Murugai case since one (the Golikari case) related to negative covenants applicable during the term of employment (or contract, as the case may be), while the other related to a negative covenant operating after the termination of the employment (or contract). It may be noted that in this case the German company did not bring an action for breach of confidentiality relating to trade secrets or upon any specific intellectual property right. The action was confined to the enforcement of a contractual obligation.
The leading case on Section 27 of the Contract Act, 1872 is the above-mentioned Supreme Court decision of Niranjan Shankar Golakari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. In this case, the respondent company manufactured tyre cord yarn under technical collaboration with a Dutch and a German company. In the collaboration agreement, the respondent was obliged to keep secret, until the termination of the agreement and during three years thereafter, all know-how, technical information, knowledge, experience, data and documents passed on by the foreign companies and further was obliged to enter into secrecy arrangements with its employees. The appellant was employed as a shift supervisor under a contract for five years. The agreement stipulated that the employee would not engage in a competitive business and shall keep confidential all information, documents etc., that might come to his knowledge. It further stipulated that if the employee left or resigned before the expiry of the said period of five years, he shall not directly or indirectly engage in a competitive business. The appellant received special training, during which he acquired knowledge of the technical processes and the machinery developed by the collaborators and other information, which was to be kept secret. After a year and a half, the appellant joined a competitor company for a higher salary. The respondent filed a suit for injunction restraining the appellant from serving in any capacity whatsoever or being associated with any person, firm or company including the said competitor till the end of the said term of five years. An injunction was also sought restraining the appellant from divulging the trade secrets and know-how, which had come to his knowledge. The appellant contended that the terms of his employment agreement were in restraint of trade and hence invalid.
The trial court granted an injunction restraining the appellant from serving as a shift supervisor in a concern manufacturing tyre cord yarn. The injunction was confined to the period of the agreement. The High Court upheld the injunction on the ground that the restrictions imposed were not blanket but were reasonable and necessary to protect the interest of the respondent particularly as it had spent considerable amounts in training and in acquiring secrets which were divulged to the employee, and the foreign collaborators had agreed to disclose their specialized processes only on the taking of the corresponding secrecy undertakings from the employees of the respondent. Further, the agreement did not prohibit the appellant from seeking the same employment from any other manufacturer after the contractual period was over. There was no indication that if the appellant was prevented from being employed, he would be forced to idleness or that such a restraint would compel him to go back to the respondent company.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court summarized the law as follows:
1) It is a general principle of the common law that a person is entitled to exercise his lawful trade or calling as and when he wills and the law has always regarded zealously any interference with trade even at the risk of interference with freedom of contract.
2) The court takes a far stricter view of the covenants between master and servant than it does of similar covenants between vendor and purchaser or any partnership agreements.
3) An employer is not entitled to protect himself against competition on the part of an employee after the employment has ceased but a purchaser of a business is entitled to protect himself against competition per se on the part of the vendor.
4) The court has made a distinction between restraints applicable during the term of the employment and those that apply after its cessation.
5) The rule is that restraints, whether general or partial, may be good if they are reasonable. A restraint upon freedom of contract must be shown to be reasonably necessary for the purpose of freedom of trade.
6) A person may be restrained from carrying on his trade by reason of an agreement voluntarily entered into by him with that object. This is founded on the public policy principle that men of full age and understanding require the utmost freedom of contract and the further public policy that an employer must have an unrestricted choice of able assistants and the opportunity to instruct them in his trade and secrets without fear of their becoming his competitors.
7) The onus is upon the party supporting the contract to show that the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect his interests. Once this is discharged, the onus of showing that the restraint is nevertheless injurious to the public, is upon the party attacking the contract.
In this case, the trial court had granted a injunction, even after the period of employment, restraining the employee from divulging any of the trade secrets, processes, or information relating to the manufacture of tyre cord yarn by continuous spinning process obtained by him in the course of and as a result of his employment with the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court upheld this part of the injunction.This distinction between pre- and post-service restraints is also illustrated by the case of Brahmaputra Tea Company v. Scarth , in which that part of the agreement that restrained the covenant from competing after the term of his engagement was over with his former employer, was held to be unenforceable but the condition by which he bound himself during the term of his agreement was held enforceable.
As stated above, in the Niranjan Golikari case, the Supreme Court held that the considerations against restrictive covenants are different in cases where the restriction is to apply after the termination of the contract than in those cases where it is to operate during the period of the contract. Negative covenants operative during the period of contract of employment when the employee is bound to serve his employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint of trade and therefore do not fall under Section 27 of the Contract Act unless the contract, as in the Shree Gopal Paper Mills case, cited above, is excessively harsh, unreasonable, one-sided, or unconscionable.
This principle, which was hitherto applicable only to contracts of employment, was held to apply to other types of contracts as well by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Others v. Coca Cola Co. & Others. In this case the court was called upon to determine the validity of a contract between the Gujarat Bottling Company (hereinafter GBC) and Coca Cola pursuant to which Coca Cola authorized GBC to bottle, sell, and distribute beverages.
Paragraph 14 of the contract restrained GBC from bottling, selling, or distributing any other brand of beverage during the term of the contract.The Court interpreted the contract as being a franchise contract and determined that the restriction was designed to facilitate the distribution of Coca Cola’s products. As the restriction applied during the duration of the contract it was held not to be in restraint of trade. Post-contract restraints are another matter and will not be enforced absent very extenuating circumstances.
The Law Commission of India in its 13th report recommended that Section 27 of the Contract Act be amended. It was noticed that the section does not follow the English common law and invalidates many agreements which are allowed by that law. In view of the growth in India’s trade, a more liberal approach should be adopted by encouraging reasonable restraints.
As regards the duties of business partners, Section 54 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 provides:
Partners may, upon or in anticipation of the dissolution of the firm, make an agreement that some or all of them will not carry on a business similar to that of the firm within a specified period or within specified local limits; and notwithstanding anything contained in Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972, such agreement shall be valid if the restrictions imposed are reasonable.
 Even the widely quoted Restatement of Torts acknowledged that [a]n exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) theextent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) #the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. Restatement of Torts§ 757, comment b (1939).
 See, e.g.:
Ninth Circuit: Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 634, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (At the most fundamental level, [the] tension [inherent in trade secret law] is between society's interest in promoting development of economically productive new ideas by providing access to and rewards (profits) to those who generate and implement such ideas, on the one hand, and, on the other, society's interest in not imposing development-retarding, monopolistic, or arbitrary constraints on use of identical ideas by persons who come to them free of the taint of stealing.).
Illinois: ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, 49 Ill.2d 88, 93-94, 273 N.E.2d 393 (1971) (Conflicting social and economic policy considerations are present in each trade secret case. A business which may invest substantial time, money and manpower to develop secret advantages over its competitors, must be afforded protection against the wrongful appropriation of confidential information by a prior employee, who was in a position of confidence and trust. At the same time, the right of an individual to follow and pursue the particular occupation for which he is best trained is a most fundamental right. Our society is extremely mobile and our free economy is based upon competition. One who has worked in a particular field cannot be compelled to erase from his mind all of the general skills, knowledge and expertise acquired through his experience. These skills are valuable to such employee in the market place for his services. Restraints cannot be lightly placed upon his right to compete in the area of his greatest worth.).
 See ILG Industries, Inc. v. Scott, supra N. 2, 49 Ill.2d at 92: A definition of the possible objects of trade secrecy is undoubtedly subject to variations and change as the facts of any particular case might dictate. Generally, a trade secret is described as a plan or process, tool, mechanism, compound, or informational data utilized by a person in his business operations and known only to him and such limited other persons to whom it may be necessary to confide it. * The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is copyrighted by the American Law Institute. Material thereform is reprinted with permission. #
 Pravin Anand, Terrence F. MacLaren, Trade Secrets throughout the World Database updated December 2005, 2 Trade Secrets throughout the World § 19:9.This chapter in this module has been taken from this article for completely educational purpose. This has not been used for any commercial purpose. So this use is not in violation of any copyright law existing in India.
 Konrad Wiedemann GmbH v. Standard Castings Pvt. Ltd.,  (10) IPLR 243.
 Saltman Eng'g Co. Ltd. v. Campbell Eng'g Co. Ltd.,  65 RPC 203.
 Suhner v. Transradio Ltd.,  RPC 329.
 Burlington Home Shopping Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajnish Chibber, 1995 PTC (15) 278.
 Krishan Murugai v. Superintendence Co. of India Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1979 Delhi 232.
 Niranjan Golakari v. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1098.
 Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Krishan Murugai, AIR 1980 SC 1717.
 Shree Gopal Paper Mills v. SKG Malhotra, AIR 1962 Calcutta 61.
 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co.,  AC 535.
 Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby,  1 AC 688.
 V.N. Deshpande v. Arvind Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1946 Bombay 423.
 Herbert Morris Ltd. v. Saxelby,  1 AC 688.
 Taprogge GmbH v. IAEC India Ltd., AIR 1988 Bombay 1957.
 Niranjan Golakari v. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1098.
 Brahmaputra Tea Co. v. Scarth,  ILR II Cal. 545.
 Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. & Others v. Coca Cola Co. & Others,  IPLR 210.
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