Re: Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India
the framers of the Indian Constitution decided to declare that the Fundamental Rights conferred on the citizens would have application even outside India. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not binding as law but was only a pious hope for achieving a common standard for all peoples and all nations. Article 13 of the Declaration which is material for our discussion runs as follows : Paragraph 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence with in the borders of each state. Paragraph 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Paragraph 1 restricts the right of movement and residence specifically within the borders of the country. The second, paragraph aims at securing the right to leave any country including his own and to return to his country. The Declaration at that stage did not have any idea of conferring on the citizens of any country right of movement beyond borders of the State or to freedom of speech or right to assemble outside the country of origin. Even in the American Constitution there is no mention of right to freedom of speech or expression as being available outside America. Regarding the right of movement within the borders of the State it is not mentioned as one of the freedoms guaranteed in the American Constitution but everyone in the country takes it for granted that one can roam at will throughout the United States.
The right of a citizen to leave any country and to return to his country is recognised in the United States. While there is no restriction on the citizen to return to his own country the Government of the United States does place certain restrictions for leaving the country, such as obtaining of the passports etc. Even the right to travel outside the United States is not unrestricted. A passport is a request by the Government which grants it to a foreign Government that the bearer of the passport may pass safely and freely. The passport is considered as a licence for leaving a country and an exit permit rather than a letter of introduction. Even in America the State Department when it issues a passport specifies that they are not valid for travel to countries in-which the United States have no diplomatic representation as the position of the Government is that it will not facilitate overseas travel where it is unable to afford any protection to the traveller. The American public particularly the news reporters are claiming that they should be allowed to travel wherever they wish if need be without their Government's assurance to protection. 'The right of the American citizen to travel abroad as narrated above shows that even the right to travel outside the country is not unfettered.
In vain one looks to the American law to find whether the citizens are granted any right of freedom of speech and expression beyond the territory of the United States. The First Amendment provides for freedom of speech and press along with freedom of religion. Liberty of speech and liberty of press are substantially identical. They are freedom to utter words orally and freedom to write, print and circulate words. But this freedom of expression would be meaningless if people were not permitted to gather in groups to discuss mutual
problems and communicate their feelings and opinions to governmental officers. The First Amendment therefore provides that the people have the right to assemble peaceably and petition the government for redress of grievances. The- petition for redress can only be confined to the United States of America. In a recent address on Human Rights Warren Christopher, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State reproduced in Shan, October 1977, stated before the American Bar Association in Chicago that the promotion of human rights has become a fundamental tenet of the foreign policy of the Carter Administration. In explaining the conception of human rights and its practice in America the Deputy Secretary stated that the efforts should be directed to the most fundamental and important human rights all of which are internationally recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the United Nations approved in 1948. While emphasing the three categories of human rights (1) the right to be free from the governmental violation of the integrity of the person; (2)- the right to fulfilment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and education, and (3) the right to enjoy civil and political liberties, he stated that the freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly, of speech, of the press, freedom of movement within the outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government, were liberties which American enjoy so fully, and too often take for granted, are under assault in many places. It may be noted that while freedom of movement is referred to as both within and outside one's own country the other rights such as freedom thought, of religion, of assembly of speech, of press, are not stated to be available outside one's own country. It is thus seen that except the right to movement outside one's own country other rights are not available extra-territorially even in America.
The fundamental rights, under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution are subject to the restrictions that may be placed under Art. 19(2) to (6) of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights are not absolute but are subject to reasonable restrictions Provided for in the Constitution itself. The restrictions imposed are to be by operation of any existing law or making of a law by the Legislature imposing reasonable restrictions. The scheme of the Article, thus it while conferring Fundamental Rights on the citizens is to see that such exercise does not affect the rights of other persons or affect the society in general. The law made under Art. 19(2) to (6), impose restrictions on the exercise of right of freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably without arms etc. The restrictions thus imposed, normally would apply only within the territory of India unless the legislation expressly or by necessary implication provides for extra-territorial operation. In the Penal Code, under sections 3 and 4, the Act is made specifically applicable to crimes that are committed outside India by citizen of India. Neither in Art. 19 of the Constitution nor in any of the enactments restricting the rights under Art. 19(2) is there any provision expressly or by necessary implication providing for extra-territorial application. A citizen cannot enforce his Fundamental Rights outside the territory of India even if it is taken that such rights are available outside the country. 747
In the view that a citizen is not entitled to the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Art. 19 outside the territorial limits of India,- the contention of the learned counsel for the petition that by denying him the passport to travel outside India, his Fundamental Rights like freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peaceably, to practise profession or to carry on occupation, trade or business are infringed, cannot be accepted. The passport of the petitioner was impounded on the ground that her presence in connection with the Inquiry Commission may be necessary and in the interest of public it was necessary to do so. The impugned order does not place any restrictions on the petitioner while she is away from India. Hence the question whether the State could impose such restraint does not arise in this case. As the contention was that by impounding the, passport the petitioner's fundamental right of freedom of speech etc. outside the country was infringed, it became necessary to consider whether the citizen had any such right.
It was strenuously contended that the Legislature by involving powers under Art. 21 cannot deprive the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Art. 19 at any rate within the territory of India. It win now be considered whether an Act passed under Art. 21 should also satisfy the requirements of Art. 19.
The submission was that Art. 19 applies to laws made under Articles 20, 21 and 22 and the citizen is entitled to challenge the validity of an Act made under Art. 21 on the ground that it affects the rights secured to him under cl. (1) of Art. 19. Article 20(1) provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. Article 22 deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases, that is, in respect of preventive detention. It has been decided by this Court in Gopalan's(1) case; that in the case of punitive detention for offences under the Penal Code, it cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes the right specified under Art. 19(a) to (e) and (g) of the Constitution of India. Kania C.J. held : "If there is a legislation directly attempting to control a citizen's freedom of speech or expression, or his right to assemble peaceably and without arms etc.; the question whether that, legislation is saved by the relevant saving clause of Art. 19 will arise. If, however, the, legisation is not directly in respect of any of these subjects, but as a result of the operation of other legislation, for instance, for punitive or preventive detention, his right under any of these sub- clauses is abridged the question of the application of Article 19 does not arise."
(1)  S.C.R. 88.
Fazal Ali J., though he dissented from the majority view regarding the application of Article 19 to punitive detention observed follows
"The Indian Penal Code does not primarily or .... necessarily impose restrictions on the freedom of movement and it is not correct to say that it is a law imposing restrictions on the right to move freely. Its primary object is to punish crime and not to restrict movement...... But if it (the Punishment) consists in imprisonment there is a restriction on movement. This restraint is imposed not under a law imposing restrictions on movement but under a law defining crime and making it punishable. The punishment is correlated directly With the violation of some other person's right and not with the right of movement possessed by the offender himself. In my opinion, therefore, the Indian Penal Code does not come within the ambit of the words 'law' imposing restrictions on the right to move freely."
The learned Judge, Justice Fazal Ali, took a different view regarding preventive detention on the basis that it did not admit of a trial but the order of detention rested on an apprehended and not actual danger. Regarding punitive detention, the decision of a Bench of five Judges in H. Saha v. State of West Bengal,(1) expressed the same view. Chief Justice Ray observed :
"It is not possible to think that a person who is detained will yet be free to move or assemble or form association or unions or have the right to reside in any part of India or have the freedom of speech or expression. Suppose, a person is prosecuted of an offence of cheating and convicted after trial, it is not open to him to say that the imprisonment should be tested with reference to Art. 19 for its reasonableness. A law which attracts Article 19, therefore, must be such as is capable of being tested to be reasonable under clauses (2) to (5) of Article 19."
In the case of punitive detention, it will be open to the accused to raise all defences that are open to him in law, such as that there have been no violation of any law in force. Regarding punitive detention this Court in Saha case has held that as the Constitution has conferred rights under Art. 19 and also adopted the preventive detention to prevent the greater evil by imperilling security, the safety of the State and the welfare of the nation, it is not possible to think that a person who is detained will yet be free to move or assemble or form associations etc.
Applying the same reasoning, it is contended on behalf of the state that when a person is deprived of his life or personal liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law, he cannot invoke to his aid any of the rights guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. Whether this contention could be accepted (1)  1 S.C.R. 778.
or not will be examined with reference to the provisions of the Constitution and the decisions rendered by this Court. Article 19 to 22 appear under the title "Right to freedom". Article 19 confers freedoms on the citizens whereas Aft. 20 to 22 are not limited to citizens but apply to all persons. Article 19 does not deal with the right to life which is dealt with under Art. 21. While Art. 19 provides for freedoms-which a citizen is entitled to, Articles 20 to 22 restrain the State from doing certain things. Though the right to life and personal liberty is not dealt with under Art. 19, as it is mentioned in Art. 21 though in a negative form, the right to life and personal liberty is secured and the State can deprive it only according to the procedure established by law. While the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) are subject to restrictions that may be placed by Articles 19 (2) to (6), the right not to be deprived of life and personal liberty is subject to its deprivation by pro- cedure established by law. The scope of the words "personal liberty" was considered by Mukherjea, J. in Gopalan's case (supra.) The learned Judge observed : "Article 19 gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restrictions that may be placed upon them by law so that they may not conflict with the public welfare or general morality. On the other hand, Articles 20, 21 and 22 are primarily concerned with penal enactments or other law under which personal safety or liberty of persons would be taken away in the interest of society and the set down the limits within which the State control should be exercised...... the right to the safety of one's life and limbs' and to enjoyment of personal liberty, in the sense of freedom from physical re-strain and coercion of any sort, are the inherent birth right-. of a man. The essence of these rights consists in restraining others from interfering with them and hence they cannot be described in terms of "freedom" to do particular things. . . ." The words "personal liberty" take their colour from the words "deprivation of rifle'. It means liberty of the person, that is freedom from personal restraint. Article 21 is one of the Articles along with Articles 20 and 22 which deal with restraint on the person. According to Dicey : "The right to personal liberty as understood in England means in substance a person's right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest or other physical coercion in any manner that does not admit of legal justification."
(Dicey's Laws of Constitution 10th Edn. page 207)
In the debates relating to the drafting of the Constitution, in Art. 15 the word that was used was "liberty". The framers of the Constitution thought that the word "liberty" should be qualified by the insertion of the word "personal" before it for otherwise it might be construed very widely so as to include even the freedoms already dealt with under Art. 19, 30 (which corresponds to Art. 19 in the Constitution). The word "personal liberty" in Article 21 is, therefore, confined to freedom from restraint of person and is different from other rights enumerated in Article 19 of the Constitution.
It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that after the decision of the Bank Nationalisation case and Bennet Colomon's case the view taken earlier by the Supreme Court that in construing whether the deprivation of personal liberty is valid or not the enquiry should only be confined to the validity of the procedure prescribed without any reference to the rights conferred under Art. 19(1) is no longer good law. The decisions bearing on this question may now be examined.
In Gopalan's case it was held that Art. 19 dealt with the rights of the citizens when he was free, and did not apply to a person who had ceased to be free and had been either under punitive or preventive legislation. It was further held that Art. 19 only applied where a legislation directly hit the rights enumerated in the Article and not where the loss of rights mentioned in the Article was a result of the operation of legislation relating to punitive or preventive detention. It was also stated by Justice Mukherjea that a law depriving the personal liberty must be a valid law which the legislature is competent to enact within the limits of the powers assigned to it and which does not transgress any of the Fundamental Rights the Constitution lays dawn. The,, learned Judge explained that the reasonableness of a law coming under Art. 21 could not be questioned with reference to anything in Art. 19 though a law made under Art. 21 must conform to the requirements of Articles 14 and 20. It cannot be said that it should conform to the requirements of Article 19. The, view, thus expressed in Gopalan's case, was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi(1) where it was held :
"Although personal liberty has a content sufficiently comprehensive to include the freedoms enumerated in Art. 19(1), and its deprivation would result in the extinction of those freedoms, the Constitution has treated these civil liberties as distinct from fundamental rights and made separate provisions in Art. 19 and Arts. 21 and 22 as to the limitations and conditions subject to which alone they could be taken away or abridged ... The interpretation of these Articles and their correlation was elaborately dealt with by the full court in Gopalan's case.
Approving the interpretation of the Articles in Gopalan's case it was held that law which authorises deprivation of personal liberty did not fall within the purview of Art. 19 and its validity was not to be judged by the criteria indicated in that Article but depended on its compliance with the requirements of Arts. 21 to 22.
This view was again affirmed in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh,(2) where Das, J. in approving the law laid down in Gopalan's case observed as follows
"As I explained in Gopalan's case and again in Chiranjit LaPs case 1950 SCR 869 our Constitution protects the freedom of the citizen by article 19 (1) (a) to
(1)  S.C.R. 451
(2)  S.C.R 889.
(e) and (g) but empowers the State, even while those freedoms last, to impose reasonable restrictions on them in the interest of the State or of public order or morality or of the general public as mentioned in clauses (2) to (6). Further, the moment even this regulated freedom of the individual becomes incompatible with and threatens the freedom of the community the State is given power by article 21, to deprive the individual of his life and personal liberty in accordance with procedure established by law, subject of course, to the provisions of Art. 22.
In Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. & another v. The Union of India, & Others, (1) the test laid down was that there must be a direct or inevitable consequence of the measures enacted in the impugned Act, it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having that effect and operation. A possible eventuality of this type would not necessary be the consequence which could be in the contemplation of the legislature while enacting a measure of. this type for the benefit of the workmen concerned. The test, thus applied, is whether the consequences were "direct and inevitable" ?
In Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan v. Union of India,(2) after citing with approval the case of Ram Singh and Express Newspapers case, it was observed :
"It is not the form or Incidental infringement that determine the constitutionality of a statute in a reference to the rights
guaranteed in Art. 19(1) but the reality and the substance........ Viewed in this way, it does not select any of the elements or attributes of freedom of speech falling within Art. 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution."
Reality and substance test was laid down in this case while, approving of the earlier decisions when the court was considering the question whether the ban on advertisement would affect the rights conferred under Art. 19(1) (a). The correctness of the view as laid down in Gopalan's case and affirmed in Ram Singh's case was doubted by Subba Rao, J. in Kochuni v. The State of Madras(3). The learned Judge after referring to the dissenting view of Fazal Ali, J. in Gopalan's case rejecting the plea that a law under Art. 21 shall not infringe Art. 19(1) observed :
"The question being integrated with the dissenting view expressed by Fazal Ali, J. we are bound by this judgment." Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision by this Court in Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. The Union of India. (4) The learned counsel referred to the passage at page 5 60A
(1)  1 S.C.R. 135.
(2)  2 S.C.R. 671 at page 691.
(3)  3 S.C.R. 887.
(4)  3 S.C.R. 842.
Part where it was held that "the correct approach ; in such cases should be to enquire as to what in substance is the loss or injury caused to a citizen and not merely what manner and method has been adopted by ,,he State in placing the restriction and, therefore, the right to freedom, of speech cannot be taken away with the object of taking away the business activities of the citizen. Reference was also made to another passage at 867 where it 'was held that the "legitimacy of the result intended to be achieved does not necessarily imply that every means to achieve it is permissible; for even if the end is desirable and permissible, the means employed must not transgress the limits laid down by the constitution if they directly impinge on any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It is no answer when the constitutionality of the measure is challenged that apart from the fundamental right infringed the provision is otherwise legal. The above observations relied on by the learned counsel were made in a petition where the validity of Delhi Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960 which fixed the maximum number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to the price charged was questioned. The order was challenged as contravening Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. The court held that the order was void as it violated Art. 19 (I) (a) of the Constitution and was not saved by Article 19 (2). The court held that the right extended not merely to the method which is employed to circulate but also to the volume of circulation, and the impugned Act and order placed restraints on the latter aspect of the right as the very object of the Act was directly against circulation and thus, interfered with the freedom of speech and expression. At page 866, the Court observed :
"The impugned law far from being one, which merely interferes with the right of freedom of speech incidently, does so directly though it seeks to achieve the end by purporting to regulate the business aspect to a newspaper........ Such a course is not permissible and the courts must be ever vigilant in guarding perhaps the most precious of all the freedom guaranteed by our Constitution."
This decision does not help us in resolving the point at issue in this case for the court was concerned with the question whether the right of freedom of speech was directly affected by the impugned order. The impact of legislation under Art. 21 on the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) was not in issue in the case.
The two cases which were strongly relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner as having over-ruled the view of Gopalan's case as affirmed in Ram Singh's case are Bank Nationalisation Case(2) and Bennet Colomon's case.(2) In Kharak Singh's(3) case the majority took the view that the word 'liberty' in Art. 21 is qualified by the word 'personal' and there its content is narrower and the qualifying adjective has been employed in order (1)  3 S.C.R. 530.
(2)  2 S.C.R. 757.
(3)  1 S.C.R. 332.
to avoid overlapping between those elements or incidents of liberty like freedom of speech or freedom of movement etc. already dealt with in Art. 19(1) and the liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 and particularly in the context of the difference between the permissible restraints or restrictions which might be imposed by sub clauses (2) to (6) of the, Article of the several species of liberty dealt with in a several clauses of Article 19(1). The minority view as expressed by Subba Rao, J. is that if a person's fundamental right under Art. 21 is infringed, the State can rely upon a law to sustain the action; but that cannot be a complete answer unless the State laws satisfy the test laid down in Article 19(2) as far the attributes covered by Article 19(1) are concerned. In other words, the State must satisfy that petitioners fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that the law only imposes reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the view as ,expressed by Subba Rao, J. has been affirmed by the subsequent decisions in the Bank Nationalisation(1) case and Bennet Colomon(2) case.
On 19th July, 1969, the acting President promulgated an ordinance No. 8 of 1969 transferring to and vesting the undertaking of 14 names commercial banks in the corresponding new bank under the ordinance. Subsequently, the Parliament, enacted Banking Companies (Acquisition of Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1969. The object of the Act was to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the undertakings of certain banking companies in conformity with the national policy and objectives and for matters corrected therewith and incidental thereto. The petitioners before the Supreme Court who held shares in some of the named banks or had accounts current or fixed deposits in the banks challenged the validity of the enactment. In the petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution the validity of the Ordinance and the Act was questioned on various grounds. I am concerned with ground no. 3 which runs as follows : Article 19(1) (f) and Art. 31(2) are not mutually exclusive and the law providing for acquisition of property for public purpose could be tested for its validity on the ground that it imposes limitation on the right to property which were not reasonable; so tested the provision of the Act transferring undertaking of the named banks and prohibiting practically from carrying banking business violates the guarantee under Art. 19(1) (f) and (g). In dealing with this contention, the court held that Articles 19 (1) (f) and Article 31 (2) are not mutually exclusive. The court observed that the principle underlying the opinion of the majority in Gopalan's case was extended to the protection of the freedom in respect of property and it was held that Art. 19(1) (f) and 31(2) were mutually exclusive in their operation and that substantive provisions of law relating to acquisition of property were not liable to be challenged on the ground that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right to hold pretty. After mentioning the two divergent lines of authority, the court held that "the guarantee under Art. 31 (1) and (2) arises out of the limitations imposed on the authority of the State,
(1)  3 S.C.R. 530.
(2)  2S.C.R.757.
by law, to take over the individual's property. The true character of the limitation of the two provisions is not different. Clause (1) of Article 19 and clause (1) and (2) of Art. 31 are part of the similar article 19(1) (f) enunicating the object specified and Article 19(1) and 31 deal with the limitation which may be placed by law subject to which the rights may be exercised. Formal compliance with the conditions of Art. 31(2) is not sufficient to negative protection of guarantee to the rights to property. The validity of law which authorises deprivation of property and the law which authorises compulsory acquisition of the property for a public purpose must be adjudged by the application of the same test. Acquisition must be under the authority of a law and the expression law means a law which is within the competence of the legislature and does not impair the guarantee of the rights in Part 111. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on similar reasoning it is necessary that an enactment under Art. 21 must also satisfy the requirements of Article 19 and should be by a law which is within the competence of the legislature and does not impair the guarantee of the rights in part III including those conferred under Art. 19 of the Constitution of India. The important question that arises for consideration is whether the decision in the Bank Nationalisation case has over-ruled the decision of Gopalan's case and is an authority for the proposition and an act of the legislature relating to deprivation of life and personal liberty should also satisfy the other fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution.
In order to determine what exactly is the law that has been laid down in Bank Nationalisation Case, it is necessary to closely examine the decision particularly from pages 570 to 578 of 1970(3) SCR. After holding that :
"Impairment of the right of the individual and not the object of the State in taking the impugned action, is the measure of protection. To concentrate merely on power of the State and the object of the State action in exercising that power Is therefore to ignore the true intent of the Constitution."
the Court proceeded to observe that "the conclusion in our judgment is inevitable that the validity of the State action must be adjudged in the light of its operation upon rights of individual and groups of individuals in all their dimensions." Having thus held the Court proceeded to state : "But this Court has held in some cases to be presently noticed that Art. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2) are mutually exclusive."
It is necessary at this stage to emphasize that the Court was only considering the decisions that took the view that Article 19 (1 ) (f) and 31(2) were mutually exclusive. After referring to passages in A. K. Gopalan's case at pages 571 to 573 noted at page 574 :
"The view expressed in A. K. Gopalan's case was reaffirmed in Ram Singh and others v. State of Delhi(1)".
(1)  S.C.R. 451.
Having thus dealt with the passages in the judgment in Gopalan's case the Court proceeded to consider its effect and observed that the principle underlying the judgment of the majority was extended to the protection of freedom in respect of property and it was held that-Article 19(1) (f) and. Art. 31(2) were mutually exclusive in their operation. While observations in judgment of Gopalan's case as regards the application of Art. 19(1) (f) in relation to Art. 21 were not referred to, the Court proceeded to deal with the correctness of the principle in Gopalan's case being extended to the protection of the freedom in respect of property. In A. K. Gopalan's case (supra) Das, J., stated that if the capacity to exercise the right to property was lost, because of lawful compulsory acquisition of the subject of that right, the owner ceased to have that right for the duration of the incapacity. In Chiranjit Lal Chowduri's case,(1) Das, J. observed at page 919 : ". . . the right to property guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) would...... continue until the owner was under Art. 31 deprived of such property by authority of law."
Das, J. reiterated the same view in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal, (2) where he observed :
"Art. 19(1) (f) read with Art. 19(5) pre- supposes that the person to whom the
fundamental right is guaranteed retains his property over or with respect to which alone that right may be exercised.
Thus the observation in Gopalan's case extending the principle laid down in the majority judgment to. freedom in respect of property was reiterated by Das, J. in Chiranjit Lal Chowduri's case (supra) and Subodh Gopal's case. The principle was given more concrete shape in State of Bombay v. Bhanjit Munji(3) case wherein it was held that "if there is no property which can be acquired held or disposed of,. no restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold or dispose it of, and as clause (5) contemplates the placing of reasonable restrictions of the exercise of those rights it must follow that the Article postulates the existence of property over which the rights are to be exercised." This view was accepted in the later cases Dabu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay(4) and Smt. Sitabati Debi and Anr. v. State of West Bengal.(5) The Court proceeded further after referring to some cases to note that. "With the decision in K. K. Kochuni's case(6) there arose two divergent lines of authority (1) "authority of law" in Art. 31 (1) is liable to be tested on the ground that it violates other fundamental rights and freedoms including the right to bold property guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (f) and (2) "authority of law" within the meaning of Art. 31(2) is not liable to be tested on the ground that it impairs the guarantee of Art. 19(1) (f) in so far as it imposes substantive restrictions
(1)  S.C.R. 869.
(2)  S.C.R. 587.
(3)  (1) S.C.R. 777.
(4)  1 S.C.R. 128.
(5)  2 S.C.R. 940.
(6)  3 S.C.R. 887.