Judgment:
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur
Bench, directing return of the plaint, as according to the High
Court the Court at Nagpur had no jurisdiction to entertain a
part of the claims made in the suit. The plaintiff was granted
liberty to represent the plaint in the Court having jurisdiction
at Pune. The trial Court was directed to follow the procedure
under Order 7 Rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(in short the 'CPC') for return of the plaint to the plaintiff.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The appellant filed a special civil suit No.881/91 for
recovery of Rs.79,63,99,736/- as damages for breach of
contract. The stand of the plaintiff in the plaint was that it is
the manufacturer of moulds and high precision plastic
component for the industrial application specially for use by
automobile industry. It has its manufacturing operations at
Nagpur and the defendants have entered into an agreement
with it for lifetime supply of its products. it has made huge
investments at Nagpur amounting to rupees thirty crores and
that it has a most sophisticated factory at Nagpur. Plaintiff is
supplying its products to the Defendant No.1 for almost two
decades. The defendant no.1 vide registered letter dated
03.11.1999, which was received by the plaintiff at its Nagpur
office on 11.11.1999, has terminated its agreement with the
plaintiff. Due to the said termination, the machineries which
were installed by the plaintiff specifically for manufacturing
moulds for the defendant No.1 would remain idle and that
there will be no use of its unit installed at Nagpur. The
plaintiff, therefore, contended that it is entitled to
compensation of damages inasmuch, as the defendant No.1's
action of refusing to honour its promise and assurance was
illegal and arbitrary
The defendant Nos.1, 3 and 4 filed an application under
Section 9A read with Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC submitting
therein that the suit was clearly abuse of process of law and
was not maintainable. The registered office of defendants 1
and 2 was at Pune and that the defendant Nos.3 and 4 are the
residents of Pune, whereas the defendant No.5 has its
registered office at Tokyo (Japan). The lease agreements
between defendant No.1 and the plaintiff had been executed at
Pune, and supplies were made by the plaintiff to defendant
No.1 at Pune/Aurangabad, i.e. outside the territorial
jurisdiction of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur and,
therefore, it had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit
and the suit deserves to be dismissed summarily. It was
denied by the respondents-defendants that the plaintiff has
set up its factory at Nagpur at the instance of defendant No.1.
It was further contended that the plaintiff has deliberately
suppressed the fact that it has its registered office at Mumbai
and neither of the parties to the suit resided at Nagpur. The
respondents further averred in the said application that the
parties by consent have restricted the jurisdiction to Pune
Court only. The said term pertaining to jurisdiction is
contained in all the purchase orders placed by defendant No.1
with the plaintiff. Plaintiff had deliberately filed a part of the
purchase order and suppressed that part of the purchase
order from the Court which contained the clause regarding
jurisdiction.
The non-applicant/plaintiff filed its reply to the said
application reiterating the averments made in the plaint. It
reiterated that it had made huge investments at Nagpur on the
assurance made by the defendant No.1. The plaintiff, further,
submitted in its reply that the cause of action for suit has arisen
substantially, if not wholly, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the learned Court at Nagpur. Goods were
supplied from Nagpur and the cost thereof is received at
Nagpur and that the goods have also been delivered at Nagpur.
Substantial part of the claims in the plaint was on account of
damages etc. for breach of Memorandum of Understanding (in
short 'MoU') and the breach of assurances given by the
defendant No.1. The plaintiff, therefore, submitted that if the
substantial cause of action arises out of damages on other
counts and if the small part of the claim arises out of
purchase order, the claim cannot be separated and, therefore,
it was in the interest of justice that the Court should entertain
the present suit.
3. The learned trial Court, after considering the rival
contentions raised on behalf of the parties, found that the suit
was outcome of the damages caused to the Unit of the plaintiff
because of the breach of the contract. He further observed that
the letter of termination was received by the plaintiff at
Nagpur. It is further observed in the order that the term about
jurisdiction pointed out on behalf of the defendants was
relating to the breach of contract under order of purchase and
not relating to the damage caused to the plaintiff by
termination of the entire contract which was admittedly for the
life time. The learned trial Court, therefore, held that the cause
of action to file present suit arises at Nagpur and, therefore,
directed the suit to proceed according to law.
4. Questioning for quashing the order passed by Joint Civil
Judge, Senior Division, Nagpur Civil Revision was filed before
the High Court by the respondents. It was submitted that the
substantial part of the claim arises out of four purchase orders
which came to be placed by defendant No.1 with the plaintiff.
All the purchase orders ousted the jurisdiction of all Courts
except the Court at Pune. Except these purchase orders there
was no other written contract. Since the suit is mainly based
on the cause of action arising out of said purchase orders
which ousted the jurisdiction of Courts except the Court
situated at Pune, though there may be ancillary cause of
action the ouster clause in the purchase order governs the
proceedings between the parties.
5. Reference was made to various decisions of this Court in
Hakam Singh v. M/s Gammon (India) Ltd. (AIR 1971 SC 740),
Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd. (2004 (4)
SCC 671) and New Moga Transport Company v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors. (2004 (4) SCC 677). The plaintiff-appellant before this Court referred to various Mou dated
6.11.1996 and submitted that the same related to the
technical terms between the parties. As per the said terms the
plaintiff was entitled to receive 7 moulds but it was given 4
moulds. There was no ouster clause in the said MoU and,
therefore, suit for breach of terms would not be covered by the
ouster clause.
6. Reference has also been made to various
communications dated 9.10.1993, 25.5.1996, 30.11.1996 and
23.9.1997 to substantiate the stand that assurance was given
by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be its
life time supplier. Relying on the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2
of CPC it was submitted that the suit is required to include the
whole of the claim which the plaintiff was entitled to make in
respect of the cause of action. Therefore, it was necessary for it
to join all causes of action and since only insignificant part of
cause of action was governed by the purchase orders the suit
filed at Nagpur will not be governed by the ouster clause.
7. The High Court referred to various purchase orders and
conditions and averments in the plaint. With reference to the
averments held that the claims were referable to the purchase
orders. The averments in para 29 indicated that they were
referable to MoU dated 6.11.1996. According to the High Court
perusal of the purchase orders indicated that the said MoU
was also a part of the purchase orders. With reference to
Condition No.20 of the purchase orders it was held that only
the Pune Court had jurisdiction in all the matters arising out
of the purchase orders. Accordingly, the High Court held that
the suit is based on several causes of action and it was open to
the plaintiff to file a suit for causes of action not related to
purchase order at Nagpur and to file another suit arising out
of cause of action related to the purchase orders at Pune.
8. Accordingly, the order was passed for return of the
plaint.
9. In support of the appeal, with reference to the order of
the trial Court it was submitted that in para 60 it was
categorically held that the court at Nagpur had jurisdiction to
try the suit. The High Court accepted that by operation of
Order 2 Rule 2 CPC it was permissible to raise several causes
of action and there was no ouster clause in that sense. The
main relief is for damages and costs incurred. The purchase
order related only to part of the relief claimed. Therefore, it
was submitted that the trial Court's view should not have been
interfered with.
10. In response, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that the High Court has noted that the purchase
orders clearly excluded the jurisdiction and, therefore, the
High Court's view is irreversible.
11. The relevant portion of the purchase orders which are
identical reads as follows:
"NOTES:
1. THE MOULDS WILL BE DESIGNED AND
MANUFACTURED AS PER THE FOLLOWING:
(1) THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING(MOU) DATED 6 NOVEMBER 1996, EXECUTEDBETWEEN M/S BAL M/S MARUBENT
CORPORATION,M/S TAKAHASHI SEIKI CO., LTD., M/S TOKYO
R&D CO. LTD. AND M/S SUNDEEP POLYMERS
PVT. LTD. AND AMENDMENT THERETO AS MAY
BE AGREED TO BETWEEN THE PARTIES FROM
TIME TO TIME AS PER THE PROJECT NEEDS.
(2) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT DATED
11/2/97 BETWEEN TAKAHASHI SEIKI CO. LTD.
AND SUNDEEP POLYMERS LTD.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. PRICE
PRICES ARE FIRM AND FOR FREE DELIVERY
AT OUR WORKS
6. PAYMENT
60% ADVANCE ALONGWITH THE ORDER.
20% AFTER SUBMISSION OF T1 SAMPLE
20% AFTER FINAL APPROVAL OF SAMPLE
AND MOULD
12. GUARANTEE
MOULD SHOULD BE GUARANTEED FOR
QUALITY, PRECISION, RELIABILITY AND ALSO
FOR WORKMANSHIP AND PERFORMANCE, USE
OF MATERIAL AND DESIGN WE SHOULD BE ABLE
TO GET MINIMUM 300,000 PIECES WITH NORMAL
MAINTENANCE.CONDITIONS
15. The prices and terms and conditions in this
order will be taken as firm and cannot be changed
till the order is fully executed.
20. This contract shall be deemed to have been
entered into at Pune and only Pune Courts will have
jurisdiction in all matters arising out of this Order."
Some of the pleadings in the plaint also need to be noted.
"29. In the year 1995 or near about, the lst
defendant finalized the new model scooter in the
Japan, Code name alpha-4 in co-operation with the
defendant No.5. Since this was to be a modern
design vehicle, having entire plastic body, it was
important to select a top quality supplier in India
for the development of supplier of plastic parts for
alpha-4 vehicle and such similar models in the
future.
(a) The 1 defendant placed an order for a supply of a
part of the moulds for the alpha-4 from the
defendant No.5 and raised a purchase order
No.529911 dated 6/11/1996 on the 5th defendant
for an approximate amount of Rs.JPY 175 Million.
The plaintiff craves leave to refer to and rely upon
the aforesaid Purchase Order of the 1 defendant
when produced.
(b) A Memo. of Understanding (M0U) has been
entered into by various parties involved in the
development of Alpha-4, viz. the plaintiff, defendant
Nos.1 and 3, Takahashi Seiki and another Japanese
Company Tokyo R&D Co. Ltd. This MoU spelt out
the role and obligation of each party in the
development of the plastic parts of the Alpha-4. The
Ist defendant also spelt out its commitment in
buying the plastic parts from the moulds supplied
by the 5th defendant and for which the plaintiff was
to set up additional investments. Hereto enclosed
and annexed as document No.XXIV is a copy of the
aforesaid Mou."
33. In line with the aforesaid understanding
between the plaintiff and the Ist, 4th and 5th
defendants and also relying upon the MoU and the
Ist defendant's letter dated 30.11.1996 the plaintiff
agreed to accept the 4 sets of Purchase Orders for
the manufacture of 10 Alpha-4 moulds, raised by
the 1st defendant, at an initial payment of Rs.296.7
lacs. These Purchase Orders are:
a) No.541024 dated 12/2/1997 for Rs.148.5 lacs.
b) No.541023 dated 12/2/1997 for Rs.111.5 lacs.
c) No.2121209 dated 22/2/1998 for Rs 35 lacs.
d) No.20122154 dated 16/3/1998 for Rs.1.7 lacs.
The aforesaid Purchase Orders were in the tine
with the MoU and the Technical Assistance
Agreement, as already spelt out, and the same also
mentioned on the Orders."
12. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Assistant Charity
Commissioner and Ors. (2004 (3) SCC 137) it was inter-alia
held as follows:
"16. Submission of learned counsel for respondent
No.2-trust was that requirement of law being
reading the plaint in its totality, the appellants
cannot take the plea that they would give up or
relinquish some of the reliefs sought for. That would
not be permissible. The plea clearly overlooks the
basic distinction between statements of the facts
disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for.
The reliefs claimed do not constitute the cause of
action. On the contrary, they constitute the
entitlement, if any, on the basis of pleaded facts.
As
indicated above, Order VI Rule 2 requires that
pleadings shall contain and contain only a
statement in a concise form of the material facts on
which the party pleading relies for his claim. If the
plea of Mr. Savant, learned counsel for the
respondent-trust is accepted the distinction
between the statement of material facts and the
reliance on them for the claim shall be obliterated.
What is required in law is not the piecemeal reading
of the plaint but in its entirety. Whether the reliefs
would be granted on the pleaded facts and the
evidence adduced is totally different from the relief claimed. All the
reliefs claimed may not be allowed to a party on the pleadings and the evidence
adduced. Whether part of the relief cannot be
granted by the Civil Court is a different matter from
saying that because of a combined claim of reliefs
the jurisdiction is ousted or no cause of action is
disclosed. Considering the reliefs claimed vis-a-vis
the pleadings would not mean
compartmentalization or segregation, in that sense.
The plea raised by the respondent-trust is therefore
clearly unacceptable.
17. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles the
reliefs sought for in the suit as quoted supra have to
be considered. The real object of Order VII Rule 11
of the Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law
suits. Therefore, the Order X of the Code is a tool in
the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and
by searching examination of the party in case the
Court is prima facie of the view that the suit is an
abuse of the process of the court in the sense that it
is a bogus and irresponsible litigation, the
jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code can
be exercised.
18. As noted supra, Order VII Rule 11 does not
justify rejection of any particular portion of the
plaint. Order VI Rule 16 of the Code is relevant in
this regard. It deals with 'striking out pleadings'. It
has three clauses permitting the Court at any stage
of the proceeding to strike out or amend any matter
in any pleading i.e. (a) which may be unnecessary,
scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or, (b) which
may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair
trial of the suit, or, (c) which is otherwise an abuse
of the process of the Court.
19. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the Code states the basic
and cardinal rule of pleadings and declares that the
pleading has to state material facts and not the
evidence. It mandates that every pleading shall
contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise
form of the material facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case
may be, but not the evidence by which they are to
be proved.
20. There is distinction between 'material facts'
and 'particulars'. The words 'material facts' show
that the facts necessary to formulate a complete
cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single
material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action
and the statement or plaint becomes bad. The
distinction which has been made between 'material
facts' and 'particulars' was brought by Scott, L.J. in
Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd. (1936) 1 KB 697 in the
following passage :
The cardinal provision in Rule 4 is that
the statement of claim must state the
material facts. The word "material" means
necessary for the purpose of formulating
a complete cause of action; and if any one
"material" statement is omitted, the
statement of claim is bad; it is
"demurrable" in the old phraseology, and
in the new is liable to be "struck out"
under R.S.C. Order XXV, Rule 4 (see
Philipps v. Philipps ((1878) 4 QBD 127));
or "a further and better statement of
claim" may be ordered under Rule 7.
The function of "particulars" under Rule 6
is quite different.
They are not to be used
in order to fill material gaps in a
demurrable statement of claim - gaps
which ought to have been filled by
appropriate statements of the various
material facts which together constitute
the plaintiff's cause of action. The use of
particulars is intended to meet a further
and quite separate requirement of
pleading, imposed in fairness and justice
to the defendant. Their function is to fill
in the picture of the plaintiff's cause of
action with information sufficiently
detailed to put the defendant on his
guard as to the case he had to meet and
to enable him to prepare for trial.
The dictum of Scott, L.J. in Bruce case (supra) has
been quoted with approval by this Court in Samant
N. Balkrishna v. George Fernandez (1969 (3) SCC
238), and the distinction between "material facts"
and "particulars" was brought out in the following
terms:
The word 'material' shows that the facts
necessary to formulate a complete cause
of action must be stated. Omission of a
single material fact leads to an
incomplete cause of action and the
statement of claim becomes bad. The
function of particulars is to present as
full a picture of the cause of action with
such further information in detail as to
make the opposite party understand the
case he will have to meet".
Rule 11 of Order VII lays down an independent
remedy made available to the defendant to challenge
the maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of
his right to contest the same on merits. The law
ostensibly does not contemplate at any stage when
the objections can be raised, and also does not say
in express terms about the filing of a written statement. Instead, the
word 'shall' is used clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on the Court to
perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint when
the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in
the four clauses of Rule 11, even without
intervention of the defendant. In any event, rejection
of the plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the
plaintiffs from presenting a fresh plaint in terms of
Rule 13.
xx xx xx xx xx
22. Under Order II Rule 1 of the Code which
contains provisions of mandatory nature, the
requirement is that the plaintiffs are duty bound to
claim the entire relief. The suit has to be so framed
as to afford ground for final decision upon the
subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation
concerning them. Rule 2 further enjoins on the
plaintiff to include the whole of the claim which the
plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of
action. If the plaintiff omits to sue or intentionally
relinquishes any portion of his claim, it is not
permissible for him to sue in respect of the portion
so omitted or relinquished afterwards.
If the
plaintiffs as contended by Mr. Mohta want to
relinquish some reliefs prayer in that regard shall
be done before the trial Court. A reading of the
plaint and the reliefs along with the contents of the
plaint goes to show that the main dispute relates to
the question of continuance of tenancy and the
period of tenancy. They are in essence unrelated
with the other reliefs regarding enquiry into the
affairs of the trust. Such enquiries can only be
undertaken under Section 50 of the Act. For
instituting the suit of the nature specified in Section
50, prior consent of the Charity Commissioner is
necessary under Section 51. To that extent Mr.
Savant is right that the reliefs relatable to Section
50 would require a prior consent in terms of Section
51. If the plaintiffs give up those reliefs claimed in
accordance with law, the question would be whether
a cause of action for the residual claims/reliefs
warrant continuance of the suit.
The nature of the
dispute is to be resolved by the Civil Court. The
question of tenancy cannot be decided under
Section 50 of the Act. Section 51 is applicable only
to suits which are filed by a person having interest
in the trust. A tenant of the trust does not fall
within the category of a person having an interest in
the trust. Except relief in Para D of the plaint, the
other reliefs could be claimed before and can be
considered and adjudicated by the Civil Courts and
the bar or impediment in Sections 50 and 51 of the
Act will have no relevance or application to the other
reliefs. That being so, Sections 50 and 51 of the Act
would not have any application to that part of the
relief which relates to question of tenancy, the term
of tenancy and the period of tenancy. The inevitable
conclusion therefore is that Courts below were not
justified in directing rejection of the plaint. However,
the adjudication in the suit would be restricted to
the question of tenancy, terms of tenancy and the
period of tenancy only. For the rest of the reliefs, the
plaintiffs shall be permitted within a month from
today to make such application as warranted in law
for relinquishing and/or giving up claim for other
reliefs."
13. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India and Anr.
(2006 (6) SCC 207) it was held as follows:
9. By "cause of action" it is meant every fact,
which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of
facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove
in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor
Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai and Ors. (1994 (6)
SCC 322).
10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20
of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) "cause of action"
means every fact, which it is necessary to establish
to support a right to obtain a judgment. (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar
(1998 (6) SCC 514).
11. It is settled law that "cause of action" consists
of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the
legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other
words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the
law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to
claim relief against the defendant. It must include
some act done by the defendant since in the
absence of such an act no cause of action would
possibly accrue or would arise. (See South East Asia
Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt.
Ltd. and others. (1996 (3) SCC 443).
12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired
a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense
"cause of action" means the circumstances forming
the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion
for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the
necessary conditions for the maintenance of the
suit, including not only the infraction of the right,
but also the infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously, as noted above the expression
means every fact, which it would be necessary for
the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to
support his right to the judgment of the Court.
Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as
distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is
necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of
action". (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates'
Association v. Union of India and Ors. (2001 (2)
SCC 294).
13. The expression "cause of action" has
sometimes been employed to convey the restricted
idea of facts or circumstances which constitute
either the infringement or the basis of a right and
no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense,
it has been used to denote the whole bundle of
material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order
to succeed. These are all those essential facts
without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in
his suit. (See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh (1977
(1) SCC 791).
14. The expression "cause of action" is generally
understood to mean a situation or state of facts that
entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a
tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one
or more bases of suing; a factual situation that
entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from
another person. (See Black's Law Dictionary). In
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a "cause of action" is
stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to
an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every
fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in
order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases"
(4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase
"cause of action" in common legal parlance is
existence of those facts, which give a party a right to
judicial interference on his behalf. (See Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra
and Ors. (2000 (7) SCC 640).
15. In Halsbury Laws of England
(Fourth Edition)
it has been stated as follows:
"Cause of action has been defined as
meaning simply a factual situation the
existence of which entitles one person to
obtain from the Court a remedy against
another person. The phrase has been
held from earliest time to include every
fact which is material to be proved to
entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every
fact which a defendant would have a right
to traverse. 'Cause of action' has also
been taken to mean that particular act on
the part of the defendant which gives the
plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the
subject matter of grievance founding the
action, not merely the technical cause of
action".
16. As observed by the Privy Council in
Payana v.
Pana Lana (1914) 41 IA 142, the rule is directed to
securing the exhaustion of the relief in respect of a
cause of action and not to the inclusion in one and
the same action or different causes of action, even
though they arises from the same transaction. One
great criterion is, when the question arises as to
whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit
is identical with that in the first suit whether the
same evidence will maintain both actions. (See Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian
(AIR
1949 PC 78).
17. It would be appropriate to quote para 61 of the
said judgment, which reads as follows:-
"61. (1) The correct test in cases falling
under Order II Rule 2, is whether the
claim in the new suit is in fact founded
upon a cause of action distinct from that
which was the foundation of the former
suit (Moonshee Buzloor Fuheer v.
Shumroonnissa Begum, (1967)11 Moo I
551 : 2 Bar 259 (P.C.).
(2) The 'cause of action' means every fact
which will be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove it traversed in order to support his
right to the judgment (Real v. Brown ;
(1889) 22 Q.B.O. 138: 58 L.J. Q.B. 476).
(3) If the evidence to support the two
claims is different, then the causes of
action are also different. (Brunsoon v.
Nurnphroy (18841 Q.B.O. 141. : 53
L.J.Q. B. 476).
(4) The causes of action in the two suits
may be considered to be the same if in
substance they are identical ( Brunsoon
v, Numphroy, supra).
(5) The cause of action has no relation
whether to the defence that may be set
up by the defendant nor does it depend
upon the character of the relief prayed for
by the plaintiff. It refers .. to media
upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to
arrive a conclusion in his favour. (Mst.
Chand Kour v. Pratap Singh : (1887)15 IA
156. This observation was made by Lord
Watson in a case under section 43 of the
Act of 1880 (corresponding to Order II,
Rule 2) where plaintiff made various
claim in the same suit".
14. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that a
separate suit shall be filed in relation to purchase orders at
Pune and necessary amendments to the plaint filed at Nagpur
shall be made. It shall be open to the respondents-defendants
to raise such objections and to take such stand as are
available. In view of above, we dispose of the appeal with the
following directions:
(1) It shall be open to the appellant to file a separate
suit in relation to cause of action if any relating for
the purchase orders, at Pune as was submitted by
learned counsel for the appellant.
(2) If the appellant is so advised it may move for
amendment of the suit at Nagpur.
(3) It shall be open to the respondents-defendants to
raise all objections and take such pleas as are
available in law.
15. Appeal is disposed of with no order as to costs.
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