Sad Day for Democracy If Peaceful Protests Are Criminalised: Nagpur Bench

It perfectly stands justified that while according to the paramount importance to the constitutional right to protest peacefully, the Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court, while striking the right chord, catching the right pulse and taking the most pragmatic step in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgement titled Nishkarsh S/o Kiran Nimgade vs The State of Maharashtra in Criminal Application [APL] No. 1699 of 2026 and CNR No: HCBM040228942026 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:BHC-NAG:14958 that was reserved on 22.09.2026 and then finally pronounced on 29.10.2026, has quashed criminal proceedings against a 26-year-old youth who was booked for protesting against authorities in his Chandrapur district over poor and dilapidated road conditions.

It merits noting that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice MW Chandwani minced absolutely just no words to hold indubitably that peaceful civic agitations cannot be criminalised without concrete evidence of unlawful restraint or violence.

While catching the bull by the horns, the Bench was most forthright in holding most unequivocally that,

“The lines between the constitutional right to protest and the unleashing of penal prosecutions cannot be allowed to be blurred. If this mindset gains traction, it would be a sad day for democracy.”

Absolutely right!

Peaceful Assembly and the Constitutional Right to Protest

In addition, the Bench opined that,

“Merely because a large number of persons gathered to agitate against the condition of the road and insist on action against the erring officials of the PWD department and the contractor, it cannot be presumed that the people gathered on the spot formed an unlawful assembly.”

It is also worth paying unremitting attention to the fact that the Bench most forcefully articulated that Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution protects peaceful assembly without arms, adding that prosecutions must not stifle democratic non-violent protests.

In other words, the Bench underscored that the launch of criminal prosecution against the applicant is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. We thus see that the Bench deemed it fit to quash the FIR and charge sheet that had been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. Very rightly so!

Background of the Case

At the very outset, this robust, remarkable, rational and recent judgement authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice MW Chandwani of Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that,

“Heard. ADMIT. Taken up for final disposal forthwith by the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.”

Criminal Application and FIR Details

As we see, the Bench then lays bare in para 2 disclosing that,

“This application filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), seeks quashing of First Information Report (FIR) No. 44/2026 dated 22.01.2026 registered with Police Station, Mul, Dist. Chandrapur for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 189(2), 190, and 191(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) read with Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (the Act of 1951) and Section 7 of the Criminal (Amendment) Act, 1932 (the Act of 1932), consequent charge-sheet No. 54/2026 dated 22.03.2026 wherein Sections 221 and 222 of the BNS and Sections 110 and 117 of the Act of 1951 were added to the crime, and Regular Criminal Case No. 432 of 2026 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mul.”

Facts and Circumstances of the Case

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 while elaborating on the facts of the case, stating that,

“The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as under:

1. Road Accident and Public Protest

i] On 21.01.2026, a pickup vehicle bearing No. MH-34-BZ3127, which was proceeding from Gondpipri towards Nandgaon, dashed to an electricity pole and turned a turtle near Mauza Nandgaon, resulting in causing serious injury to one Haridas Vilas Mitpalliwar. The passengers travelling in the said pickup vehicle were also injured. The injured persons were shifted to a hospital at Mul. News of the accident was spread over the nearby areas, and the people gathered on the spot expressing their anger towards the poor quality of the road. They started protesting to take action against the errant officials of the Public Works Department (PWD) and the contractor who constructed the road. The people gathered on the spot and tried to obstruct the road by tying a rope across it. The police reached the spot and removed the people gathered on the spot.

2. Registration of FIR and Filing of Charge Sheet

ii] The allegation is that the people, by forming an unlawful assembly, tried to obstruct the traffic on a public road. In the said mob of the people, the applicant, along with the other co-accused persons, was present. Therefore, on the complaint lodged by Police Constable Sunil Kulmethe, the FIR came to be registered against the applicant and the other co-accused persons for the aforesaid offences. After completion of the investigation, the charge sheet came to be filed against the applicant and the other co-accused persons.”

Court’s Reasoning and Legal Analysis

Wrongful Restraint Under Section 126 of the BNS

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 8 that,

“Thus, for bringing an accused within the ambit of the act of wrongful restraint, the accused must have voluntarily obstructed any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which the said person has a right to proceed. Perusal of the entire charge sheet does not reveal that the people who gathered on the spot by tying rope across the road obstructed any person from proceeding in any direction through the road. There is no whisper in the entire charge sheet as to who was obstructed from proceeding from one direction to the other direction. Not a single statement of any passerby is recorded whose right of way had been obstructed by the people who gathered on the spot. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 126 of the BNS are not attracted against the applicant.”

What Constitutes an Unlawful Assembly Under Section 189 of the BNS?

It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench points out in para 10 that,

“Thus, for rendering any assembly as an unlawful assembly, the prosecution has to show that the common object of the persons composing that assembly was to achieve any one of the purposes specified in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 189 of the BNS. For the purpose of this case, the prosecution is relying on clause (c), which provides that the assembly was formed to commit any mischief or criminal trespass or other offence. As stated above, there is nothing on record to suggest as to who was obstructed by the people who gathered on the spot. There is no evidence at all in the entire charge sheet to that effect. Therefore, it can hardly be said that the offence of forming an unlawful assembly has been committed by the people who gathered on the spot. If that is so, the assemblage of people who gathered on the spot to agitate, however large, cannot be said to be illegal. In order for it to be illegal, the assemblage must be inspired by an illegal object as specified in Section 189 of the BNS. Merely because a large number of persons gathered to agitate against the condition of the road and insist on action against the erring officials of the PWD department and the contractor, it cannot be presumed that the people gathered on the spot formed an unlawful assembly.”

Examination of the FIR and the Allegations Against the Applicant

It cannot be just glossed over that the Bench further observes and points out in para 11 that,

“Even if for the sake of argument it is presumed that the people who gathered on the spot tried to obstruct the passersby illegally and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 126 of the BNS, a bare perusal of the FIR reveals that it has two distinct parts.

First Part of the FIR

i] In the first part, it has been alleged by the complainant that after receipt of information of the accident, the complainant, along with other police staff, reached the spot and sent the injured for medical treatment. At that time the people who gathered on the spot were agitating against the poor condition of the road and demanding action against the erring officials of the PWD department and the contractor. Thus, the people gathered on the spot tried to obstruct the commuters from proceeding ahead. The police disbursed the people gathered on the road.

Second Part of the FIR

ii] In the second part of the FIR it is revealed that thereafter the applicant and the other co-accused persons formed an unlawful assembly and were agitating to take action against erring officials of the PWD department and the contractor. Thus, in the first limb of the story in the FIR, there is no mention of the name of the applicant that he was part of the assembly. The name of the applicant surfaced when police removed the people from the road. The people gathered on the spot, along with the applicant, demanded action against the officials who were responsible for maintaining the road. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that the applicant was a member of the assembly when the assembly tried to obstruct the commuters from proceeding in any direction on the road.”

Constitutional Protection of Peaceful Protests Under Article 19(1) (b)

Most significantly, most commendably, most forthrightly, and so also most remarkably, the Bench encapsulates in para 12 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgement, postulating precisely that

“So far as the allegation against the applicant that thereafter when the people gathered on the spot, the applicant along with the other co-accused persons was agitating for taking action against the errant PWD officers and the contractor responsible for maintaining the road is concerned, it is a settled law that prosecutions must not be launched to stifle agitations that are part of the democratic process so long as the people do not take the law into their own hands or indulge in violence or damage to public or private property. Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. While reasonable restrictions could always be imposed on exercising this fundamental right, such right must not be diluted or stifled based upon vague charges bereft of the essential ingredients to constitute offences under the penal laws. The lines between the constitutional right to protest and the unleashing of penal prosecutions cannot be allowed to be blurred. If this mindset gains traction, it would be a sad day for democracy. (See Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. UOI [(2018) 11 SCR 586]). Even otherwise, there is no material on record that at the time of restraining the road, the applicant was found to be a member of the said assembly. Later on, the applicant was found with the assembly while agitating, which cannot be termed as an offence. Thus, since the main offences under Sections 126 and 189 of the BNS are not made out, Sections 190 and 191(2) of the BNS will also not be made out.”

Alleged Violation of Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act

It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 13 noting that,

“So far as allegation against the applicant of committing offence under Section 135 of the Act of 1951 is concerned, it prescribes punishment for disobeying an order lawfully made under Section 37, 39 or 40 or abets the disobedience thereof. In order to attract the penalty for contravention of Section 135 of the Act of 1951, it has to be proved that there was an order passed by the Commissioner and the District Magistrate and it has been duly promulgated in a manner provided under the Act of 1951. There is no material on record which suggests existence of any order passed by the Commissioner and the District Magistrate at the relevant time or that it was duly promulgated so that the general public may be able to know existence of such an order. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 135 of the Act of 1951 are not attracted in the present case.”

Section 7 of the Criminal Amendment Act, 1932: Why the Provision Was Not Attracted

While continuing in the same vein, the Bench also then points out in para 14 holding that, “This takes me to Section 7 of the Act of 1932, which prescribes punishment for molesting another person to the prejudice of their employment or business, causing any person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such person has a right to do or to abstain from doing, obstructs or uses violence to or intimidates such person or any member of his family or person in his employ, or loiters at or near a place where such person or member of employed person resides. There is no such allegation in the present case against the applicant of having committed such an offence. Be that as it may, for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing paras, the ingredients of Section 7 of the Act of 1932 will also not be attracted against the applicant.”

Supreme Court’s Landmark Guidelines in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

While citing relevant and remarkable case law, the Bench states in para 15 that, “A reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others, reported at 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 which reads thus:

Seven Categories Where Criminal Proceedings Can Be Quashed

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

1. Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

Non-Cognizable Offences Under the BNS and Maharashtra Police Act

It is entirely in the fitness of things and is worthwhile to note that the Bench notes in para 16 holding explicitly that, “Lastly, so far as Sections 221 and 222 of the BNS and Sections 110 and 117 of the Act of 1951 are concerned, these offences fall under the category of non-cognizable offences. In the present case as the cognizable offences as alleged are not made out, the police could not have investigated into these non-cognizable sections without prior permission of the competent Magistrate as stated in clause (4) of para 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). Therefore, these sections will also not survive in the present case.”

High Court Exercises Inherent Powers Under Section 528 of the BNSS

Finally and far most significantly, the Bench then concludes aptly by directing and holding in para 17 that, “For the above said reasons, I find substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicant that even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at its face value, it does not constitute any offence alleged against the applicant. The launch of criminal prosecution against the applicant is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, in my view, this is a fit case for the exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, the following order:

Order of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court

1. Criminal Application Allowed

1. The Criminal Application is allowed.

2. FIR and Criminal Proceedings Quashed and Set Aside

2. First Information Report No. 44/2026 dated 22.01.2026 registered with Police Station, Mul, Dist. Chandrapur for the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 189(2), 190, 191(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 read with Section 135 of the Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 and Section 7 of the Criminal (Amendment) Act, 1932, consequent charge-sheet No. 54/2026 dated 22.03.2026 and Regular Criminal Case No. 432 of 2026 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mul, are quashed and set aside, qua the applicant.

3. Application Disposed Of

3. The application stands disposed of in the above terms.”

Peaceful Protest Is a Fundamental Democratic Right That Must Be Protected

In a nutshell, it is high time and any penal action taken by any State Government or even Central Government on peaceful protests without any violence needs to be definitely nipped in the bud!

For this to happen, the Courts especially the High Courts and High Court Benches and Apex Court also must step forward and take most prompt action when it finds that the fundamental right to stage peaceful protest without any weapon of any Indian citizen is being most brazenly bulldozed upon by either State Government or Central Government as it is the last ray of hope for the citizens to ensure that what is enshrined in Constitution is implemented in letter and spirit also!

It is thus most commendable that the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in this leading case quashed the criminal proceedings that had been initiated against a 26-year-old man who was booked for protesting against authorities in Chandrapur district over poor road conditions.

No denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh

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