It is absolutely rational that while taking the right step in the right direction at the right time, the Delhi High Court while striking the right chord in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Amit Agrawal vs State of NCT of Delhi & Ors in Bail Appln. 4475/2024 & CRL.M.A. 36662/2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:3108 that was pronounced as recently as on May 1, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold unequivocally that courts when deciding bail petitions should not be swayed by all the allegations and multiple offences in the first information report (FIR) or chargesheet but must instead examine the specific allegations against the particular accused who has sought bail. Absolutely right! This is exactly the approach that all the courts must demonstrate while deciding bail! No denying it!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
How long is long enough, before a court realises that an undertrial has been in custody for too long, and the constitutional promise of speedy trial has been repudiated ? It is this concern that is at the heart of the present judgement.

As we see, the Bench observes in para 2 that:
By way of this petition filed under section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 (‘BNSS’), the petitioner seeks regular bail in case FIR No. 0077/2023 dated 14.10.2023 registered under sections 406/420/467/468/471/120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) at P.S.: Economic Offences Wing, Delhi.

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 3 that:
Notice on this petition was issued on 06.12.2024; pursuant to which Status Report dated 20.01.2025 has been filed on behalf of the State. Reply dated 03.02.2025 has also been filed on behalf of the Customs Department - the complainant in the subject FIR.

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 7 that:
Briefly, the present case arises from an alleged criminal conspiracy between one Jayanta Ghosh, a former employee of the Customs Department; co-accused Vijay Singh, a data entry operator with the Customs Department; and co-accused Deepesh Chamoli, who was employed as Senior Manager at the Punjab National Bank, Sansad Marg, New Delhi. The allegation is that the criminal conspiracy was hatched with the intention of cheating the Customs Department of unclaimed and unaccounted amounts lying deposited in their bank accounts towards refund of customs duty to importers.

Do note, the Bench notes in para 8 that:
The modus operandi alleged to have been employed by the accused persons was to forge various official documents, including scrolls, forwarding letters and cheques, using the official stamps and signatures of customs officials. It is alleged that these forged documents would in-turn be used to show bogus entities as beneficiaries who were eligible for customs duty refund, in order to misappropriate government funds.

Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 12 that:
Upon a conspectus of the facts and circumstances obtaining in the matter, the considerations that weigh with the court at this stage are the following:

1. From what has come-forth on the record and based on the submissions made, it appears, the role alleged against the petitioner is that he acted as a conduit for the other accused persons to channel and siphon-off funds lying unclaimed with the Customs Department, which monies were routed through the certain bank accounts. There is no allegation that the petitioner himself was involved in forging any scroll or cheque or other document relating to the Customs Department.
2. There is also no material on record to prima-facie show that the petitioner was aware either of the ‘nature’ of the money that was being routed through the bank account(s) or of the scale or quantum of the offences allegedly committed by the other accused persons.
3. It is a matter of record that a chargesheet in the matter has been filed against the petitioner on 12.01.2024, in which the prosecution has cited 49 witnesses. The chargesheet alongwith the documentary evidence produced by the prosecution run into some 10,000 pages; but charges are yet to be framed and trial is yet to commence.
4. The petitioner’s nominal roll shows that he has already suffered judicial custody for about 13 months. However, regardless of the maximum punishment prescribed for the offences alleged against the petitioner, the court must never lose sight of the fact that, as of now, the petitioner is only an accused pending trial and has not been held guilty for any offences as of date. As argued on behalf of the petitioner, he cannot be detained in custody endlessly awaiting completion of trial.

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 13 noting that:
On point of law, a quick overview of the principles of bail jurisprudence laid-down by the Supreme Court may be made at this juncture:

1. An undertrial is required to post bail in order to secure his presence at the trial, for which purpose an undertrial is handed over from the custody of the court to the custody of an appropriate surety. The effect of granting bail is not to set an undertrial completely at liberty but to release him from the custody of law and entrust him to the custody of his surety; and the surety is bound to ensure his production at the trial.
   
   (Sunil Fulchand Shah vs. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 409, para 24 quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 11, para 166)
2. Bail may be denied if the court is not satisfied that an accused would remain available to face trial; or the court is of the view that he would intimidate witnesses or tamper with evidence or otherwise interfere in the course of justice. The ‘operative’ test that a court must apply for grant or denial of bail is the test of ‘necessity’, namely to answer why it is necessary to detain an undertrial in custody.
   (Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, para 22)
    
3. The purpose of pre-trial custody is neither ‘punitive’ nor ‘preventative’, meaning that an accused cannot be held in custody only with the intention of punishing him for an offence which is yet to be proved against him; nor is bail to be denied on the presumption that he would commit an offence if enlarged from custody (except where additional twin conditions prescribed by the Legislature under certain special statutes).
   (Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, para 21)

Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 13.4 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that:
Pertinently, bail must not be denied as a mark of disapproval of the alleged conduct of an accused; nor should it be denied for giving to an accused the taste of imprisonment as a lesson. (Sanjay Chandra vs. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40, para 23). This is a common pitfall since oftentimes courts get swayed by the allegations contained in an FIR or a chargesheet and tend to proceed on the textual gravity of the offences alleged, meaning that courts get blinded by the multitude of penal sections foisted against an accused by the prosecution, which builds a textual narrative in the FIR or in the chargesheet. It is important therefore, for a court to look into the specific allegations against a particular accused, and how, if at all, those allegations are supported by the material or evidence available on record.

Equally significant is that the Bench then also underscores very rightly in para 13.5 propounding precisely that:
It is extremely important to appreciate that the consequences of pre-trial detention are grave : an accused, who is otherwise presumed innocent until proven guilty, is subject to psychological and physical deprivations of jail life; and is even prevented from contributing to the preparation of his defense. (Moti Ram vs. State of M.P., (1978) 4 SCC 47, para 14).

Be it noted, the Bench while citing the relevant case law notes in para 13.6 that:
In its decision in Mohd. Muslim vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166 the Supreme Court has referred to a piece authored by Donald Clemmer titled ‘The Prison Community’ in 1940, to highlight the dangers of unjust imprisonment. Quoting the author and a decision of the Kerala High Court, (A Convict Prisoner vs. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127) the Supreme Court has flagged the risk of ‘prisonisation’, that is the risk of an undertrial losing his identity; coming to be known only by a number; losing his personal possessions and personal relationships; status, dignity and autonomy over his personal life, all of which affects his self-perception.

It has also been highlighted that if an undertrial belongs to the weaker economic strata of society, imprisonment leads to immediate loss of livelihood, scattering of families and alienation from society. The Supreme Court has observed that the courts must be sensitive to these aspects, since in the event of acquittal, these losses would be irreparable.

Most remarkably, the Bench expounds in para 13.7 holding that:
It would therefore be sacrilege for a court to disregard the presumption of innocence which enures to the benefit of an accused, while on the other hand failing to ensure speedy trial. The right to speedy trial is the flip-side of the presumption of innocence. It has been held that the right to speedy trial is implicit in the broad-sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution; and a procedure prescribed by law that deprives a person of liberty can only be said to be reasonable, fair and just on the anvil of Article 21 if it also ensures speedy trial. (Mohd. Muslim vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166, para 2 quoting Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81).

Most rationally, the Bench points out in para 14 that:
It is crucial for a court to recognise and be conscious of the right of an accused to speedy trial; and to prevent that right from being defeated, rather than wake-up much too late and lament that such right has been defeated. In Mohd. Hakim vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4623 a Division Bench of this court, of which the undersigned was a member, has urged courts to act as doctors instead of coroners, to highlight that a court seized of a bail petition must endeavour to assess the pace at which a trial is proceeding and to not wait for too long, by which time the Article 21 right of an accused is already trampled upon.

It would be worthwhile to note that the Bench then notes in para 15 that:
In the present case, for example, the chargesheet comprising about 10,000 pages was filed over 01 year ago citing 49 prosecution witnesses but charges are yet to be framed. It is therefore obvious that trial will take a long time to conclude. In the meantime however, the petitioner has already suffered more than 01 year of judicial custody and has been exposed to ‘prisonisation’; and there appears to be no cogent basis to satisfy the test of ‘necessity’ as discussed above for his continued detention.

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 16 stipulating that:
Upon a conspectus of the foregoing legal position, and considering the allegations in the subject FIR insofar as they relate to the petitioner, this court is accordingly persuaded to admit the petitioner - Amit Agrawal s/o Mahender Kumar Agarwal - to regular bail, pending trial, subject to the following conditions:

1. The petitioner shall furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lacs Only) with 02 sureties in the like amount from family members, subject to the satisfaction of the learned trial court.
2. The petitioner shall furnish to the Investigating Officer, a cellphone number on which the petitioner may be contacted at any time and shall ensure that the number is kept active and switched-on at all times.
3. If the petitioner has a passport, he shall surrender the same to the learned trial court and shall not travel out of the country without prior permission of the learned trial court.
4. The petitioner shall not contact, nor visit, nor offer any inducement, threat or promise to any of the prosecution witnesses or other persons acquainted with the facts of case. The petitioner shall not tamper with evidence nor otherwise indulge in any act or omission that is unlawful or that would prejudice the proceedings in the pending trial.
5. In case of any change in his residential address/contact details, the petitioner shall promptly inform the Investigating Officer in writing.
6. The petitioner shall not open or close any bank account, without giving to the Investigating Officer 30 days prior written notice; and would furnish to the Investigating Officer the full particulars of any such action that he may take.

For sake of clarity, the Bench then clarifies in para 17 stating that:
Nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the pending case.

What’s more, the Bench then directs in para 18 holding that:
A copy of this order be sent to the concerned Jail Superintendent forthwith, for information and compliance.

Furthermore, the Bench then adds in para 19 observing that:
The petition stands disposed of in the above terms.

Finally, the Bench then draws the curtains of this robust judgment directing and holding in para 20 that:
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.

All told, we thus see that the Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Anup Jairam Bhambhani has made it indubitably clear which must be always most strictly followed by all the Judges in India while dealing with bail cases that they should not be swayed away easily by all the allegations and multiple offences that are mentioned in the first information report (FIR) or chargesheet as they may be false also but must instead examine the specific allegations with a judicial mind against the particular accused who has sought bail.

There can be just no gainsaying that the Courts must also unfailingly adhere to the time tested dictum which even the Apex Court has repeatedly given topmost priority that:
Bail is the rule and jail is the exception. It merits just no reiteration that this will ensure that innocents don’t just keep languishing in jails on mere suspicion or on mere allegations as we have seen that many cases later turn out to be false but the life of innocent is ruined who suffers jail sentence for no fault before being even convicted which is nothing but judicial murder which cannot be ever justified on one pretext or the other!

What also definitely has to be duly acknowledged is that in such cases, the innocent is also most irrationally deprived from the most basic legal and Constitutional right of contributing to preparing for his defence which Judges must always bear in mind as has also been reiterated by the Delhi High Court so very commendably in this leading case! There can be just no denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh.