It undoubtedly stands to reason that while striking the right chord and yet once again in a most significant reaffirmation of the well settled legal principles that governs bail cancellation, the Supreme Court in a major development in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Sanjay Kumar Jangid & Anr vs Mukesh Kumar Agarwal & Anr in Criminal Appeal Nos. 2381 of 2025 (Arising from SLP (Crl) Nos. 1632 of 2025) in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced as recently as on May 2, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms most unequivocally that once bail is granted, it cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner unless supervening circumstances justify such action. It must be noted that this was held so clearly by the top court while setting aside an order of the Rajasthan High Court that was pronounced on 3 December 2024 that had cancelled the bail of the two accused in a forgery and cheating case and reinstating the appellants’ bail. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this remarkable, robust, rational and recent judgment authored by the Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Vikram Nath and Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Mehta sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
Leave granted.
As we see, the Bench then specifies in para 2 of this brilliant judgment that, The instant appeal has been preferred by the accused-appellants against the judgment and order dated 03.12.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in S.B. Criminal Bail Cancellation Application No. 73/2022 wherein the High Court cancelled the regular bail which was granted to the appellants vide order dated 22.03.2022.
Briefly stated, while elaborating briefly on facts of the case, the Bench specifies in para 3 disclosing that:
Brief facts of the case are that the present matter pertains to FIR No. 854/2021 dated 15.11.2021 registered at P.S. Mansarovar, Jaipur City under sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, 447 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) lodged at the behest of Mukesh Kumar, i.e. respondent no. 1 herein, against Raj Rani Mittal, Deepak Jangid, Rahul Jangid, Dontesh Jangid i.e. appellant no. 2 herein, and other.
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 4 revealing that:
The instant appellants were arrested on 03.02.2022 during the investigation, and thereafter, the chargesheet was filed on 21.03.2023 for the offences mentioned in the FIR. On the basis of the investigation, it was found that as a part of the housing scheme named Padam Vihar, Plot No. A-56 was allotted to the respondent no. 1 by the society on 29.11.2014. The respondent no. 1 was not regularly residing at the said plot, and on one of the occasions when he was visiting the said plot, he came to know that one Deepak Jangid, who lives near the said plot, in connivance with one Raj Rani Mittal, has hatched a conspiracy and dishonestly got the said plot registered in his name and submitted fake documents to the Jaipur Development Authority (JDA).
As it turned out, the Bench while delving deeper then enunciates in para 5 pointing out that:
It was further alleged that the accused persons, in connivance with the JDA officials, got the lease issued in their name. The modus operandi adopted by the accused persons was that they, with the help of one Jitendra Kumar Kashyap, prepared fake documents and approached Raj Rani Mittal, who was reflected to be the purported owner of the plot in question as per some old documents. Thereafter, the accused Rahul Jangid got an agreement prepared in the name of Raj Rani Mittal and Deepak Jangid dated 14.09.2021, transferring the said plot to Deepak Jangid. Further, Rahul Jangid also got another document in the nature of a General Power of Attorney (GPA) prepared, thereby appointing himself as the attorney holder of Raj Rani Mittal on 14.09.2021. The said GPA was notarized in Jaipur on 16.09.2021 in the presence of the instant appellants.
Suffice to say, the Bench then observes in para 6 that:
Therefore, the role that was attributed to the appellants herein was that since they were witnesses to the said GPA and also related to the other accused persons, therefore, they were an intricate part of the entire conspiracy. Another allegation against the instant appellants is that it was in their presence that the registry of the said plot was done on 19.10.2021, based on forged documents.
Truth be told, the Bench then lays bare in para 7 disclosing that:
The present appellants were granted regular bail by the High court, vide order dated 22.03.2022, mainly based on the ground that the trial may take long time to conclude and it is just and proper to release the accused persons (appellants herein) on bail in the meanwhile.
As things stands, the Bench then specifies in para 8 stating that, Consequently, respondent no. 1, i.e. the complainant, filed the Bail Cancellation Application No. 73/2022 under Section 439(2) of the CrPC seeking cancellation of the regular bail granted to the appellants. The High Court, vide order dated 29.03.2023, dismissed the bail cancellation application.
Do note, the Bench notes in para 9 that:
Aggrieved by the order dated 29.03.2023, respondent no. 1 filed a Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 8357 of 2023 before this Court which, on admission, got converted into Criminal Appeal No. 1293 of 2024. This Court, vide order dated 01.03.2024, set aside the High Court’s order dated 29.03.2023 on account of it being cryptic and non-speaking, and remitted the matter back to the High Court with directions to give detailed reasons for the dismissal of the bail cancellation application.
Do also note, the Bench then reveals in para 10 mentioning that:
Accordingly, the Bail Cancellation Application No. 73 of 2022 preferred by the respondent no. 1 was restored before the High Court for fresh consideration, wherein the High Court, vide order dated 03.12.2024, allowed the Bail Cancellation Application No. 73 of 2022, and cancelled the regular bail granted to the appellants herein, mainly on the grounds of abuse of liberty granted and post-release conduct of the appellants.
Further, the Bench points out in para 11 that:
The High Court held that securing the presence of the accused before the Court had become a hard task in itself and reflects the abuse of liberty granted to the accused persons. Further, it was observed that a number of cases have been lodged against the accused persons post their release on bail, amongst which one relates to making an assault over the police party who had gone to apprehend the accused, speaks volumes about the post-bail conduct of the accused persons. The criminal antecedents of the accused were also considered as a factor in cancelling the bail.
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 12 that:
Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 03.10.2024, the appellants are before us.
Most significantly, most remarkably and so also most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 16 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that:
The jurisprudence surrounding cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) of the CrPC is very clear as to that bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner unless any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to enjoy the concession of bail during the trial (Dolat Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349). The grounds for cancellation of bail as illustrated in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481 and reiterated in Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 4 SCC 272 broadly lay down the grounds on which a bail can be cancelled where:
- The accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity
- Interferes with the course of investigation
- Attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses
- Threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation
- There is likelihood of his fleeing to another country
- Attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency
- Attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety
These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive. It has also been echoed in various judgments that rejection of bail stands on a different platform as compared to cancellation of bail which is considered to be a harsh order as it interferes with the liberty of an individual, and hence, it must not be lightly resorted to.
Most rationally, the Bench then underscores in para 17 propounding that:
A perusal of the record makes it apparent that even though multiple FIRs have been lodged against the co-accused persons after the appellants’ release on bail, i.e. on 22.03.2022, the names of the instant appellants have not been mentioned in most of these FIRs, nor any allegation has been levied against the appellants. It is only in FIR No. 11/2023 dated 23.01.2023 under Sections 143, 332 and 353 of the IPC that the appellants have been named. However, even in the said offence, after due investigation, chargesheet was filed on 10.07.2024, wherein the appellants were not charge-sheeted. Therefore, merely because subsequent FIRs have been registered against the other co-accused persons, it does not become a valid or fair ground to seize the liberty of bail that has been extended to the appellants herein. The exercise of cancellation of bail is a strict one, and needs to be executed in a restrictive manner, only when the circumstances demand for it. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that the instant case is not a fit one to employ the provisions of cancellation of bail and curb the appellants’ liberty.
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 18 stating that:
Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed, and the impugned order dated 03.12.2024 is set aside. We also hereby direct expeditious disposal of the trial pending before the Court of Magistrate, in connection with FIR No. 854/2021 registered at P.S. Mansarovar, District Jaipur for the offence(s) under Sections 420,406, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the IPC, within eight months from the receipt of this order.
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 19 that, Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
In conclusion, it thus certainly merits just no reiteration that all the courts must definitely pay heed strictly to what the Apex Court has held in this leading case and earlier also in many leading cases as discussed hereinabove. What the Courts must also always bear in mind is that when bail is once granted, it should not be cancelled mechanically unless supervening circumstances justify such cancellation of bail as has been held so very elegantly, eloquently and effectively in this leading case. No denying or disputing it!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh
