Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh — Judgment Summary (preserved text)

Note: wording and content preserved exactly; formatting adjusted for readability.

It is most significant to note that while clarifying the law on homicide, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Maniklal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 5578 of 2024 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 1107 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced just recently on September 12, 2025 has laid down comprehensive guidelines for the courts to determine when an offence constitutes murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) versus an attempt to murder under Section 307, particularly in cases where death occurs long after the initial assault due to supervening medical complications. It must be noted that the Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that a delayed death from complications like septicemia does not reduce the culpability from murder if the original injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Very rightly so!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:

This appeal is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh dated 30.07.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) by which the High Court partly allowed the Criminal Appeal filed by the appellant herein and altered the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “the IPC”) into one under Section 307 of the IPC.”

As we see, the Bench then observes in para 2 that:

It appears from the materials on record that four persons including the appellant herein were put to trial for the offence of murder of one Rekhchand Verma in the Sessions Case No. 21 of 2022 arising from the First Information Report bearing No. 0061 of 2022 dated 22.02.2022 registered with the Saja Police Station, District Bemetara, State of Chhattisgarh for the offence punishable under Sections 458, 294, 506(B) and 323 of the IPC respectively.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 3 about factual matrix while elaborating on the prosecution case disclosing that:

It is the case of the prosecution that on the fateful day of the incident the appellant herein along with three other co-accused trespassed into the house of the deceased and dragged him upto the terrace of the house and flung him down. After the deceased was thrown down from the terrace, the appellant and other co-accused assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs. The injured was shifted to the hospital in a very critical condition. Dying declaration of the deceased was recorded vide Ex. P-22 in which he named the appellant herein and the other co-accused. The deceased also made oral dying declarations before the doctors who attended him medically in the hospital.”

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 revealing and observing that, “It appears that the injured Rekhchand Verma survived for about nine months from the date of the alleged incident. Ultimately, he died on 08.11.2022 on account of septicemia and pneumonia leading to cardio-respiratory arrest. In such circumstances, Section 302 of the IPC came to be added. The case was committed to the Court of Session. At the end of the trial, the appellant and the three co-accused came to be convicted of the offence of murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment.”

Further, the Bench lays bare in para 5 stating that:

The appellant herein along with co-accused, namely, Rupesh Kumar Sahu preferred Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2023 in the High Court whereas the Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2023 was preferred by Gulsan Sinha and Criminal Appeal No. 1151 of 2024 was preferred by one Chavendra Patel.”

Furthermore, the Bench specifies in para 6 stating that:

All the three criminal appeals referred to above were heard by the High Court and those were partly allowed vide the Impugned Judgment and order passed by the High Court. As stated above, the High Court altered the conviction of the appellant herein and the other co-accused from Section 302 of the IPC to one under Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/-.”

As things stands, the Bench points out in para 7 that:

In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant Maniklal Sahu is here before us with the present appeal.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 67 that:

In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the three doctors referred to above, the cause of death of deceased Rekhchand was cardiorespiratory failure. The injuries suffered by him at the time of assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore hepatic dysfunction. The injuries suffered by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and would come under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 of the IPC. The deceased ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries. The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not, in our view, alter the culpability. In the case in hand, there had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to snap the chain of causation. It would have been quite a different matter if the original injuries had healed meanwhile or ceased to be dangerous to life and the fatal complications had set in unexpectedly. If that would have been so, the appellant herein would then at any rate be entitled to the benefit of doubt as to the cause of death.”

It cannot be lost sight of and is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 68 that:

We are taken by surprise as to on what basis the High Court has recorded a finding that the deceased succumbed to the injuries suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment. There is absolutely no evidence in this regard. Not a single suggestion in this regard was put by the defence counsel in the cross-examination of the doctors. Even otherwise this aspect is wholly irrelevant in view of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC. In other words, according to the High Court, since the deceased died after about nine months from the date of the incident due to lack of proper treatment the case is not one of murder. This finding in our opinion is erroneous. On one hand, the High Court believes that the cause of death was due to injuries suffered by the deceased, and on the other hand, takes the view that as he died after nine months due to lack of proper treatment the offence would fall within Section 307 of the IPC.”

Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 69 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that:

1. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to cause death, though the death occurred after several days of septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 of the IPC.

2. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC.

3. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC, provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be liable to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.

4. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal result is wholly irrelevant.

5. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused, then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death, even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.

6. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can be said that the injury is one which may, in particular circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not merely of culpable homicide.

7. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death.

8. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death although death was ultimately due to supervention of some other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not of such significance. What is significant is whether death was only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred in due course.

9. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.”

As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 70 that:

In view of the aforesaid, all that we can say is that the High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the IPC on the ground that the victim survived for almost nine months from the date of the incident, and died on account of pneumonia and other complications during the course of treatment and not due to the injuries suffered at the time of assault. We do not agree with the view expressed by the High Court in the Impugned Judgment and order.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench then directs and holds in para 71 that:

In the circumstances referred to above, we reach the conclusion that there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 72 that:

Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh