It is entirely in order and so also absolutely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord in reinforcing the right to speedy trial, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @RL Chongthu v. State of Bihar in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 10130 of 2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 1339 that was pronounced as recently as on November 20, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that the right under Article 21 extends to the stage of investigation and unexplained delays in filing chargesheet can be a ground for quashing prosecution.

To put it differently, the Apex Court has made it indubitably clear that whenever there is a large gap between the FIR and the chargesheet, the Court must seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself about its adequacy. We thus see that the Apex Court Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh quashed the criminal proceedings against an IAS officer Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu by citing an unjustified delay of over a decade in the investigation.

It must be mentioned here that the appeal was filed by the petitioner against a judgment of the Patna High Court dated May 9, 2025 which had refused to quash the order of cognizance passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa, in 2022. It must be also laid bare here that the matter pertained to grave allegations of irregularities in granting arms licenses during the Appellant’s tenure as District Magistrate, Saharsa, in 2005. We thus see that the Apex Court allowed the appeal, set aside the cognizance order and the sanction for prosecution. The top court unequivocally observed that:
The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence.” Absolutely right!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Sanjay Karol for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The Appellant is aggrieved by the High Court of Judicature at Patna’s refusal in exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 in terms of judgment and order dated 9th May 20252 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 62048 of 2023, wherein the prayer was to quash and order taking cognizance dated 1st June 2022 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sahasra in connection with Sahasra Sadar P.S Case No. 112 of 2005 dated 24th April 2005.”

Briefly stated, the Bench while putting things in perspective points out in para 3 about the factual aspects envisaging that:
As can be seen, the genesis of this case is over twenty years old. It is necessary to recapitulate past events in order to appreciate the context in which the impugned judgement is under challenge before us.

1. The Appellant is an officer of the Indian Administrative Services, Bihar Cadre. He was posted as District Magistrate-cum-Licensing Authority, Saharsa, Bihar on 24 December 2002 and remained in possession till his transfer to Banka on 11 April 2005.
2. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India passed an order vide letter No. 11026/76/2004, directing further streamlining of the procedure for issuance of arms licences.
3. For compliance of the directions issued, one Bal Krishna Jha, ASI was deputed to collect information. It was found that 7 persons to whom arms licences had been issued were unverified. The details as given in the FIR are:
   • Omprakash Tiwari, S/o Jagtanand Tiwari, R/o Patna, presently at Chitragupt Nagar, Kayasth Tola, Saharsa.
   • Smt. Rani Durgawati, W/o Omprakash Tiwari, R/o Patna, presently at Chitragupt Nagar, Kayasth Tola, Saharsa.
   • Hariom Kumar, S/o Jago Singh, Ward No. 15, Bokaro Shankarwar Tola, P.S. Mokama, District-Patna, presently at Shankar Chowk, Saharsa.
   • Abhishek Tripathi, S/o Vishwajeevan Tripathi, Village-Rajendra Tola, Balwa Tal, Motihari, at present Kayasth Tola.
   • Uday Shankar Tiwari, S/o Jagtanand Tiwari, R/o Patna, at present Chitragupt Nagar, Kayasth Tola, Saharsa.
   • Rajesh Kumar, S/o Keshav Prasad, Village-Chitragupt Nagar, Parmaveer Albert kka Institute & Cultural Arts Center, Saharsa.
   • Madhup Kumar Singh, S/o Shambhu Nath Singh, R/o Rajapatti, Dumra Road, Sitamarhi, at present Gangjala, Saharsa.
   The FIR stated that some licences were issued to persons not physically capable, in violation of Section 13(2) of the Arms Act, 1959, giving undue benefit to the applicants. The then licensing authority (the appellant) was named an accused for alleged conspiracy and abetment.
4. After investigation, chargesheet dated 9 July 2005 was filed sending one accused (Omprakash Tiwari) for trial while investigation continued against others. A supplementary chargesheet dated 13 April 2006 noted that no offence under the Arms Act was made out against the appellant, and allegations were ‘false’. The complainant submitted ‘no objection’.
5. The Sub-Divisional Officer of Police, Sadar, Saharsa by letter dated 26 November 2007 addressed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa. A request for re-investigation was resubmitted by letter dated 5 October 2008.
6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa in an order dated 19 June 2009 held that re-investigation could not be granted, but permitted further investigation under Section 173(8), CrPC.
7. The General Administration Department, Government of Bihar by letter dated 10 December 2015 asked the Appellant to show cause regarding the issuance of arms licences to 16 accused persons.
8. The explanation was accepted and the Department discharged the Appellant on 25 February 2016, closing disciplinary proceedings. Chargesheet No. 834/2020, after further investigation, was submitted on 31 August 2020.
9. The State granted sanction under Section 197 CrPC on 27 April 2022. Cognizance was taken on 1 June 2022. The appellant challenged the same before the High Court, leading to the impugned judgment.

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 that:
The High Court rejected the application under Section 482, CrPC observing that various illegalities and irregularities pervaded the issuance of licenses by the appellant, in as much as certain persons who were physically unfit, were issued licenses; in some of the applications approved, the bodyguard of the appellant was listed in the “column of care”; in yet others licenses were issued a mere 2 days after calling for the police report, in which time the said report was obviously not furnished. Regarding the departmental proceedings, it was observed that while discharging the appellant, the department had asked him to remain careful in the future which, cannot be equated to exoneration in departmental proceedings. Further, on the aspect of power vested in the authority as per section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, it was held that the power cannot be used and arbitrary and unjust manner. The Court did observe that the Trial Court, keeping in view the many years that had passed since the inception of the case, ought to conclude the trial expeditiously by conducting the same on day-to-day basis.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 17 noting that:
The inescapable conclusion arrived at from the above discussion in the Indian context, is that there has been an evolution in legislative wisdom over the years and the criminal procedure have moved from a period of no timelines and minimal judicial interventions/oversight to progressively more oversight and recognition of the need to conclude investigations in time. It may be true that no strict timelines are provided in the CrPC, but it is equally so that investigations are to be completed in reasonable time.”

Most rationally and most forthrightly, it cannot be lost on us that the Bench observes in para 19 that:
Coming back to the present case, why the investigation in this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us. Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by the appellant were also issued to a fictitious person even at the time when the order for further investigation was taken. Out of the 16 accused persons one person stood charge-sheeted in terms of the first chargesheet and the remaining, excluding the appellant and one Abhishek, were charge-sheeted by way of the second chargesheet.

When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as above - 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet.

In other words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation must be drawn to a close.

This is evidenced by the fact that further investigation or rather permission therefor, can be granted even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal Gautam v The State Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) 7968 of 2016] Where though, Article 21 would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday existence.”

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 20 that:
On this count, prosecution against the appellant is liable to be quashed. The conclusion is that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also consequent action, we have decided in favour of the appellant. The appeal is accordingly allowed.”

Finally and far most significantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 21 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely directing and holding that:
Before parting with this matter, we deem it fit to issue the following directions:

(i) In view of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali27, it can be seen that the ‘leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being the position, in our considered view, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the court must perform.

(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished. The direction above does not come based on this case alone. This Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. This Court has time and again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a reality.

(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that the process of investigation has many moving parts and is therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of this judgement, clearly establishes that investigations cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence.

If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.

(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion.

Pending application(s) if any, shall stand(s) disposed of.”

In a nutshell, we thus see that the Apex Court issues most commendable directions by which it is made crystal clear that the Court is bound to seek explanation from the investigating agency if there is a large gap between FIR and chargesheet for the inordinate delay. It also underlined that statutory recognition of prompt investigation is a pre-constitutional stipulation. It also underscores the undying importance of reasons in not only just judicial sphere but so also in administrative matters. We thus see that the criminal proceedings against the IAS officer who is the petitioner is quashed for delay of more than a decade in the investigation proceedings. Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh