It has to be definitely taken note that the Delhi High Court in a latest judgment titled Kuldeep Singh Sengar vs Central Bureau of Investigation in CRL.A. 53/2020 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:11860-DB that was pronounced just recently on December 23, 2025 has suspended the life sentence that had been awarded to expelled BJP leader Kuldeep Singh Sengar who was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial Court in the Unnao rape case. It must be noted that the Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr Justice Subramonium Prasad and Hon’ble Mr Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar suspended Sengar’s sentence until his appeal is heard, allowing him to remain out on bail. It is also worth mentioning here that the Division Bench released Sengar on bail while directing him to furnish a personal bond of Rs 15 lakh with three sureties of the like amount and also directed Sengar not to come within a 5-km radius of the victim’s house and not threaten her or her mother.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Subramonium Prasad for a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The present application has been filed by the Appellant under Section 389(1) read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1963 [CrPC] seeking regular suspension of sentence during the pendency of the appeal.
As we see, the Division Bench then lays bare in para 2 that:
The Appellant herein has been convicted for offences punishable under Sections 376/363/366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [IPC] read with Sections 5(c)/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 [POCSO Act] vide judgment dated 16.12.2019 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge – West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [learned Trial Court] in Sessions Case No. 448/2019 arising out of FIR No. 96/2018 registered at Police Station Makhi, Unnao, Uttar Pradesh, reregistered as RC-08(S)/2018, PS CBI/ACB/Lucknow [Impugned Judgment]. Vide a separate order on sentence dated 20.12.2019 passed by the learned Trial Court, the Appellant has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the remainder of life, along with a fine of Rs. 25,00,000/- and an additional compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- payable to the mother of the survivor. Against the Impugned Judgment as well as the Order on sentence, the Appellant has approached this Court by way of the Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2020, which is pending adjudication.
Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 4 that:
The incident of rape upon the Victim/Survivor came to be registered under Case No. SC – 448/2019 arising out of FIR No. 96/2018 at PS Makhi, Unnao under Sections 363, 366, 376, 506 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. Investigation into these allegations was handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI] vide a Notification dated 12.04.2018 issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, after which a case RC 08(S)/2018 dated 12.04.2018 came to be registered in the ACB, CBI, Lucknow Branch.
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench envisages in para 9 that:
Sum and substance of allegations levelled against the Appellant in RC 08(S)/2018 are that on 04.06.2017 at about 8:00 PM, one ‘SS’ who was the Accused No. 1 (A-1) in the RC 08(S)/2018, enticed and induced the Victim/Survivor to accompany her, on the pretext of providing a job at the residence of the Appellant. The Victim/Survivor was taken by ‘SS’ inside the house of the Appellant from the rear portion of the property where there were no security guards, whereby the Appellant then forcibly raped the Victim/Survivor.
While continuing in the same vein, the Division Bench points out in para 10 stating that:
It is noted in the Final Report filed under Section 173 CrPC, that the Victim/Survivor did not reveal the incident to anyone, as she was threatened by the Appellant, to the effect that were the Victim/Survivor to speak anything about it, some untoward harm would entail. However, the Victim/Survivor later came to confide in her uncle (PW-9), who then relayed the facts to his sister-in-law, being the Victim/Survivor’s mother (PW-8), at whose instance the FIR was registered. However, since the local police did not take any action, mother of the Victim/Survivor was constrained to approach the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, POCSO Act, Unnao, UP, alleging inter alia that the Appellant threatened the Victim/Survivor to kill her and her family, were the details of the incident that occurred on 04.06.2017 revealed to anyone.
As it turned out, the Division Bench enunciates in para 11 laying bare herein that:
The Final Report also takes note of the circumstances surrounding the death of the father of the Victim/Survivor in judicial custody. It has been stated that upon returning to Village Makhi on 03.04.2018 father of the Victim/Survivor was assaulted by the brother of the Appellant at District Court, Unnao, and later, was planted with a country made pistol/gun with four live cartridges, allegedly under the supervision of the Appellant. In any event, father of the Victim/Survivor was sent to judicial custody, where he succumbed to his injuries in the early morning of 09.04.2019. This incident is the subject matter of RC 09(S)/2018 under Sections 323, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3/25 Arms Act, lodged against father of the Victim/Survivor.
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 12 that:
Based on the statement of the Victim/Survivor in her statement under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC as well as the date of birth recorded as 17.08.2001 at the time of her primary education in Akbal Bahadur Singh [ABS] Public School, Saidapur, Sarei Khande, Post Chhiblaj, District Raebareli, Uttar Pradesh, the investigation of CBI concluded that the Victim/Survivor was a child within the meaning of Section 2(d) POCSO.
Most significantly, the Division Bench encapsulates in para 40 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that:
Learned Counsel for the Victim/Survivor has drawn the attention of this Court to a catena of points which have been highlighted in the earlier judgments to contend that the investigation has been faulty, the Appellant, who is in position of authority, has bent the law to his advantage and a premier institution like the CBI has been compromised in the nature and manner of collecting evidence. All these arguments cannot advance the case of the Victim/Survivor at this juncture. The Appellant has been found guilty of an offence under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act and punished under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Appellant has also been convicted in RC 09(S)/2018 and RC 10(S)/2018 and is undergoing imprisonment for a period of ten years for offences under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. In the opinion of this Court, once this Court is prima facie of the opinion, for the purpose of the instant Application, that the offence under Section 5 of the POCSO Act is not attracted in the present case, and, therefore, the Appellant cannot be sentenced for the remainder of his life, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Victim/Survivor that investigation was compromised cannot be a ground not to suspend the sentence of the Appellant, more so looking at the period of incarceration already undergone.
Do further note, the Division Bench then notes in para 41 that:
Substantial arguments have been raised by both the sides on the question of alibi and on the question of age. Learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant has very strenuously contended that the learned Trial Court has erred in relying on the records of a private school and ignored the records of a Government school, wherein the latter shows that at the time when the offence was committed, the Victim/Survivor was not a minor. On the other hand, learned SPP for the CBI has relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court in Lilaben v. State of Gujarat (supra) to contend that the question of age ought not be gone into at the time of hearing an application for suspension of sentence. This Court, in any event, has made no observations on the discrepancy or otherwise in the age of the Victim/Survivor, in adherence to the findings in Lilaben v. State of Gujarat (supra).
It is worth noting that the Division Bench notes in para 42 that:
In the opinion of this Court, at this stage, being satisfied that (i) offence under Section 5(c) of the POCSO Act is not made out against the Appellant on account of him not falling within the definition of a ‘public servant’, (ii) only an offence under Section 3 of the POCSO Act would be made out, and (iii) looking at the fact that the Appellant has already undergone about 7 years and 5 months under incarceration, which is more than minimum number of years under Section 4 of the POCSO Act prior to its amendment in 2019, this Court is inclined to suspend the sentence of the Appellant. Needless to state, all the issues regarding alibi, age, etc. can be gone into detail at the time of hearing of the Appeal.
Most remarkably, the Division Bench points out in para 43 that:
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Victim/Survivor that the Appeal was admitted on 17.01.2020 and this Court ought to have heard the Appeal finally instead of deciding the instant Application for suspension of sentence is attractive, but for the fact that the learned Counsel for the Victim/Survivor has moved an application being CRL. M.A. 21475/2025 for advancing further evidence. Recording of further evidence, as prayed for in the said application, would entail examination of witnesses for which purpose, the matter would have to be referred back to the learned Trial Court. In such a situation, letting the Appellant be in Jail when he has already spent about 7 years and 5 months in jail, would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
In Hussainara Khatoon (V) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 108, the Apex Court has held that speedy trial is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which would apply to the Appellant as well. This principle has been reiterated in several Judgments of the Apex Court such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671, A.R.Antulay (supra), Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 and Akhtari Bi v. State of M.P., (2001) 4 SCC 355. The number of years already undergone in incarceration is a very major factor while considering an Application under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C and this Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Appellant has already undergone about 7 years and 5 months under incarceration as on 30.11.2025.
Most forthrightly, the Division Bench postulates in para 44 holding clearly that:
Learned Counsel for the Victim/Survivor has also laid great emphasis on the issue of life of the Victim/Survivor being in danger. Undoubtedly, the Trial was transferred by the Apex Court from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi keeping in mind this very fact of the Victim/Survivor being vulnerable and her father having been killed, for which the Appellant has been held guilty of the offence under Section 304-(II) of the IPC. It is also a fact that attempts have been made to harm the relatives and lawyers of the Victim/Survivor and, therefore, this aspect is a very important factor which this Court has to keep in mind. The Apex Court vide Order dated 01.08.2019 in SMW (Crl.) No. 1/2019 has granted CRPF cover to the Victim/Survivor and her family. However, vide Order dated 23.05.2025, the Apex Court has withdrawn security from the mother of the Victim/Survivor and other relative(s). However, the CRPF cover continues to be provided to the Victim/Survivor as on date. This Court expects that CRPF cover will continue in order to protect to the Victim/Survivor. At the same time, however, the argument of keeping the Appellant in custody because of threat perception to the Victim/Survivor, in the opinion of this Court is not a tenable argument to deny the benefit of Section 389 Cr.P.C to the Appellant, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Kashmira Singh (supra).
The Courts cannot keep a person in custody being apprehensive that the police/paramilitary may not do its job properly. Such an observation or such a thought process would undermine the laudable work of our police/paramilitary forces. The concerned DCP of the area where the Victim is currently residing, is directed to personally ensure and supervise the protection given to the Victim/Survivor during the pendency of the Appeal. The State is also providing for the accommodation of the Victim. The DCW is responsible to ensure that the Victim is provided with sufficient accommodation and such arrangement is directed to be continued till further orders. In any way, the appeal is in this Court and it is always open for the Victim to approach this Court, if required.
It would be instructive to note that the Division Bench hastens to add in para 45 noting and stipulating that:
Considering all these issues and circumstances, this Court is inclined to suspend the sentence of the Appellant during the pendency of the Appeal, on the following conditions:
- The Appellant shall furnish a security in the sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- with three sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Jail Superintendent. The sureties must be residents of Delhi.
- The Appellant is directed not to come within a 5 km radius of the place of residence of the Victim/Survivor.
- The Appellant is directed to stay in Delhi during the pendency of the Appeal to ensure that the Appellant is available for completing the remaining part of the sentence in case he is found to be guilty.
- The Appellant is directed not to threaten the Victim/Survivor or the mother of the Victim/Survivor.
- The Appellant is directed to deposit his passport with the Trial Court.
- The Appellant is directed to report in person to the Local Police Station once a week, i.e., on every Monday between 10:00 AM and 11:00 AM. The Police is directed to ensure that the Appellant is not kept waiting unnecessarily and is released within one hour after completing the formalities.
For sake of clarity, the Division Bench clarifies and holds in para 46 that:
It is made clear that violation of any of the above conditions will entail cancellation of the suspension of sentence.
Finally, the Division Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 47 that:
Let this Order be communicated to the concerned Jail Superintendent.
CRL.A. 53/2020 & CRL.M.A. 21475/2025
Subject to the orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice, list before the Roster Bench on 15.01.2026.
In conclusion, we thus see clearly that the primary reason for granting bail to Kuldeep Singh Sengar in Unnao rape case is that as held by the Delhi High Court that Sengar cannot be categorized as a public servant under Section 5 (c) of the POCSO Act or Section 376(2)(b) of the IPC. It must be seen that the Delhi High Court also took into account the period of incarceration already undergone by Sengar while ordering the suspension of sentence. Sengar has undoubtedly got temporary relief from Delhi High Court but the victim has declared firmly to go to Supreme Court. We have to keep our fingers crossed on what Apex Court will decide finally if the victim appeals against this leading case to the top court!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh
