Long Cohabitation Shows That Relationship Partook Character Of Consensual Sex: Kerala HC
It is definitely most pragmatic and entirely in the fitness of things that while striking the right chord, the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Pradeep v. The Station House Officer in Crl.MC No. 5348 of 2019 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:KER:87073 that was pronounced just recently on November 17, 2025 while quashing a false promise to marry rape case registered against a man where the victim maintained sexual relationship with the accused when her husband was alive has held unambiguously that the long cohabitation of the accused and victim over a period of more than eight years showed that their relationship partook the character of consensual sex, and that the accused and victim had been behaving with each other like husband and wife.
We thus see that the Bench found that the final report and accompanying records relied on by the prosecution were not capable of bringing out the essential requirements for the prosecution of the petitioner in connection with the commission of the offences alleged against him. It was thus but quite ostensible that thus allowing the petition, the Bench quashed the proceedings against the petitioner. Very rightly so!
It is high time and misuse of rape laws must be checked. Consensual sex under no circumstances should ever be termed as rape. Why should a women agree to have sex with women without marriage? Why women is given blank cheque and men punished for rape even though women herself consents to the same? Even Apex Court has voiced its views in this regard and recommended that consensual sex should be decriminalized because there is huge misuse of rape laws. It is high time that Centre takes the initiative in this regard and amend the law accordingly!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice G Girish of Kerala High Court at Ernakulam sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The accused in S.C No.802/2019 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court-IX, Thiruvananthapuram has filed this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings against him in the said case. The allegation against the petitioner is that he committed the offences punishable under Sections 493, 496 and 376 I.P.C.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on the facts of the case stating that:
The prosecution case is summarised as follows:
The de facto complainant/second respondent is a widow having a daughter and a son aged 18 years and 16 years respectively. Her husband died in the year 2013. During 2009, the petitioner befriended the de facto complainant by calling her over mobile phone and rendered financial assistance to her. While so, on a day in the year 2009, the petitioner came to the room which the de facto complainant was occupying at Kuzhithura in connection with her business of sale of ‘agarbathi’ and ‘olibanum’, and indulged in sexual relationship with her after making her believe that he would marry her.
Thereafter, on 22.10.2013, the husband of the de facto complainant passed away. After the death of the husband of the de facto complainant, the petitioner resided along with the de facto complainant and her children and maintained the relationship with her. While so, the petitioner got employment as a Watcher in the Forest Department at Wayanad. Even thereafter, the petitioner used to come to the residence of the de facto complainant on leave and indulged in sexual relationship with her. When the de facto complainant insisted for the performance of a marriage, the petitioner tied a knot in the gold chain worn by her in front of a candle and lamp and made her believe that he had married her. The relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant went on for years.
While so, the de facto complainant came to know that the petitioner had married another woman residing at Aryanad. When the de facto complainant questioned the petitioner about the aforesaid alliance, he replied that though he had married another lady, he considered the de facto complainant alone as his wife and continued physical relationship with her. On 01.11.2017, the de facto complainant had the occasion to talk with the lady whom the petitioner had married, over telephone. At that time, the de facto complainant had told that lady that even before the petitioner married her, he had tied the nuptial knot upon her neck and that both of them were living as husband and wife for a long period.
However, the petitioner called the de facto complainant on 04.11.2017 and informed her that he does not want to continue the relationship with her and that she should not call him thereafter. Though the de facto complainant tried to contact the petitioner on several occasions thereafter, he did not care to respond. Though the de facto complainant came to the office of the petitioner at the place called Kattikulam, the petitioner did not care to accept her, and instead, shouted at her to leave from that place. Thus, the petitioner committed the aforesaid offences.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that:
As regards the offences under Sections 493 and 496 I.P.C incorporated in the final report, it has to be stated that a prosecution for the commission of the aforesaid offences is, prima facie, not maintainable since under Section 198 Cr.P.C, the court concerned is proscribed from taking cognizance of the said offences except upon a complaint made by a person aggrieved by the offence. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be compelled to face trial for the offences under Sections 493 and 496 I.P.C in a final report filed by the police under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.”
Most rationally, it is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 6 that:
As regards the offence under Section 376 I.P.C, it is pertinent to note that the facts revealed from the prosecution records itself make it clear that the sexual relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant was purely consensual. It is true that the de facto complainant had come forward with a contention that she extended consent for the above relationship believing the offer of marriage by the petitioner. However, it is not possible to attribute any credence to the aforesaid contention of the de facto complainant since it is seen that even as per her version she had been maintaining relationship with the petitioner from the year 2009 which was about four years prior to the death of her husband. It is not possible to accept the contention of the de facto complainant that she had extended consent for sexual relationship with the petitioner at a time when her husband was alive, believing the offer made by the petitioner to marry her. The subsequent conduct of the de facto complainant maintaining the relationship with the petitioner for about four years after the death of her husband, also show that the sexual relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant cannot be classified as rape. True that the de facto complainant has got a case that the petitioner contracted marriage with another lady during the year 2014 against the promise made to her that she alone would be considered as his wife. But the above allegation of de facto complainant is of no consequence since the statement of the de facto complainant itself would reveal that she maintained relationship with the petitioner even after knowing the aforesaid marriage of the petitioner with another lady. An overall analysis of the relationship between the petitioner and the de facto complainant for a period of more than eight years starting from 2009, when the husband of the de facto complainant was still alive, would make it clear that the consensual sex between the de facto complainant and the petitioner cannot be termed as rape.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 7 that:
The consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. A promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90 IPC. However, the position will be different if it is shown that the accused, with a view to elicit the assent of the victim, gave the false promise of marriage, without having the intention or inclination to marry her, and made the victim submit herself to him, and later on deceived her by backtracking from the promise of marriage.”
We see that in the next few paras from 8 to 11, the Bench dwells on various Apex Court rulings which are as follows:-
1. Uday v. State of Karnataka [(2003) 4 SCC 46];
2. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana [(2013) 7 SCC 675];
3. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra [(2019) 18 SCC 191];
4. Naim Ahamed v. State (NCT of Delhi), [(2023) 15 SCC 385].
It would be prudent to note that the Bench points out in para 12 noting that, “Thus, the consistent view being followed in the aforesaid judicial precedents is that absence of consent cannot be presumed in every case where the prosecutrix alleges that she indulged in sexual intercouse with the offender believing the offer of marriage made by him. For bringing home the offence of rape, it has to be established that from the very beginning the accused was not having any intention at all to marry the prosecutrix and that the offer of marriage was made as a ploy to make her surrender to him in order to satiate his carnal desires.”
Most significantly, the Bench then encapsulates in para 13 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that:
As far as the present case is concerned, the aforesaid vital requirement to establish misconception of facts vitiating the consent extended by the de facto complainant is lacking, and hence it cannot be said that the offence of rape is attracted. The long cohabitation of the accused and victim over a period of more than eight years itself show that their relationship partook the character of consensual sex, and that the accused and victim had been behaving with each other like husband and wife. The fact that the accused went in search of greener pasture for giving vent to his promiscuous sexual urge, and started a new relationship in the nature of marriage with another lady, by itself will not bring his prior relationship with the victim within the meaning of rape. Hence the proceedings initiated against the accused in connection with the commission of rape, is primafacie unsustainable.”
Finally and resultantly, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 14 that:
As a conclusion to the aforesaid discussion, I find that the final report and accompanying records relied on by the prosecution are not capable of bringing out the essential requirements for the prosecution of the petitioner in connection with the commission of the offences alleged against him. Therefore, the prayer of the petitioner to quash the proceedings against him, deserves to be allowed. In the result, the petition stands allowed. The proceedings against the petitioner in S.C No.802/2019 on the files of the Additional Sessions Court-IX, Thiruvananthapuram, which arose out of Crime No.3053/2017 of Fort Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, are hereby quashed.”
In a nutshell, this latest judgment by the Kerala High Court is a grim reminder yet again that misuse of rape laws is rampant by women which definitely cannot be glossed over any longer as even Apex Court has acknowledged it! Centre and Parliament must most promptly join hands to bring forth a new legislation in the upcoming winter session of Parliament to amend penal laws and not term sex with consent as rape so that this gross brazen abuse of rape laws by women is nipped in the bud altogether! It merits just no reiteration that the earlier this is done, the better it shall be as it will save the lives of so many men from being trampled upon ruthlessly and being in jail for many years! It definitely brooks no more delay any longer now!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh