CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1166 of 2001
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to
the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur upholding the
conviction of the appellants for offence punishable under Section 304
Part I read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the
'IPC') and the award of sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment as
awarded by the trial Court.
2. Prosecution version in a
nutshell is as follows:
On the morning of 26th April, 1987 Ramesh (hereinafter referred to as
the 'deceased') was returning from the house of Ismail Khan. He was
waylaid by the three accused persons who attacked him with knife, lathi
and rod. Ramesh sustained numerous injuries on his person. Rakesh Kumar
and Bittu alias Gurdeo Singh intervened. The incident was witnessed by
his mother Khargi Bai (PW-1), maternal grandmother Tulasa Bai (PW-22)
and others. Ramesh was taken to the Police Station where he lodged the
first information report (Ex.P.10) which was recorded by Head Constable
Santosh Kumar (PW-20). Ramesh was immediately taken to the District
Hospital at Bina where Dr. Rajnish Shrivastava (PW-11) examined him. He
found as many as 18 injuries on his body as per his report Ex.P.16.
Ramesh was admitted in the hospital. On the following day he was
referred to District Hospital, Sagar for X-ray and further treatment.
There he breathed last on 30.4.1987. Dr. M.C. Jain (PW-16) performed the
autopsy on the next day. Postmortem report is Ex.P.28.
During the course of investigation
knife article 'B' was recovered from the possession of accused Dashrath
alias Champa on the basis of the information supplied by him. Accused
Govind also made a disclosure statement leading to recovery of lathi
article 'D' and accused Satish made a statement leading to the recovery
of rod article 'C'.
On completion of investigation, a
challan was put up against the three accused persons for commission of
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
3. The three accused persons were
tried. Seven witnesses were examined as eye-witnesses to further the
prosecution version. They included the mother (PW-1) and grand mother
(PW-22) of the deceased. The other five eye-witnesses produced were
Laxmi Bai (PW-2), Asgari Begam (PW-4) and neighbours of the deceased and
Santosh Singh (PW-17), Rakesh (PW-18) and Bittu (PW-19). But none of the
witnesses admitted to having seen the incident. Therefore, the
prosecution with the permission of the Court cross examined them. The
trial Court was of the view that these witnesses were deliberately
making false statements and concealing the truth. But the First
Information Report (Ex.P10) was recorded by the Head Constable Santosh
Kumar (PW-20) on the information given by the deceased. The said Head
Constable had also recorded the statement of the deceased under Section
161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Cr.P.C.').
His statement is marked as Ex.P.32. Learned Additional Sessions Judge
treated both the statements to be statements under Section 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). Relying on
those statements and the medical evidence, the trial Court found that
Ramesh had died as a result of the injuries inflicted upon him by the
accused persons. But since none of the injuries was found on the vital
organs of the deceased it was held that the offence committed was
covered under Section 304 Part I IPC. The accused persons challenged
correctness of the judgment before the High Court by filing an appeal
which was dismissed by the impugned order.
4. Learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that there was no material evidence to connect
appellants with the crime and, therefore, both the trial Court and the
High Court were not justified in finding the accused persons guilty. It
is submitted that considering the nature of injuries sustained, it would
have been impossible for the deceased to make any statement.
5. Learned counsel for the State on
the other hand supported the judgments of the trial Court and the High
6. The factual scenario as borne out
from the records is that the deceased was brought to District hospital,
Bina where he was admitted for observation and treatment. Dr. Rajnish
Shrivastava (PW-11) found 18 injuries on his person. The doctor in cross
examination stated that the deceased was examined by him at 1.00 p.m. in
the afternoon on 26.4.1987. At that time the patient had not gone in
shock. It was later that shocks started developing resulting in fall of
blood pressure and vomiting as was recorded in bed head ticket (Ex.
P.17). The observation was recorded at 5.00 p.m. on 26.4.1987. The
deceased was admitted in District Hospital, Sagar. The bed head ticket
(Ex.P.27) shows that he was admitted in the hospital at 11.15 p.m. on
27.4.1987 and in the bed head ticket the general condition was recorded
to be satisfactory and also that he was conscious. The deceased breathed
his last three days later on 30.4.1987.
7. Though PWs. 18 and 1 stated that
the deceased was unconscious, PW-22 stated that he was in senses. It was
also stated by this witness that the deceased had lodged the report. She
also stated that the police had recorded the statement of the deceased.
Though some of the witnesses resiled from the statements made during
investigation, PW-19 stated that he and Ramesh's mother carried him to
the police station.
8. Santosh Kumar, Head Constable
(PW-20) had testified that the deceased was fully conscious when he was
brought to the police chowki and it was the deceased who had lodged the
complaint which was recorded by him. The statement of the deceased was
marked as Ex.P.32. The trial Court and the High Court relying on the
evidence of PW-20 concluded that the statement given by the deceased was
to be treated as a dying declaration. The bed head ticket of District
Hospital, Sagar, (Ex.P.27) shows that when the deceased was brought he
was conscious and his general condition was satisfactory.
These materials were sufficient to
discard the stand of the accused persons that the deceased was
unconscious when he was brought to the hospital. As the deceased died on
30.4.1987 the trial Court and the High Court treated the first
information report (Ex. P.10) to be in the nature of the dying
declaration; so was the statement of the deceased (Ex.P.32). In both
these statements the three accused persons have been named as the
assailants. The trial Court and the High Court analysed the evidence in
great detail and found that the prosecution established its stand
because of the dying declaration.
9. At this juncture, it is relevant
to take note of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, which deals with cases
in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be
found, etc. is relevant. The general rule is that all oral evidence must
be direct viz., if it refers to a fact which could be seen it must be
the evidence of the witness who says he saw it, if it refers to a fact
which could be heard, it must be the evidence of the witness who says he
heard it, if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other
sense, it must be the evidence of the witness who says he perceived it
by that sense. Similar is the case with opinion. These aspects are
elaborated in Section 60. The eight clauses of Section 32 are exceptions
to the general rule against hearsay just stated. Clause (1) of Section
32 makes relevant what is generally described as dying declaration,
though such an expression has not been used in any Statute. It
essentially means statements made by a person as to the cause of his
death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his
death. The grounds of admission are: firstly, necessity for the victim
being generally the only principal eye-witness to the crime, the
exclusion of the statement might deflect the ends of justice; and
secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a sanction equal
to the obligation of an oath.
The general principle on which this
species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope
of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and
the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the
truth; a situation so solemn and so lawful is considered by the law as
creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath
administered in a Court of justice. These aspects have been eloquently
stated by Lyre LCR in R. v. Wood Cock (1789) 1 Leach 500.
Shakespeare makes the wounded Melun, finding himself disbelieved while
announcing the intended treachery of the Dauphin Lewis explain:
"Have I met hideous death within my
view, Retaining but a quantity of life, Which bleeds away even as a form
of wax, Resolveth from his figure 'against the fire? What is the world
should make me now deceive, Since I must lose the use of all deceit?
Why should I then be false since it
is true That I must die here and live hence by truth?" (See King John,
Act 5, Sect.4)
10. The principle on which dying
declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim "nemo
moriturus proesumitur mentiri a man will not meet his maker with a lie
in his mouth."
11. This is a case where the basis
of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in
which a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying
that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to
accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements
of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the
dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice
because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious
crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a
scrap of evidence.
12. Though a dying declaration is
entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has
no scope of cross-examination. Such a scope is essential for eliciting
the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the
Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature
as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court
has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of
either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court
must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind
after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.
Once the Court is satisfied that the
declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its
conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as
an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in
several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which
could be summed up as under as indicated in Smt. Paniben v. State of
Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817):
(i) There is neither rule of law nor
of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without
corroboration. [See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
(1976) 2 SCR 764)]
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that
the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on
it, without corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar
Yadav and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v. State of
Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)]
(iii) The Court has to scrutinize
the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is
not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had
an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit
state to make the declaration. [See K. Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v.
The Public Prosecutor (AIR 1976 SC 1994)]
(iv) Where dying declaration is
suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.
[See Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC 264)]
(v) Where the deceased was
unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with
regard to it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v State of M.P.
(AIR 1982 SC 1021)]
(vi) A dying declaration which
suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. [See Ram
Manorath and Ors. v. State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654)(vii) Merely
because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the
occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State of Maharashtra v.
Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981 SC 617)]
(viii) Equally, merely because it is
a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the
shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza
and Ors. v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505).
(ix) Normally the Court in order to
satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye-witness
said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the
dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. [See Nanahau
Ram and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)].
(x) Where the prosecution version
differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said
declaration cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan
and Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)].
(xi) Where there are more than one
statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time
must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration
could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted.
[See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v.State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC
13. In the light of the above
principles, the acceptability of alleged dying declaration in the
instant case has to be considered. The dying declaration is only a piece
of untested evidence and must like any other evidence, satisfy the Court
that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is
absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny the Court is
satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the
deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent,
there shall be no legal impediment to make it basis of conviction, even
if there is no corroboration.
[See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. (JT 1992 (2) SC 417),
Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra (JT 1993 (5) SC 87),
Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT 1994 (3) SC
232) and State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (JT 1996 (2) SC 595)].
14. There is no material to show
that dying declarations were result of product of imagination, tutoring
or prompting. On the contrary, they appear to have been made by the
deceased voluntarily. It is trustworthy and has credibility.
15. In view of the factual scenario
as analysed in the background and the principles set out above the
inevitable conclusion is that the trial Court and the High Court were
justified in finding the accused persons guilty. There is no merit in
this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. The appellants who are on
bail shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve remainder of
sentence, if any.
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