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        Judgment: 
        Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8781 OF 2006P. Sathasivam, J.- Leave granted
 
                          
        This appeal is directed against the 
        judgment dated
        27.4.2006 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Regular
        First Appeal No. 188 of 2006 whereby the High Court
        dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein. The
        respondents are the sons of the appellant's elder brother
        who died in the year 1986. 
                          
        3) The brief facts are as under:In the year 1957, since the appellant was a handicapped
        person, the father of the appellant purchased a piece of land
        in the name of and for the benefit of the appellant herein,
        who was minor at that time by way of registered sale deed
        dated 02.09.1957. The father of the appellant died in the
        year 1965 and at the time of his death, the plot underneath
        the house in question was lying vacant. The appellant was
        actively engaged in the business, therefore, in the year 1966
        he rased a full fledged 3 storey house on the said plot with
        his funds. Moreover, a loan of Rs.30,000/- was also taken
        from the Life Insurance Corporation by the appellant for
        construction of the house and later on it was repaid.
 
                          
        After
        constructing the house, the first floor of the building was
        let out to one Aseema Architect by the appellant in the year
        1969. The appellant and his family and the respondents'
        father and his family were living together in House No.107,
        Chawri Bazar, Delhi. Since relations between the brothers
        were cordial, on request of the respondents' father, the
        appellant allowed him to use the second floor of the house
        as a licensee. In the year 1974, respondents' father played
        a fraud and filed two suits in the name of his sons
        respondents herein, bearing Suit No.183 of 1974 and 133 of
        1974 for declaration and possession of the ground/first
        floor. There is no dispute of ownership of the appellant as
        far as the second and third floors of the house are
        concerned. In September 1986, after the death of their
        father, the respondents claimed the possession of the first
        floor of the building on the basis that they had obtained
        some decree from the Court, the particulars of which were
        not disclosed. In spite of best efforts, the appellant could
        not obtain the details of the case, therefore, no action could
        be taken. Aseema Architect, who was paying rent to the
        appellant, stopped payment of rent and in the year 1989,
        filed interpleader suit No. 424 of 1989 alleging therein that
        there is a bona fide dispute about the person(s) to whom the
        rent is payable. In that suit, the details of the decree
        obtained fraudently in the year 1976 was disclosed. On
        7.2.1990, the appellant herein filed Suit No. 378 of 1993
        before the Additional Dist. Judge, Delhi praying for the
        following reliefs: 
                          
        a) declare plaintiff (appellant herein) as absolute and
        exclusive owner of H.No.8, Nizamuddin Basti, N.D.
        and to declare the decrees dated 5.2.1976 in Suit
        No.183/74 and dated 19.1.1976 in Suit No.
        133/74 as null and void. 
                          
        b) Grant decree for possession of 2nd floor of H.No.8,
        Nizamuddin Basti, New Delhi in favour of the
        appellant herein. 
                          
        Written statement was filed by the respondents herein in
        which the respondents had taken the plea that the appellant
        appeared in the suits and as such he had full knowledge of the
        case. 
                          
        The following issues were framed by the trial Court:(1) Whether the suit is barred by limitation?
 (2) Whether Plaintiff is entitled for a decree of
        declaration that the plaintiff is absolute and
        exclusive owner of the suit property in question?
 (3) Whether plaintiff is entitled for a decree of
        declaration declaring the decree dated 5.2.1976 in
        Suit No. 183/74 as null and void?
 (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of
        possession as prayed for?
 
                          
        Evidence by way of affidavit of the plaintiff (appellant herein)
        was filed on which cross examination of the appellant was
        closed. In the cross-examination, no question on limitation
        was asked by the respondents. It is at this stage, the
        respondent moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d)
        C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint on the ground of suit being
        barred by law of limitation. Reply to the said application was
        filed. The trial Court dismissed the suit of the appellant
        herein merely on the basis of the limitation holding that since
        partial rejection of the plaint is not permitted in law, the entire
        plaint has to be rejected.  
                          
        4) Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court, the appellant
        preferred an appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The High
        Court dismissed the appeal recording that since there cannot
        be a partial rejection of suit, hence the entire suit has to be
        dismissed. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present
        appeal has been filed by the appellant before this Court. 
                          
        5) We have heard Mr. Vinay Garg, learned counsel
        appearing for the appellant and Ms. Shalini Kapoor, learned
        counsel appearing for the respondents. 
                          
        6) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted
        that the approach of the High Court is against the settled
        principle of law that when there are numerous cause of action
        joined in one claim, it is not permissible to the Court to reject
        the claim under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. if it is possible to
        give a decree for some of the cause of action. He also
        submitted that the trial Court entertained the application of
        the respondents herein under Order VII Rule 11(d) C.P.C. filed
        after 15 years of institution of the suit that too after filing of
        written statement, framing of issues, cross-examination of the
        plaintiff-appellant herein and resultantly permitted the
        respondents to circumvent the case to avoid decision on the
        specific issue of limitation, framed as one of the issues by the
        Court, on the basis of evidence produced on record. He
        further submitted that the application has been allowed by
        reading one para in isolation and ignoring other relevant paras
        of the plaint which specifically deal with the date of knowledge
        of the fraudulent decree obtained by the respondent on the
        basis of which ownership rights in the property were claimed.
        Learned counsel submitted that the point of limitation being a
        mixed question of law and fact should have been decided after
        appreciation of evidence already on record and not summarily
        under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 
                          
        7) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
        respondents submitted that inasmuch as the trial Court and
        the High Court, on proper verification of the plaint averments
        and finding that there is no material for delay in filing the suit,
        rightly rejected the plaint and allowed the application prayed
        for dismissal of the above appeal. 
                          
        8) We have perused the relevant materials and considered
        the rival contentions. 
                          
        9) The only question to be considered in this appeal is
        whether the defendants/respondents herein made out a case
        for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the
        C.P.C. 
                          
        10) As per Order VII Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be
        rejected in the following cases:"(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
 (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff,
        on being required by the Court to correct the valuation
        within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
 (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint
        is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the
        plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the
        requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court,
        fails to do so;
 (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to
        be barred by any law:
 (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
 (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of
        rule 9;"
 
                          
        11) In Saleem Bhai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and
        Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 557 it was held with reference to Order VII
        Rule 11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be
        looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the
        averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power
        at any stage of the suit - before registering the plaint or after
        issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the
        conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an
        application under Clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11 of
        the Code, the averments in the plaint are the germane: the
        pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would
        be wholly irrelevant at that stage. 
                          
        12) In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
        and Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 70, it was held that the basic question
        to be decided while dealing with an application filed under
        Order VII Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action
        has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has
        been stated with a view to get out of Order VII Rule 11 of the
        Code. 
                          
        13) The trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful
        and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious
        and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to
        sue, it should exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 of
        the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein
        is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
        of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by
        examining the party searchingly under Order X of the Code.
        (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and Anr. (1977) 4
        SCC 467). 
                          
        14) It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be
        considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was
        observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar
        Singh Gill, (1982) 3 SCC 487 only a part of the plaint cannot
        be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as
        a whole must be rejected. 
                          
        15) In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property
        (1998) 7 SCC 184, it was observed that the averments in the
        plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d)
        of Rule 11 of Order VII was applicable. 
                          
        16) In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. Vs. Assistant
        Charity Commissioner and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 137, this
        Court held thus: 
                          
        "15. There cannot be any compartmentalization,
        dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of
        various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is
        adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of
        interpretation according to which a pleading has to be
        read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not
        permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to
        read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the
        substance and not merely the form that has to be
        looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it
        stands without addition or subtraction or words or
        change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention
        of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from
        the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole.
        At the same time it should be borne in mind that no
        pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice
        on hair-splitting technicalities." 
                          
        17) For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear
        that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments
        relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the
        said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an
        application to satisfy the Court that the plaint does not
        disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said
        question, it is incumbent on the part of the Court to verify the
        entire plaint. Order VII Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is
        rejected, the Court has to record the order to that effect with
        the reasons for such order. Inasmuch as the learned trial
        Judge rejected the plaint only on the ground of limitation, it is
        useful to refer the averments relating to the same. Learned
        counsel appearing for the appellant, by taking us through the
        entire plaint, submitted that inasmuch as sufficient materials
        are available in the plaint, it is proper on the part of the trial
        Court to decide the suit on merits and not justified in rejecting
        the plaint that too after the evidence of the plaintiff. In the
        light of the assertion of the counsel for the appellant, we
        carefully verified the plaint averments. In paragraph 5, the
        appellant/plaintiff has specifically stated that he is a
        handicapped person from the beginning and it is difficult for
        him to move about freely. The following averments in the
        plaint are relevant to answer the point determined in this
        appeal: 
                          
        "a) That without any intimation to the Plaintiff, said
        Rajeev Kumar Gupta got decreed the said suit. It seems that
        the said Rajeev Kumar Gupta in collusion with his father
        Shri Inder Prakash Gupta produced some-one-else under the
        pretext of Shri Ram Prakash Gupta, the present Plaintiff in
        the court and got the said decree in his favour on the said
        false pretext by playing a fraud upon the Plaintiff as well as
        upon the court. The Plaintiff never appeared in the above
        said cases before the High Court nor ever made any
        statement to the effect that the suit of the Plaintiff
        may/might be decreed and as such the judgment and decree
        dated 05.02.1976 passed in the above said suit No. 183/74
        entitled as Rajeev Kumar vs. Ram Prakash Gupta is totally
        false, baseless, nullity and void in the eyes of law and is not
        at all binding upon the Plaintiff and the same has been
        procured by fraud and mis-representation as submitted
        above." 
                          
        "b) That the Plaintiff came to know for the first time about
        the passing of the above said decree in favour of said Rajeev
        Kumar Gupta by the High Court of Delhi, in the above said
        suit No. 183/74 in the month of October, 1986. It is
        submitted that Shri Inder Prakash Gupta, the elder brother
        of the Plaintiff died at Delhi in the month of September, 1986
        and after his death Shri Rajeev Kumar Gupta asked the
        Plaintiff to give first floor portion of the above building No. 8,
        Nizamuddin Basti to them and alleged that there was a High
        Court judgment in their favour. However, no particulars of
        the said judgment were given at that time by any of the
        Defendants, and therefore, the Plaintiff could not take any
        action at that time." 
                          
        "c) That the said tenant M/s Aseema Architect also
        stopped payment of rent from the year 1985 and perhaps on
        the instructions or at the instance of said Indra Prakash
        Gupta, the elder brother of the Plaintiff, he deposited the
        rent from July, 1985 to March, 1986 in the court of Rent
        Controller, Delhi. However, after the death of Shri Inder
        Prakash Gupta, the above said tenant refused to pay the
        rent and ultimately he filed a inter-pleader suit being suit
        No. 424/89 entitled as Aseema Architect versus Ram
        Prakash alleging therein that there is a bonafide dispute
        about the person/s to whom the rent is payable. In fact, the
        said suit was and is not maintainable because admittedly
        the said tenant took the above said premises from the
        Plaintiff and he is stopped from denying the title of the
        Plaintiff under section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act and for
        other reasons also." 
                          
        "d) That in any case, it is submitted that as on one of the
        dates, the Plaintiff could not appear because of his illness,
        the learned trial Court proceeded ex-parte and decreed the
        suit ex-parte in favour of said Shri Rajeev Kumar Gupta. It
        is submitted that the full details of the above said judgment
        were given by the said Rajeev Kumar in the said court as the
        copy of the said judgment of the High Court was filed therein
        and thereafter taking the details from the same, the High
        Court's file was inspected and the malafide motives and
        designs of the Defendants came to light and, therefore, the
        present suit is being filed at the earliest possible challenging
        the said judgment and the decree of the High Court of
        Delhi." 
                          
        18) As observed earlier, before passing an order in an
        application filed for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule
        11(d), it is but proper to verify the entire plaint averments.
        The abovementioned materials clearly show that the decree
        passed in Suit No. 183 of 1974 came to the knowledge of the
        plaintiff in the year 1986, when Suit No.424 of 1989 titled
        Assema Architect vs. Ram Prakash was filed in which a
        copy of the earlier decree was placed on record and thereafter
        he took steps at the earliest and filed the suit for declaration
        and in alternative for possession. It is not in dispute that as
        per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit ought to have
        been filed within a period of three years from the date of the
        knowledge. The knowledge mentioned in the plaint cannot be
        termed as inadequate and incomplete as observed by the High
        Court. While deciding the application under Order VII Rule  
                          
        11, few lines or passage should not be read in isolation and
        the pleadings have to be read as a whole to ascertain its true
        import. We are of the view that both the trial Court as well as
        the High Court failed to advert to the relevant averments as
        stated in the plaint. 
                          
        19) It is also relevant to mention that after filing of the
        written statement, framing of the issues including on
        limitation, evidence was led, plaintiff was cross-examined,
        thereafter before conclusion of the trial, the application under
        Order VII Rule 11 was filed for rejection of the plaint. It is also
        pertinent to mention that there was not even a suggestion to
        the plaintiff/appellant to the effect that the suit filed by him is
        barred by limitation. 
                          
        20) On going through the entire plaint averments, we are of
        the view that the trial Court has committed an error in
        rejecting the same at the belated stage that too without
        adverting to all the materials which are available in the plaint.
        The High Court has also committed the same error in
        affirming the order of the trial Court. 
                          
        21) In the light of our above discussion, we set aside the order
        of the trial Court dated 20.2.2006 passed by the Civil Judge,
        Delhi in Suit No. 318/2003 and the judgment dated 27.4.2006
        passed by the High Court of Delhi in R.F.A. No. 188 of 2006.
        In the result, the civil appeal is allowed and the Civil Judge is
        directed to restore the suit to its original file and dispose of the
        same on merits preferably within a period of six months from
        the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment. It is made
        clear that except on the question of limitation, we have not
        gone into the merits of the claim made by both parties. No
        costs. 
                          
        
        
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