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        Judgment: 
        Civil Appeal No.4307 OF 2007 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2967 of 2006)Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.- Leave granted
 
                          
        Challenge in this appeal is to the 
        order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New 
        Delhi (in short 'National Commission') holding that the State Commission 
        has the power to restore the complaint which was dismissed for default. 
        For coming to the aforesaid conclusion the National Commission relied 
        upon the decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. R. 
        Srinivasan (2000 (3) SCC 242).
 3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the view contrary to 
        what has been stated in New India Assurance's case (supra) has been 
        taken in Jyotsana Arvindkumar Shah and Ors. v. Bombay Hospital Trust
        (1999 (4) SCC 325). Further, Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short 
        the 'Act') was amended in 2003 and by the newly introduced Section 22A, 
        National Commission was given power of restoration but no such power has 
        been conferred on the State Commission.
 
                          
        4. Learned Counsel for the 
        respondents on the other hand submitted that the National Commission has 
        referred the case to the factual position and, therefore, held that 
        restoration was permissible. 
 5. In Jyotsana's case (supra) it was observed at para 7 as 
        follows:
 
 "We heard learned Counsel on both sides for quite some time. When we 
        asked the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent to point out the 
        provision in the Act which enables the State Commission to set aside the 
        reasoned order passed, though ex parte, he could not lay his hands on 
        any of the provisions in the Act. As a matter of fact, before the State 
        Commission the appellants brought to its notice the two orders, one 
        passed by the Bihar State Commission in Chief Manager, UCO Bank v. 
        Ram Govind Agarwal 1996 (1) CPR 351 and the other passed by the 
        National Commission in Director, Forest Research Institute v. Sunshine 
        Enterprises 1997 (1) CPR 42 holding that the redressal agencies have 
        no power to recall or review their ex parte order.
 
                          
        The State Commission had 
        distinguished the above said orders on the ground that in those two 
        cases the opponents had not only not appeared but also failed to put in 
        their written statements. In other words, in the case on hand, according 
        to the State Commission, the opponent (respondent) having filed the 
        written statements, the failure to consider the same by the State 
        Commission before passing the order would be a valid ground for setting 
        aside the ex parte order. The State Commission, however, fell into an 
        error in not bearing in mind that the Act under which it is functioning 
        has not provided it with any jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte 
        reasoned order. It is also seen from the order of the State Commission 
        that it was influenced by the concluding portion of the judgment of the 
        Bombay High Court to the effect that the respondent (writ petitioner) 
        could approach the appellate authority or make an appropriate 
        application before the State Commission for setting aside the ex parte 
        order, if permissible under the law. Here again, the State Commission 
        failed to appreciate that the observation of the High Court would help 
        the respondent, if permissible under the law. If the law does not permit 
        the respondent to move the application for setting aside the ex parte 
        order, which appears to be the position, the order of the State 
        Commission setting aside the ex parte order cannot be sustained. As 
        stated earlier, there is no dispute that there is no provision in the 
        Act enabling the State Commission to set aside an ex parte order."
 6. Subsequently, in New India Assurance's case (supra) this Court 
        appears to have taken a different view as it is evident from what has 
        been stated in paragraph 18, the same reads as follows:
 "We only intend to invoke the spirit of the principle behind the above 
        dictum in support of our view that every court or judicial body or 
        authority, which has a duty to decide a lis between two parties, 
        inherently possesses the power to dismiss a case in default. Where a 
        case is called up for hearing and the party is not present, the court or 
        the judicial or quasi judicial body is under no obligation to keep the 
        matter pending before it or to pursue the matter on behalf of the 
        complainant who had instituted the proceedings. That is not the function 
        of the court or, for that matter of a judicial or quasi judicial body. 
        In the absence of the complainant, therefore, the court will be well 
        within its jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint, for non-prosecution. 
        So also, it would have the inherent power and jurisdiction to restore 
        the complaint on good cause being shown for the non-appearance of the 
        complainant."
 
                          
        7. In the latter case i.e. New India 
        Assurance's case (supra) reference was not made to the earlier decision 
        in Jyotsana's case (supra). Further the effect of the amendment 
        to the Act in 2003 whereby Section 22(A) was introduced has the effect 
        of conferment of power of restoration on National Commission, but not to 
        the State Commission. In view of the divergence of views expressed by 
        coordinate Benches, we refer the matter to a larger Bench to consider 
        the question whether the State Commission has the power to recall the ex 
        parte order. Records be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India 
        for appropriate orders. 
                          
        
        
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