CEC Appointment Law: CJI to Take a Call on Plea Seeking Recall of Split Verdict

By Adv. Tarun Choudhury
Supreme Court Advocate

Introduction

The controversy surrounding the CEC Appointment Law has entered a new and potentially important procedural phase.

But it is necessary to begin with one clarification because some of the headlines surrounding the case can give the wrong impression.

The Supreme Court has not recalled its 23 September 2026 judgment. It has not struck down the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. Nor has the Court held that any Judge was biased.

What happened on 7 October 2026 is narrower.

An interlocutory application seeking recall of the September split verdict was mentioned before Chief Justice of India Surya Kant. Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan sought the Court’s attention to the application. The CJI reportedly indicated that the Court would examine the matter and then take a call.

That may sound procedural. In constitutional litigation, however, procedure can sometimes determine who ultimately decides the substantive constitutional question.

Case	Dr. Jaya Thakur & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.
Citation	2026 INSC 1040
Judgment Date	23 September 2026

The Three Layers of the Controversy

The controversy now has three distinct layers:

1. The 2023 CEC Appointment Law itself;
2. The split decision of 23 September 2026 concerning whether the challenge requires a Constitution Bench; and
3. The subsequent application seeking recall of that split verdict.

These three issues should not be mixed together.

The underlying case is Dr. Jaya Thakur & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., reported as 2026 INSC 1040, decided on 23 September 2026 by Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma. The two Judges differed on whether the constitutional challenge to the 2023 Act involved a substantial question of constitutional interpretation requiring a Bench of at least five Judges under Article 145(3).

The disagreement therefore was not, at that stage, a final decision that the CEC Appointment Law was constitutional or unconstitutional.

That distinction is fundamental.

What Is the Latest Position on the CEC Appointment Law?

As of 7 October 2026, the safest statement of the legal position is this:

The 2023 CEC Appointment Law continues to operate. The constitutional challenge to its relevant provisions has not been finally decided on merits. The 23 September split opinions have not been recalled. The papers have been directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for consideration of a Constitution Bench, while a separate recall application and a reported curative proceeding have added another procedural dimension.

This is important because there is a tendency in current legal reporting to compress a complicated constitutional proceeding into a single headline.

The reality is more nuanced.

The petitions challenge, among other provisions, Sections 6, 7 and 8(2) of the 2023 Act.

The September Bench did not finally determine whether those provisions pass constitutional scrutiny.

Instead, the Judges disagreed over the proper judicial forum for determining that question.

That disagreement resulted in the papers being placed before the CJI for consideration of an appropriate Constitution Bench.

What Was the Supreme Court Actually Deciding on 23 September 2026?

The starting point is the nature of the petitions.

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging provisions of the 2023 Act governing the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners.

The Central Controversy: The Selection Committee

The central controversy concerns the composition of the statutory Selection Committee.

The petitioners argued that the statutory arrangement compromises the institutional independence of the Election Commission.

The Union, on the other hand, defended Parliament’s authority to enact a law under Article 324(2).

The preliminary question before the two-Judge Bench was whether determining that challenge required a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3).

The two Judges answered that question differently.

That is what produced the split.

It is therefore inaccurate to describe the 23 September judgment simply as a judgment “striking down” or “upholding” the CEC Appointment Law.

It did neither.

The Difference Between the Two Judges

Justice Dipankar Datta’s Approach

Justice Dipankar Datta took the view that a reference to a Constitution Bench was not necessary.

The reasoning, as reflected in the source material and contemporaneous reporting, was substantially connected with the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India.

The broad approach was that the constitutional principles concerning the independence of the Election Commission and free and fair elections had already been considered by the Supreme Court.

Therefore, the mere fact that Parliament subsequently enacted a statute did not automatically convert the dispute into a new constitutional question requiring five Judges.

In other words, the question could be approached as the application of already recognised constitutional principles to the statutory scheme enacted by Parliament.

Justice Datta also made observations concerning the importance of institutional independence and the appearance of independence.

But these observations must be understood in their proper procedural setting.

They were not a final declaration that Section 7 of the 2023 Act was unconstitutional.

That distinction is particularly important for lawyers writing about the case.

Justice Satish Chandra Sharma’s Approach

Justice Satish Chandra Sharma took the opposite view regarding the need for a Constitution Bench.

The question, according to this approach, was not merely whether principles already recognised in Anoop Baranwal could be applied to another statute.

A new and substantial constitutional question had arisen:

Can Parliament establish an Election Commission appointment mechanism in which the political executive has an effective majority on the Selection Committee?

That question had not previously been decided by the Supreme Court in the context of an enacted parliamentary law.

On this reasoning, Article 145(3) became important.

If the case involved a substantial question concerning interpretation of the Constitution, at least five Judges would have to hear it.

Thus, the disagreement between the two Judges was essentially about the constitutional character of the question and, consequently, the proper size of the Bench.

Article 145(3): Why Does It Matter?

Article 145(3) provides that the minimum number of Judges required to decide a case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution shall be five.

But that does not mean that every constitutional controversy automatically requires five Judges.

The expression “substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution” has significance.

This is where the reasoning of the two Judges diverged.

Approach	Core Reasoning	Procedural Consequence
Justice Dipankar Datta	Existing constitutional principles could be applied to the statutory scheme.	A Constitution Bench was not considered necessary.
Justice Satish Chandra Sharma	The legislation raised a fresh and substantial constitutional question.	Article 145(3) required consideration by at least five Judges.

One approach was that the relevant constitutional principles had already been settled and the Court was essentially being asked to apply them.

The other approach was that Parliament’s subsequent legislation created a fresh constitutional question concerning the permissible structure of the Election Commission’s appointment mechanism.

That difference is not academic.

It determines whether a two-Judge Bench can proceed or whether the case must be considered by a Constitution Bench.

The September split therefore concerned the forum and constitutional route, rather than the final validity of the 2023 Act.

Section 7 of the CEC Appointment Law: The Heart of the Dispute

The most politically and constitutionally sensitive provision is Section 7.

Under Section 7, the Selection Committee consists of:

• the Prime Minister, as Chairperson;
• the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, as Member; and
• a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, as Member.

That structure is materially different from the arrangement laid down by the Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal.

The CJI is no longer part of the statutory Selection Committee.

Instead, the third member is a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.

This creates the structural concern at the heart of the litigation.

The Prime Minister and the nominated Cabinet Minister represent the executive side of the committee, while the Leader of the Opposition represents the Opposition.

The petitioners therefore question whether such an arrangement provides an adequate institutional safeguard against executive dominance in appointments to the very body that supervises elections.

That is not a trivial question.

The Election Commission is not an ordinary government department.

It is a constitutional authority responsible for administering the electoral process through which governments themselves are elected and removed.

What Did Anoop Baranwal Actually Decide?

Any serious discussion of the CEC Appointment Law must begin with Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161.

The case was decided on 2 March 2023 by a Constitution Bench.

At that time, Parliament had not enacted a law under Article 324(2) governing the appointment mechanism.

The Constitution itself provides in Article 324(2) that appointments are to be made by the President, subject to any law made by Parliament.

The Supreme Court therefore stepped in to deal with the legislative vacuum.

The Interim Selection Committee

It directed that, until Parliament made such a law, the appointment recommendation should come from a committee comprising:

• the Prime Minister;
• the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, or the leader of the largest opposition party where appropriate; and
• the Chief Justice of India.

This was an exercise of the Court’s constitutional power in the absence of parliamentary legislation.

That last qualification is critical.

What Anoop Baranwal Did Not Decide

Anoop Baranwal did not permanently amend Article 324.

Nor did it say that Parliament could never enact a different statutory appointment mechanism.

The real question in the present litigation is more subtle:

How far can Parliament go when designing that statutory mechanism without undermining the constitutional independence of the Election Commission?

That is the question which ultimately requires an authoritative answer.

Parliament Has the Power to Legislate — But Is That Power Unlimited?

There is little doubt that Article 324(2) gives Parliament legislative space concerning the appointment of the CEC and Election Commissioners.

The constitutional text itself contemplates legislation.

Therefore, the argument cannot simply be:

Parliament enacted a law different from Anoop Baranwal, therefore Parliament acted unconstitutionally.

That would be an oversimplification.

The more difficult question is whether the particular mechanism Parliament chose is constitutionally permissible.

There is a settled distinction in constitutional law between changing the legal basis of a judgment and directly overruling a judicial decision by legislative declaration.

Parliament can change the law on which a judicial decision rests.

It cannot simply declare that a judgment of the Supreme Court was wrong and therefore shall have no legal effect.

That distinction is well recognised in decisions such as Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality and subsequent constitutional jurisprudence.

Applied to the present controversy, Parliament can legislate under Article 324(2).

But the resulting legislation remains subject to constitutional review.

Parliament’s power to legislate is not the same thing as constitutional immunity for whatever legislative structure it chooses.

The Real Constitutional Question: Independence of the Election Commission

This is, in my view, the most important part of the litigation.

The Election Commission conducts elections to:

• the Lok Sabha;
• State Legislative Assemblies;
• the offices of President; and
• the office of Vice-President.

Article 324 places the superintendence, direction and control of these elections in the Election Commission.

That makes institutional independence indispensable.

Consider the problem from a constitutional rather than political perspective.

The government of the day is itself a participant in the electoral process.

The Opposition is also a participant.

The Election Commission, however, is supposed to stand above that contest.

Its authority must therefore command confidence not merely from the government but also from political parties, candidates and voters.

This explains why the composition of the appointment committee matters.

The Structural Independence Question

The question is not simply:

“Will a particular Election Commissioner act fairly?”

The constitutional question is broader:

“Does the appointment mechanism provide sufficient structural safeguards to ensure that the Election Commission remains independent of the political executive?”

Independence and the Appearance of Independence

There is an important distinction between actual independence and the perception of independence.

A constitutional institution may technically enjoy legal powers and safeguards and yet lose public confidence if the process by which its leadership is selected appears overwhelmingly controlled by one side of the political contest.

This is why the issue cannot be dismissed as a technical dispute about who sits on a committee.

Public confidence is itself an important component of institutional legitimacy.

At the same time, caution is required.

A court must not declare a statutory arrangement unconstitutional merely because it does not resemble the Court’s preferred policy model.

The constitutional question must ultimately be answered by reference to the text and structure of the Constitution, binding precedent and established constitutional principles.

The 7 October Recall Application: What Has Actually Happened?

The latest development concerns a separate procedural issue.

An interlocutory application seeking recall of the September split verdict was mentioned before the CJI on 7 October 2026.

The CJI is reported to have indicated that the Court would examine the application and then take a decision.

That is all that can safely be said at this stage.

• The September judgment has not been recalled.
• There has been no judicial finding that Justice Satish Chandra Sharma was biased.
• There has been no order declaring the September opinion void.
• There has been no order striking down Section 7.

The source material also records an important limitation: no official Supreme Court order of 7 October was located at the time of preparation, and the courtroom exchange is therefore being treated as a reported procedural development, based on contemporaneous reports.

That is how responsible legal reporting should approach the issue.

The Allegation Concerning the Judge’s Son

The recall and curative proceedings reportedly raise an issue concerning the professional engagement of the son of Justice Satish Chandra Sharma as standing counsel for the Election Commission before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.

The petitioners reportedly contend that the relationship should have been disclosed and that disclosure would have enabled them to consider whether to seek recusal.

This is a serious allegation.

But there is an equally important legal safeguard:

An Allegation Is Not a Finding

The Supreme Court has not, as of the latest reported position, held:

• that the engagement existed in the manner alleged;
• that it was required to be disclosed;
• that the Judge was actually biased;
• that the September opinion was vitiated; or
• that the judgment must consequently be recalled.

Those are matters that would have to be determined judicially.

A responsible lawyer should therefore resist the temptation to convert a pleading into a judicial conclusion.

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Recall, Review and Curative: Three Different Remedies

Another point that deserves greater public explanation is the distinction between recall, review and curative jurisdiction.

They are not three names for the same remedy.

Review

Review jurisdiction under Article 137 is narrow.

A review is not an opportunity to re-argue the entire case merely because a litigant believes the Court reached the wrong conclusion.

The jurisdiction is ordinarily invoked on recognised grounds such as an error apparent on the face of the record or discovery of important material meeting the applicable legal requirements.

Curative Petition

The curative jurisdiction was recognised in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388.

It is an extraordinary remedy intended to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice in circumstances where the ordinary judicial process has been exhausted.

It is not a disguised second appeal.

Recall

Recall stands on a somewhat different footing.

The Court has, in exceptional circumstances, recalled orders where there has been a fundamental procedural defect—for example, where an order was passed without jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice.

But recall is not an unrestricted mechanism for reopening every concluded judicial decision.

That distinction may become central to the maintainability of the latest application.

Remedy	Key Characteristic
Review	Narrow jurisdiction under Article 137; not an opportunity to re-argue the entire case.
Curative Petition	Extraordinary remedy intended to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice after the ordinary judicial process has been exhausted.
Recall	Exceptional remedy concerning fundamental procedural defects, such as lack of jurisdiction or breach of natural justice.

Does Non-Disclosure Automatically Establish Bias?

No.

That conclusion would be legally unsafe.

The law of judicial recusal does not operate on the basis that every professional or familial connection automatically establishes bias.

The question is generally whether the circumstances create a reasonable apprehension of bias from the perspective of an objective observer.

Cases such as Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi and Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India are part of the jurisprudential background on this issue.

But the opposite principle is equally important.

Recusal cannot become a weapon for forum shopping.

A litigant cannot seek the removal of a Judge merely because the Judge’s presence is considered inconvenient.

The Court therefore has to strike a careful balance between two constitutional values:

• the unquestionable need for judicial impartiality; and
• the equally important need to prevent strategic demands for recusal.

The precise circumstances alleged in the present matter will have to be judged on their own facts.

What Happens If the Recall Application Is Rejected?

If the application is rejected, the September position would continue.

The papers would remain available for consideration of the Constitution Bench issue.

The underlying constitutional challenge to Sections 6, 7 and 8(2) would continue.

The separate curative proceeding, if maintainable, would have to follow its own procedural course.

Most importantly, rejection of the recall application would not mean that Section 7 has been declared constitutional.

The substantive constitutional challenge would still remain.

What If the Recall Application Is Allowed?

If the Court allows the recall application, the September opinions—or such portion of them as the Court specifies—could be recalled.

But even that would not automatically mean that the 2023 CEC Appointment Law is unconstitutional.

Nor would it automatically restore the Anoop Baranwal appointment mechanism.

The consequence would principally concern the procedural route by which the constitutional challenge is to be considered.

The Court would then have to determine the appropriate next step.

That distinction is crucial.

Recall of a judgment and striking down legislation are two entirely different judicial acts.

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What Could a Constitution Bench Ultimately Decide?

If a Constitution Bench eventually hears the substantive challenge, several possibilities arise.

1. The 2023 Act Could Be Upheld

The Court could conclude that Article 324(2) expressly permits Parliament to legislate and that the Anoop Baranwal arrangement was only an interim mechanism operating until legislation was enacted.

On that view, the statutory Selection Committee could be regarded as constitutionally permissible.

2. The Court Could Strike Down or Read Down Section 7

The Court might conclude that the particular composition of the Selection Committee provides insufficient protection for institutional independence.

It could then consider whether the provision can be constitutionally read down or whether part of the statutory structure must be invalidated.

3. The Court Could Require a Different Independent Safeguard

The Court might recognise the need for an independent member without necessarily concluding that the Chief Justice of India must permanently occupy that position.

That would be a materially different constitutional conclusion from simply restoring Anoop Baranwal.

4. The Court Could Address the Constitutional Limits of Parliamentary Design

The judgment may ultimately clarify how Article 324(2), judicially recognised institutional independence and Parliament’s legislative authority interact.

That could become the most enduring contribution of the litigation.

Why This Case Matters Beyond the Election Commission

The significance of this litigation extends beyond the appointment of Election Commissioners.

It concerns a broader constitutional principle:

How should institutions that regulate democratic competition be insulated from the political actors whose conduct they regulate?

That question arises in many constitutional democracies.

In India, the Election Commission occupies a particularly important position because Article 324 places the administration of national and State elections within its constitutional sphere.

The credibility of an election does not depend only upon whether votes are physically counted correctly.

It also depends upon whether citizens believe that the institution supervising the process is independent, impartial and capable of resisting political pressure.

That is why the appointment mechanism matters.

The Test Should Not Change With the Government

There is another way of looking at the controversy.

A constitutional arrangement should not be judged according to which political party happens to be in power when the law is challenged.

Suppose Party A is in government today.

Party A may benefit from the existing appointment mechanism.

Tomorrow Party B may form the government.

The same mechanism will then operate in Party B’s favour.

The real constitutional test is therefore not:

“Does this arrangement benefit my political side?”

It is:

“Would I still regard this arrangement as fair if the political positions were reversed?”

That is the standard by which institutional design should ultimately be assessed.

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My Legal Assessment

In my considered view, the most important thing about the present litigation is to resist political simplification.

The CEC Appointment Law is not yet finally upheld or struck down.

The September 2026 split judgment did not settle the constitutional validity of Section 7.

Justice Datta and Justice Sharma differed principally on whether the constitutional challenge required a Constitution Bench.

The papers were consequently directed to be placed before the CJI.

The subsequent recall application adds a further procedural question, but it does not itself determine the constitutional validity of the legislation.

The allegation concerning the professional engagement of a Judge’s son with the Election Commission deserves to be examined objectively if the Court finds the application maintainable. But until the Court reaches a finding, it should remain described as an allegation, not as established judicial bias.

On the substantive constitutional issue, there is a strong argument that Article 324(2) gives Parliament authority to legislate regarding appointments. Anoop Baranwal cannot sensibly be read as permanently removing Parliament from that field.

But legislative competence is not the end of the matter.

The statutory scheme must still withstand constitutional scrutiny.

The question whether an executive-heavy Selection Committee is compatible with the constitutional requirement of an independent Election Commission is sufficiently important to deserve a clear and authoritative answer.

What India does not need is prolonged uncertainty in which a split reference, a recall application and a constitutional challenge remain entangled for years.

The eventual decision should settle the constitutional principle clearly.

What We Know for Certain as of 7 October 2026

Issue	Position as of 7 October 2026
Case	Dr. Jaya Thakur & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., 2026 INSC 1040
Date of Decision	23 September 2026
Challenged Provisions	Sections 6, 7 and 8(2) of the 2023 Act
Constitutional Validity	Not finally decided by the September Bench
Judicial Difference	Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma differed over whether a Constitution Bench was required
Section 7	Provides for a Selection Committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister
Anoop Baranwal	Prescribed an interim appointment mechanism involving the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and CJI until Parliament enacted legislation
7 October 2026	An interlocutory recall application was mentioned before the CJI
Recall Order	No recall order has been passed
Status of 2023 Act	The 2023 CEC Appointment Law has not been struck down
Allegation of Bias	The allegation concerning the professional engagement of the son of Justice Satish Chandra Sharma with the Election Commission remains an allegation and has not been judicially determined

Frequently Asked Questions

What Is the CEC Appointment Law?

The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 is the parliamentary legislation governing the appointment and service conditions of the CEC and Election Commissioners.

Did the Supreme Court Strike Down the CEC Appointment Law on 23 September 2026?

No. The September judgment did not finally determine the constitutional validity of Sections 6, 7 and 8(2). The two Judges differed on whether the challenge required consideration by a Constitution Bench.

What Happened on 7 October 2026?

An interlocutory application seeking recall of the September split verdict was mentioned before the Chief Justice of India. The CJI reportedly indicated that the Court would examine it and take a decision.

Has the CEC Appointment Law Been Declared Unconstitutional?

No. As of 7 October 2026, the 2023 Act remains in force and the constitutional challenge remains unresolved.

How Does the 2023 Law Differ From Anoop Baranwal?

Under Anoop Baranwal, the interim Selection Committee consisted of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Chief Justice of India. Section 7 of the 2023 Act replaces the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.

Has the Supreme Court Found Justice Satish Chandra Sharma Biased?

No. An allegation concerning the professional engagement of his son with the Election Commission has been raised in proceedings, but the Court has not made a finding that the Judge was biased.

Why Is the Case Constitutionally Important?

Because it raises a fundamental question about the relationship between Parliament’s power under Article 324(2) and the requirement that the Election Commission remain institutionally independent and capable of commanding public confidence.

Conclusion

The latest development in the CEC Appointment Law litigation should be understood carefully.

The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Parliament’s 2023 appointment mechanism passes constitutional scrutiny.

The Court’s 23 September 2026 split was principally about whether the constitutional challenge should be considered by the existing Bench or by a Constitution Bench.

The 7 October development adds a separate question: whether the September split verdict itself should be recalled.

For now, the answer to that question is still pending.

What ultimately matters is not the immediate fate of one application or even one statutory provision.

The larger question is whether the constitutional design governing the appointment of India’s Election Commissioners provides sufficient protection for the independence of the institution entrusted with conducting elections.

That is a question that transcends one government, one Opposition and one election.

The Election Commission belongs to the constitutional system, not to the government of the day.

And the law governing its appointments should be capable of commanding confidence even when political power changes hands.

That is why the final judicial answer in the CEC Appointment Law litigation will be watched far beyond the courtroom.

Need Legal Advice on a Constitutional or Supreme Court Matter?

Constitutional litigation, CEC Appointment Law disputes, Election Commission matters, Article 324 issues, judicial review, public law challenges and Supreme Court proceedings require more than a general legal opinion. They demand careful analysis of the law, precedents, procedural strategy and the appropriate remedy.

If your matter involves a constitutional question, challenge to government action, Election Commission dispute, Supreme Court litigation, review or recall proceedings, or an issue affecting fundamental legal rights, taking advice at the right stage can make a significant difference.

Do not leave an important constitutional matter to guesswork. A wrong procedural step can cost valuable time, money and legal opportunity.

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Adv. Tarun Choudhury
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Frequently Asked Questions

1. What is the CEC Appointment Law 2023 and how does it affect the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner?

The CEC Appointment Law 2023, formally the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, establishes the statutory procedure for appointing the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners. Its Selection Committee consists of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.

2. Why has the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of the CEC Appointment Law?

The challenge to the CEC Appointment Law raises questions concerning the independence of the Election Commission of India, Article 324 of the Constitution and the constitutional limits on Parliament’s power to determine the appointment mechanism. The controversy also involves whether the statutory Selection Committee sufficiently protects the institutional independence of the Election Commission.

3. What was the Supreme Court split verdict on the CEC Appointment Law in September 2026?

The September 2026 judgment did not finally strike down the CEC Appointment Law. The two-judge Bench differed on whether the constitutional challenge raised a substantial question requiring consideration by a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3) of the Constitution. Because of this disagreement, the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for consideration of a larger Bench.

4. What did the Supreme Court decide in Anoop Baranwal regarding the appointment of the Election Commissioners?

In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), the Constitution Bench prescribed an interim appointment mechanism involving the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the Chief Justice of India until Parliament enacted a law under Article 324(2). The later CEC Appointment Law 2023 replaced that interim arrangement with a statutory Selection Committee. The constitutional validity of that legislative framework remains the central issue in the present controversy.

5. Can the Chief Justice of India recall the Supreme Court’s split verdict on the CEC Appointment Law?

The Chief Justice of India can consider whether the matter should be placed before an appropriate Bench, but the reported development of 7 October 2026 does not mean that the September split verdict has already been recalled. Any question concerning recall, review, curative jurisdiction or a Constitution Bench must be determined according to the Supreme Court’s constitutional and procedural powers. The reported application should therefore not be treated as a recall order or a finding that the CEC Appointment Law is unconstitutional.

Key Takeaways: CEC Appointment Law & Supreme Court Split Verdict

• The CEC Appointment Law 2023 has not been struck down. The Supreme Court controversy concerns its constitutional validity and the proper judicial forum for deciding that challenge.
• The September 2026 Supreme Court judgment resulted in a split view. The two judges differed on whether the challenge involves a substantial question of constitutional interpretation requiring a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3).
• The Chief Justice of India now has a crucial procedural role. The matter has been directed to the CJI for consideration of whether a larger Bench should hear the constitutional challenge.
• The 2023 law changes the Election Commission appointment mechanism. Its Selection Committee comprises the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister.
• Anoop Baranwal remains central to the controversy. The 2023 Constitution Bench judgment had prescribed an interim appointment mechanism involving the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition and Chief Justice of India until Parliament enacted legislation.
• Parliament has constitutional authority to legislate on Election Commission appointments. However, legislation made under Article 324(2) remains subject to constitutional scrutiny, including questions concerning Article 14, Article 324 and basic constitutional principles.
• Election Commission independence is at the heart of the dispute. The larger constitutional question is whether the appointment process provides adequate institutional safeguards for an Election Commission that must conduct free and fair elections.
• The reported recall application does not mean the judgment has already been recalled. The CJI’s reported response that the application will be examined is a procedural development, not an order recalling the September 2026 opinions.
• Allegations concerning possible judicial bias must be treated cautiously. Claims regarding professional or family connections are matters raised in pleadings or applications unless and until a competent court makes a finding on them.
• Recall, review and curative jurisdiction are legally distinct. A party cannot assume that filing a recall or related application automatically reopens or nullifies a Supreme Court judgment.
• The eventual outcome could have major institutional consequences. The Court may ultimately uphold the statutory appointment framework, interpret or read down aspects of it, or consider the matter through a Constitution Bench.
• For voters, the issue is bigger than the appointment of individual Election Commissioners. The real constitutional question is whether India’s election-management institution enjoys sufficient independence, credibility and public confidence.

Summary

The CEC Appointment Law 2023 remains in force. The Supreme Court’s September 2026 split verdict concerned whether the constitutional challenge requires a Constitution Bench under Article 145(3), rather than finally deciding that the law is unconstitutional. The reported October 2026 recall application is now before the Chief Justice of India for consideration.

At the centre of the controversy are Article 324, the Election Commission’s institutional independence, the statutory Selection Committee and the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India.

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