S. 92 CPC: Supreme Court Settles Pre-Leave Interim Relief Controversy in Public Trust Suits

S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., 2026 INSC 1010

Supreme Court of India | Judgment dated 18 September 2026 | Civil Appeal Nos. 13001–13003 of 2026 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25577–25579 of 2025 | Bench: Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan

Introduction

The Supreme Court has settled an important question concerning S. 92 CPC: whether a civil court can grant protective or preservatory interim relief while an application seeking leave to institute a representative suit against a public charitable or religious trust is still pending.

In S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., reported as 2026 INSC 1010, the Court answered the question in the negative.

The Court held that where persons invoke Section 92 CPC and seek leave to institute the suit, the civil court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders before that leave is granted. This includes an order appointing a receiver or an ad hoc management arrangement under the general procedural powers of the CPC.

At the same time, the judgment contains an important qualification. Where the facts disclose compelling urgency, the court may dispense with prior notice, record cogent reasons in writing, and grant leave ex parte. Once leave is granted, the suit comes into existence, and the court can consider appropriate interim relief.

That distinction is the real significance of the judgment.

The Supreme Court has therefore not held that public trusts can never be subjected to interim protection. It has held that the statutory gateway of Section 92 leave cannot be bypassed in order to obtain such protection.

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The Case at a Glance

Particular	Details
Case	S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors.
Citation	2026 INSC 1010
Date of judgment	18 September 2026
Bench	Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan
Appeals	Civil Appeal Nos. 13001–13003 of 2026
Origin	SLP (C) Nos. 25577–25579 of 2025
Principal provision	Section 92 CPC
Other provisions considered	Sections 26, 94, 141, and 151 CPC; Order XL Rule 1
Central issue	Can interim protective orders be passed before Section 92 leave is granted?
Answer	No
Urgent cases	Ex parte leave may be granted for compelling reasons.
Result	Appeals dismissed with clarification

The Supreme Court’s judgments portal records the case as S. Panchalingu v. Peoples Education Trust (R), C.A. Nos. 13001–13003/2026, uploaded on 18 September 2026.

The Question Before the Supreme Court

The Court framed the substantial question of law in direct terms:

Whether a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92 CPC together with an application seeking leave to institute the suit possesses the power to pass protective or preservatory interim orders while the leave application remains pending?

The answer was

No.

But the answer has to be understood alongside the court’s treatment of urgent cases.

The Court did not say that the law must stand helplessly while trust property is allegedly being dissipated. Instead, it held that urgency must be addressed at the leave stage itself.

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Why Section 92 CPC Is Different

Section 92 CPC creates a special form of representative litigation concerning an alleged breach of an express or constructive trust created for a public charitable or religious purpose.

The provision permits the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust having obtained the leave of the Court, to institute a suit seeking specified reliefs.

These include, among other things:

• removal of trustees;
• appointment of trustees;
• vesting of trust property;
• accounts and inquiries;
• directions concerning trust property;
• settlement of a scheme; and
• other appropriate relief.

Section 92(2) reinforces the requirement by providing that a suit claiming the specified reliefs cannot be instituted except in conformity with Section 92.

The Supreme Court therefore treated leave as more than a procedural formality. It is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit.

This is the starting point from which the entire judgment follows.

The Statutory Gateway: Section 26 and Section 92

Ordinarily, Section 26 CPC provides that a suit is instituted by presentation of a plaint, while Order IV deals with the institution of suits.

Section 92, however, creates a special regime.

For an ordinary civil suit, presentation of the plaint is ordinarily sufficient to commence the action.

For a representative suit under Section 92 brought by persons interested in the trust, something additional is required:

Leave of the Court must first be obtained.

The Supreme Court therefore distinguished the proposed action from the instituted suit.

Until leave is granted, the court is considering whether the proposed representative action should be permitted to proceed. It is not yet exercising the ordinary jurisdiction arising from a properly instituted Section 92 suit.

This distinction is decisive when an interlocutory application is filed.

Why Does Section 92 Require Leave?

The requirement has a clear statutory purpose.

A public charitable or religious trust is not merely a private association between a few individuals. Its property and administration may affect a much larger body of beneficiaries and the public interest.

At the same time, allowing every person claiming an interest in a public trust to immediately institute representative proceedings could expose the trust to repeated or vexatious litigation.

Section 92 therefore strikes a balance.

It gives interested persons a remedy against:

• breach of trust;
• improper administration;
• mismanagement; and
• circumstances requiring judicial directions,

while protecting the trust from unnecessary representative litigation.

The Supreme Court described this dual character as a “protective shield” and a “remedial sword.”

The leave requirement is the mechanism through which that balance is achieved.

The 1976 Amendment: From Executive Consent to Judicial Scrutiny

The legislative history strengthens this interpretation.

Before the 1976 amendment, the statutory mechanism involved the Advocate-General’s consent.

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, replaced that mechanism for suits instituted by two or more interested persons with the requirement of obtaining leave of the court.

The Supreme Court viewed this as a deliberate shift from executive scrutiny to judicial scrutiny.

Consequently, the court considering leave is performing a substantive statutory screening function.

It must determine whether the proposed representative action satisfies the requirements of Section 92 before the suit is permitted to proceed.

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What Must Exist for a Section 92 Suit?

The judgment also reaffirms the substantive requirements of Section 92.

The Court identified three cumulative requirements:

1. The trust must be created for a public charitable or religious purpose.
2. There must be an alleged breach of trust or a necessity for directions concerning administration of the trust.
3. The relief claimed must fall within Section 92(1).

The Court referred to Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra, reported as (2026) 1 SCC 569, in explaining that failure to satisfy any one of these requirements may defeat maintainability, whereas maintainability requires their cumulative satisfaction.

Thus, the leave stage is not an empty procedural ritual.

It is the point at which the statutory character of the proposed litigation is tested.

Facts of the People’s Education Trust Case

The dispute arose from proceedings concerning People’s Education Trust.

The appellants initiated proceedings under Section 92 CPC and sought leave to institute the representative suit.

While that application was pending, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, passed an order under Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC, constituting an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees to manage the Trust’s day-to-day affairs.

The Karnataka High Court subsequently set aside that order.

The High Court took the view that the proposed Section 92 suit remained effectively “stillborn” until leave was granted and that the civil court therefore lacked jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders during the pre-leave stage.

The appellants challenged that decision before the Supreme Court.

The Conflict Among the High Courts

The Supreme Court was dealing with a genuine divergence of judicial opinion.

Certain decisions of the Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala, and Madras High Courts had recognized a protective jurisdiction during the pendency of the leave application.

The Orissa and Karnataka High Courts, on the other hand, had taken the view that such jurisdiction was unavailable before leave was granted.

The controversy therefore involved an important practical question:

Should the court prioritize immediate preservation of trust property, or should it strictly respect the statutory requirement that the representative suit cannot begin until leave is granted?

The Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of the latter proposition while preserving an urgent mechanism through ex parte consideration of leave.

The Appellants’ Case

The appellants’ argument had an obvious practical attraction.

If trust property is allegedly at immediate risk, they argued, should the court really be unable to do anything until the leave application has been formally decided?

They relied upon:

• Section 94 CPC;
• Order XL Rule 1;
• Section 151 CPC;
• Section 141 CPC; and
• authorities recognizing the court’s protective or inherent jurisdiction.

Particular reliance was placed on the nature of a receiver.

A receiver, it was argued, does not finally determine rights. The receiver merely preserves property and acts as the “hand of the court.”

The appellants therefore contended that appointment of an ad hoc committee or receiver could be justified even before leave, particularly where the trust property was allegedly at risk.

The Respondents’ Answer

The respondents approached the issue from the statutory side.

Their argument was that the leave application is a threshold proceeding.

Until leave is granted, there is no Section 92 suit.

If there is no instituted suit, there can be no interlocutory application in that suit.

They also stressed that the words used by Parliament are not merely “with the leave of the Court,” but “having obtained the leave of the Court.”

That language, they argued, makes prior leave indispensable.

The Supreme Court accepted the substance of this reasoning.

The Supreme Court’s Core Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning can be understood through one simple proposition:

Interim jurisdiction is ancillary to an existing substantive proceeding.

Section 92 prevents the representative suit from coming into existence until leave is obtained.

Therefore, the court cannot ordinarily exercise interlocutory jurisdiction in aid of a suit that has not yet been instituted.

The Supreme Court consequently held that the filing of the plaint and leave application does not itself create the Section 92 suit.

That conclusion also answers the arguments based upon the various general procedural provisions.

Why Section 94, Order XL, and Section 151 Cannot Bypass Section 92

The Court considered the relationship between Section 92 and the general procedural powers contained in the CPC.

Section 94 CPC

Section 94 concerns supplemental proceedings, including temporary injunctions and appointment of receivers.

The word “supplemental” is important.

Such proceedings supplement an existing substantive proceeding; they do not independently create the jurisdiction upon which the substantive action depends.

Consequently, Section 94 cannot be used to bypass the statutory leave requirement.

Order XL Rule 1

Order XL Rule 1 permits appointment of a receiver where the circumstances justify it.

But the Court rejected the proposition that this provision creates an independent jurisdiction to appoint a receiver before a Section 92 suit exists.

The reference to circumstances “before or after the decree” cannot be read as eliminating the requirement of a properly instituted suit.

Section 151 CPC

Section 151 preserves the inherent powers of the civil court.

But inherent power is not an alternative source of jurisdiction where a special statute has prescribed a condition precedent.

The general power under Section 151 therefore cannot be used to achieve indirectly what Section 92 prohibits directly.

Section 141 CPC

Section 141 extends the procedure applicable to suits to other civil proceedings where appropriate.

But it is procedural.

It cannot transform a leave application into a substantive Section 92 suit or override the statutory condition imposed by Section 92.

The Supreme Court therefore rejected the combined reliance upon these provisions.

The Receiver Question

The receiver issue deserves separate attention because it was central to the dispute.

The appellants characterized the proposed intervention as merely preservatory.

The Supreme Court did not accept that characterization as sufficient.

Appointment of a receiver over a public trust may substantially affect the existing management.

It can interfere with trustees who are otherwise lawfully administering the institution.

The Court therefore treated such intervention as potentially intrusive, rather than automatically neutral.

This becomes particularly important if leave is ultimately refused.

If a receiver or ad hoc management body had already been installed before leave and the court subsequently declined permission to institute the suit, the trust’s administration would have been disturbed even though the proposed representative action never crossed the statutory threshold.

That possibility reinforced the Court’s conclusion.

The Significance of Manohar Lal Chopra and Vareed Jacob

The appellants’ reliance upon Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal raised the important issue of inherent jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court did not reject the general principle that civil courts possess inherent powers.

Instead, it drew the distinction between existing jurisdiction and the use of inherent power to manufacture jurisdiction where a statutory condition has not been satisfied.

Similarly, Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese explains the relationship between Section 94 and Section 151.

The inherent power can supplement procedural powers in appropriate circumstances but cannot operate contrary to a special statutory scheme.

Panchalingu applies that principle specifically to Section 92.

The general procedural provisions must operate within, not outside, the statutory framework created by Section 92.

Cotton Corporation and the Principle of Ancillary Relief

The Court also drew upon the principle recognized in Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank Ltd. that interim relief ordinarily operates in aid of the final relief in a suit.

That principle fits naturally with the Court’s conclusion.

An interlocutory order is not an independent cause of action.

It is ancillary to the substantive proceeding.

Where the proposed Section 92 action has not yet become a suit, the court cannot ordinarily exercise interlocutory powers as though the statutory condition for institution had already been satisfied.

R.M. Narayana Chettiar: The Important Qualification

The most important earlier precedent for understanding the judgment is R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar.

That case established two propositions that must be read together.

1. First, leaving under Section 92 is a condition precedent to institution.
2. Second, notice that before granting leave is ordinarily desirable but is not an inflexible requirement in every circumstance.

Where circumstances make prior notice impracticable or the matter genuinely urgent, leave may be granted without prior notice.

A defendant affected by such an order is not without remedy and may seek revocation of the leave.

Panchalingu builds its urgent-relief mechanism upon this earlier principle.

The Emergency Exception: What the Court Actually Permits

This is the part of the judgment that should receive particular attention.

The Court recognized that circumstances may arise where immediate protection of public charitable property is genuinely necessary.

But it rejected the solution of granting interim relief before leave.

Instead, the court should consider the leave application urgently.

Where compelling circumstances exist, it may:

• dispense with prior notice;
• record cogent reasons in writing;
• grant leave ex parte; and
• Thereafter, consider appropriate interim relief.

The Court expressly stated that after leave is granted, it retains the power to pass interim orders beyond merely appointing a receiver.

This is why the judgment should not be described simply as saying:

“No interim relief in Section 92 cases.”

That would be legally inaccurate.

The correct proposition is

No protective or preservatory interim relief while the Section 92 leave application remains pending.

Ex Parte Leave Is Not to Be Granted Casually

The exception is subject to safeguards.

The Supreme Court stressed care, caution, and circumspection in granting leave without notice.

The court must record prima facie cogent reasons demonstrating why the ordinary process of notice should not be followed.

A bare allegation that trust property is in danger cannot automatically justify ex parte leave.

The urgency must emerge from the facts.

This requirement protects the statutory screening function while ensuring that genuine emergencies do not become victims of procedural delay.

What Happens After Ex Parte Leave?

Once leave is granted, the representative suit comes into existence.

The court can then consider the appropriate interlocutory remedy in accordance with the CPC.

The proposed defendants are also protected.

They can seek revocation or recall of the leave, which must then be decided on its merits and according to law.

The procedural sequence is therefore:

Ordinary Case

Plaint + leave application → notice → decision on leave → leave granted → suit instituted → interim relief considered

Genuine Emergency

Plaint + leave application → compelling urgency → reasons recorded → ex parte leave → suit instituted → interim relief considered

The Supreme Court has effectively replaced the earlier debate about “pre-leave protective jurisdiction” with this more structured procedure.

What Happened to the Earlier High Court Authorities?

The Court considered the authorities supporting pre-leave protective jurisdiction rather than ignoring them.

The earlier Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala, and Madras decisions were based substantially upon the concern that a court should not remain powerless where trust property faces an immediate threat.

The contrary, Orissa and Karnataka authorities emphasized the statutory requirement that the suit cannot be instituted until leave is obtained.

The Supreme Court has now settled the conflict.

The concern identified by the first line of cases remains legitimate, but the Court has chosen a different solution:

accelerate the decision on leave rather than grant interim relief before leave.

One important qualification is that the Supreme Court noted that Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan involved a private trust and therefore did not provide a direct answer to the statutory question arising under Section 92.

The Effect of Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice

The appellants also relied upon the treatment of Section 92 leave applications under Rule 16-A of the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice.

The fact that a leave application may be registered separately as a miscellaneous proceeding does not, according to the Supreme Court, transform it into a substantive Section 92 suit.

Procedural registration cannot override the substantive statutory requirement.

The distinction is important:

• A proceeding can exist for the purpose of deciding leave without being the Section 92 suit itself.
• That is why the court can decide the leave application but cannot exercise the interlocutory powers belonging to the suit before leave is granted.

Section 91 and Section 92: A Useful Statutory Comparison

The judgment also considers the difference between Sections 91 and 92 of the CPC.

Section 91 permits a suit in certain public nuisance matters by two or more persons “with the leave of the Court.”

Section 92 refers to persons having an interest in the trust “having obtained the leave of the Court.”

The Supreme Court found significance in the different statutory language.

The comparison reinforces the conclusion that Section 92 deliberately makes prior leave a condition precedent to institution.

It is another example of a basic rule of statutory interpretation:

Different words used by Parliament in closely related provisions ordinarily cannot simply be treated as having no significance.

Current Legal Position After Panchalingu

As of 19 September 2026, the position may be stated concisely:

Issue	Current Position
Is Section 92 leave a condition precedent?	Yes.
Does filing the plaint itself institute the Section 92 suit?	No, where leave is statutorily required
Can interim protective/preservatory relief be granted while leave is pending?	No
Can a receiver be appointed before leave?	No
Can Section 94 bypass Section 92?	No
Can Order XL Rule 1 independently create pre-leave jurisdiction?	No
Can Section 151 be used to circumvent Section 92?	No
Can Section 141 convert the leave proceeding into a suit?	No
Can leave be granted without prior notice?	Yes, where compelling urgency justifies it and reasons are recorded
Can interim relief follow ex parte leave?	Yes.
Can defendants challenge ex parte leave?	Yes, through revocation/recall proceedings

The Supreme Court’s operative answer appears in paragraph 60, followed by dismissal of the appeals in paragraph 61.

What Panchalingu Does Not Mean

The judgment should not be overstated.

It does not mean:

• that receivers can never be appointed in Section 92 proceedings;
• that interim injunctions are unavailable in Section 92 suits;
• that courts must always give notice before granting leave;
• that Section 151 CPC has ceased to operate;
• that public trusts are immune from judicial supervision; or
• that allegations of mismanagement cannot justify urgent intervention.

The actual holding is narrower:

Interlocutory jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the proposed Section 92 suit until the statutory leave necessary to institute that suit has been granted.

That distinction is essential.

Practical Implications for Lawyers

The judgment changes the way urgent Section 92 litigation should be framed.

An applicant faced with an immediate threat should avoid making the principal request:

“Grant an interim injunction/receiver pending disposal of the leave application.”

That approach now directly conflicts with Panchalingu.

Instead, the application should establish:

1. Why Section 92 Applies

Set out the public charitable or religious character of the trust, the alleged breach or need for directions, and the statutory relief sought.

2. Why Leave Should Be Granted

Place sufficient material before the court to satisfy the statutory threshold.

3. Why the Case Is Genuinely Urgent

Identify the specific act that will cause irreversible or serious prejudice if the matter is delayed.

4. Why Notice Should Be Dispensed With

Explain why giving prior notice would defeat the purpose of immediate judicial intervention.

5. What Relief Is Required After Leave

Once leave is granted, the court can consider the appropriate interlocutory remedy.

This approach follows the Supreme Court’s procedural sequence rather than attempting to circumvent it.

Implications for Trustees and Public Trusts

The judgment gives trustees an important threshold protection.

The filing of a Section 92 plaint does not by itself expose the trust to:

• appointment of a receiver;
• displacement of existing management;
• constitution of an ad hoc management body; or
• other protective interlocutory intervention.

The leave application must first succeed.

At the same time, trustees should not read the judgment as immunity from judicial scrutiny.

Where the requirements of Section 92 are established and leave is granted, the ordinary interlocutory powers of the court become available.

The judgment therefore protects procedure, not misconduct.

Why the Judgment Matters to Educational and Religious Trusts

The practical significance is particularly obvious for institutions administering:

• schools and colleges;
• universities;
• charitable hospitals;
• temples and religious institutions;
• trust-owned land;
• endowments;
• charitable buildings; and
• income-producing public trust properties.

A receiver or ad hoc committee can significantly alter an institution’s functioning.

By insisting upon the statutory leave threshold, the Supreme Court has prevented such intervention from occurring merely because a proposed representative action has been filed.

At the same time, the ex parte leave mechanism ensures that a genuine emergency does not become incapable of judicial protection.

The Deeper Legal Principle

The importance of Panchalingu extends beyond Section 92.

The case illustrates a fundamental principle of civil procedure:

Procedural power follows jurisdiction; it does not create jurisdiction.

Section 94 may provide supplemental remedies.

Order XL may provide the mechanism for appointing a receiver.

Section 151 preserves inherent powers.

Section 141 extends procedural rules.

But none of those provisions can eliminate a special statutory condition imposed upon the institution of the underlying proceeding.

The Court therefore treated Section 92 as the controlling provision and the general procedural powers as subordinate to its statutory framework.

Relationship With the Earlier Supreme Court Authorities

The judgment is best understood not as destroying the earlier law, but as harmonizing it.

Case	Principle
R.M. Narayana Chettiar	Establishes the threshold character of leave and permits ex parte leave in appropriate circumstances.
Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad	Explains the representative and protective purpose of Section 92.
Ashok Kumar Gupta v. Sitalaxmi Sahuwala Medical Trust	Addresses the statutory requirements governing Section 92 proceedings.
Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra	Reaffirms the cumulative requirements for maintainability.
Manohar Lal Chopra	Recognizes inherent civil-court powers but does not authorize their use contrary to a special statutory scheme.
Vareed Jacob	Explains the relationship between express procedural powers and Section 151.
Cotton Corporation	Reinforces the principle that interim relief is ordinarily ancillary to substantive proceedings.

Panchalingu brings these principles together in the specific context of the pre-leave stage under Section 92.

Is There Any Later Supreme Court Development?

The judgment was delivered on 18 September 2026.

As of 19 September 2026, the Supreme Court’s judgments portal continues to list S. Panchalingu as a judgment uploaded on 18 September 2026, and the available legal reporting identifies no subsequent Supreme Court decision modifying or qualifying its operative holding.

The immediate legal position is therefore governed by paragraphs 60 and 61 of Panchalingu.

Because the judgment is a Supreme Court ruling on a substantial question of law, its interpretation of Section 92 is binding on courts throughout India under Article 141 of the Constitution.

The Ratio of S. Panchalingu

The ratio can be stated in a single formulation:

Where two or more persons seek to institute a representative suit under Section 92 CPC, obtaining leave is a condition precedent to institution. Until leave is granted, the civil court cannot exercise interlocutory jurisdiction in the proposed suit and cannot grant protective or preservatory interim relief, including by invoking Section 94, Order XL Rule 1, Section 141, or Section 151 CPC. Where compelling urgency exists, however, the court may dispense with prior notice, record cogent reasons, and grant leave ex parte, after which appropriate interim relief may be considered.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors. is an important clarification of S. 92 CPC and the jurisdiction of civil courts at the threshold of representative litigation concerning public charitable and religious trusts.

The Court has settled the conflict among the High Courts by holding that leave is not a procedural afterthought; it is the statutory gateway to the institution of the Section 92 suit.

Until that gateway is crossed, the court cannot use the general machinery of Sections 94, 141, or 151 CPC, or Order XL Rule 1, to grant protective or preservatory relief in the proposed suit.

The decision is particularly important because the Court did not ignore the practical difficulty that can arise when trust property is allegedly facing immediate danger.

Its answer is procedural rather than jurisdictionally expansive:

If the emergency is genuine, accelerate the decision on leave; do not bypass the leave requirement.

Where compelling circumstances exist, the court may dispense with prior notice, grant leave ex parte for recorded reasons, and then consider appropriate interim protection.

That approach preserves both sides of Section 92.

It protects public trusts from premature and potentially disruptive representative litigation while retaining an effective remedy where the facts justify urgent judicial intervention.

For practitioners, the practical lesson is therefore clear:

In a Section 92 proceeding, do not seek to obtain interim protection before crossing the statutory threshold. If immediate protection is genuinely necessary, demonstrate the urgency and seek urgent consideration—and, where justified, ex parte grant—of leave itself.

The question after Panchalingu is no longer simply whether a civil court can protect trust property.

The more precise question is

Has the statutory gateway through which the court acquires that jurisdiction already been crossed?

The Supreme Court’s answer is unequivocal:

Not until Section 92 leave has been granted.

Key Authorities

• S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., 2026 INSC 1010, decided 18 September 2026.
• R.M. Narayana Chettiar & Anr. v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar & Ors., (1991) 1 SCC 48.
• Vidyodaya Trust v. Mohan Prasad R. & Ors., (2008) 4 SCC 115.
• Ashok Kumar Gupta v. Sitalaxmi Sahuwala Medical Trust, (2020) 4 SCC 321.
• Operation Asha v. Shelly Batra & Ors., (2026) 1 SCC 569.
• Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450.
• Vareed Jacob v. Sosamma Geevarghese & Ors., (2004) 6 SCC 378.
• Cotton Corporation of India Ltd. v. United Industrial Bank & Ors., (1983) 4 SCC 625.
• State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao, (2000) 3 SCC 689.
• Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan, ILR 1945 All 818.
• Bai Sakri v. Bai Dhani, ILR 1947 Bom 784.
• Sulaiman v. Chunakara S.M. Jama Ath, 1982 SCC OnLine Ker 145.
• N. Anandan v. Ayyanna Gounder & Ors., 1993 SCC OnLine Mad 165.
• R. Shanmugam & Ors. v. M. Ganesa Mudaliar & Ors., 2009 SCC OnLine Mad 917.
• Kintali China Jaganadham v. K. Laxmi Naidu, 1987 SCC OnLine Ori 44.
• Shree Beereshwara Swamy Devaru Temple v. G.N. Sathya, Karnataka High Court, W.P. No. 9267/2022, decided 30 September 2022.

Statutory Provisions

Provision	Subject
Section 26 CPC	institution of suits.
Section 91 CPC	suits concerning public nuisances and wrongful acts affecting the public.
Section 92 CPC	public charitable and religious trusts.
Section 94 CPC	supplemental proceedings.
Section 141 CPC	procedure applicable to miscellaneous civil proceedings.
Section 151 CPC	inherent powers of civil courts.
Order IV CPC	institution of suits.
Order XL Rule 1 CPC	appointment and powers of receiver.

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This article is intended for legal education and general information. The authoritative source for the ratio and operative directions is the Supreme Court judgment itself.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

1. Can a civil court grant interim relief before granting leave under Section 92 CPC?

No. In S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., 2026 INSC 1010, the Supreme Court held that a civil court cannot grant protective or preservatory interim relief while an application for leave under Section 92 CPC is still pending. Leave of the court is a condition precedent for instituting a Section 92 suit. In urgent cases, however, the court may grant leave ex parte after recording sufficient reasons and thereafter consider interim relief.

2. Is leave of the court mandatory for filing a suit under Section 92 CPC?

Yes. Leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement for suits concerning breach of a public charitable or religious trust or where directions from the court are required for administration of such a trust. Until leave is granted, the Section 92 suit cannot be treated as properly instituted.

3. Can a receiver be appointed under Order XL Rule 1 CPC before Section 92 CPC leave is granted?

The Supreme Court has clarified that Order XL Rule 1 CPC cannot be used to bypass the mandatory leave requirement under Section 92 CPC. Therefore, a receiver or similar protective arrangement cannot ordinarily be imposed before leave is granted. Once leave has been granted, the court may consider an appropriate application for appointment of a receiver in accordance with law.

4. What can a court do when urgent protection of public trust property is required under Section 92 CPC?

Where there is genuine urgency—such as an alleged imminent threat to public charitable or religious trust property—the court need not remain powerless. It may dispense with prior notice, record cogent reasons, consider the Section 92 CPC leave application urgently, and grant leave ex parte where legally justified. After leave is granted, the court can consider an application for appropriate interim protection.

5. What is the significance of the Supreme Court judgment in S. Panchalingu v. People’s Education Trust for Section 92 CPC cases?

The judgment clarifies the procedural sequence governing Section 92 CPC public trust litigation. The Supreme Court held that Sections 94, 141, and 151 of the CPC and Order XL Rule 1 CPC cannot independently confer jurisdiction to grant interim relief before Section 92 leave is granted. The decision is significant for trustees, beneficiaries, charitable institutions, and lawyers dealing with public trust disputes, trust property protection, receiver applications, and Section 92 CPC litigation.

🔑 Key Takeaways: Supreme Court on Section 92 CPC and Interim Relief

• Section 92 CPC leave is a condition precedent—A civil court cannot treat a Section 92 public trust suit as instituted until the required leave of the court has been granted.
• No interim relief before Section 92 leave—The Supreme Court held that protective or preservatory interim orders cannot ordinarily be granted while the Section 92 CPC leave application is pending.
• Order XL Rule 1 CPC cannot bypass Section 92—a court cannot use its power to appoint a receiver under Order XL Rule 1 CPC to circumvent the mandatory leave requirement.
• Section 151 CPC does not create jurisdiction—The court’s inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be used to overcome the statutory threshold imposed by Section 92 CPC.
• Sections 94 and 141 CPC also cannot override Section 92—Supplemental and procedural powers operate within an existing proceeding and cannot independently establish jurisdiction before leave is granted.
• Urgent cases receive a procedural solution—where immediate protection of public charitable or religious trust property is genuinely necessary, the court can consider the leave application urgently and, where justified, grant ex parte leave after recording appropriate reasons.
• Interim relief can follow immediately after leave—Once Section 92 leave has been granted, the court may consider applications for injunctions, receivership, or other appropriate protective orders according to law.
• The judgment settles conflicting High Court approaches—The Supreme Court’s decision in S. Panchalingu & Ors. v. People’s Education Trust (R) & Ors., 2026 INSC 1010, provides a clear procedural framework for courts dealing with Section 92 CPC litigation.
• Section 92 CPC is specifically concerned with public trusts—The provision applies to suits concerning an alleged breach of a public charitable or religious trust or situations requiring judicial directions for administration of such trusts.
• Core legal principle: jurisdiction comes first—procedural and inherent powers cannot be used to bypass a statutory condition precedent. In Section 92 litigation, leave first; interim relief thereafter is the governing sequence.

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