It is imperative to note that while ruling on a significant point pertaining to the functioning of Judges, the Apex Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Nirbhay Singh Suliya vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr in Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2026 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 24570 of 2024) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026 INSC 7 that was pronounced just recently on January 5, 2026 minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that a fearless Judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary, as much as an independent judiciary itself is the foundation on which rule of law rests. We need to note that the top court also expressed concern over frivolous complaints being filed against members of judiciary which lead to Trial Court Judges treading with trepidation with regard to bail matters. We thus see that the Apex Court quashed the Madhya Pradesh High Court order and directed that the judicial officer be reinstated with back wages.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice KV Viswanathan for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 2 that:
This case highlights the unfortunate plight of a judicial officer (appellant herein) who, after 27 years of unblemished service, was removed from service. The sole and exclusive basis on which the appellant has been removed are four judicial orders by which he enlarged certain parties thereon on bail. Those four orders were contrasted with fourteen other orders of bail and after finding that in the four orders Section 59-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 (for short the Excise Act) was not referred to, action has been taken. According to the High Court, in the fourteen other orders the appellant referred to the said Section implying thereby that he was conscious of the existence of the said Section on the statute. Section 59-A prescribes what has now famously come to be known as twin conditions for grant of bail.
As we see, the Bench then stipulates in para 3 that:
The question before us is whether on facts, based on the four judicial orders of grant of bail per se and without anything more, the authorities were justified in removing the appellant from service?
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 4 while elaborating on the facts of the case stating that:
The facts lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant joined service on 31.10.1987 as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. The appellant scaled the ladder up and in 2003 was promoted as Additional District Judge and in September, 2008 was confirmed in the said post. On 16.05.2011, he was transferred to Khargone, District Mandaleshwar (MP), where he joined as First Additional District & Sessions Judge. In the course of discharge of his duties, he dealt with several matters, including bail applications under the Excise Act.
Briefly stated, the Bench enunciates in para 5 that:
One Jaipal Mehta, a resident of Jaitapur, Khargone, lodged a complaint with the Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur. The complaint which did not set out any details of the bail orders and which was in very general terms.
While elaborating further, the Bench states in para 6 that:
It will be seen that according to the complaint, the allegation was that the appellant was taking bribe through his steno, namely, Anil Joshi for grant of bail in cases under the Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk liters or more; that the said Anil Joshi was claiming that he will get the work done through the appellant for extraneous consideration; that due to such corrupt employee, the judiciary was getting defamed; that even in 1995-96, serious complaints of bribery were made against the said employee on which no action was taken; that the said employee has been posted in Khargone for more than 25 years and is earning money through illegal means and that an inquiry is essential.
Most remarkably and most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 27 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, A fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary, as much as an independent judiciary itself is the foundation on which rule of law rests. A judicial Officer is tasked with the onerous duty of deciding cases. Invariably one party to the case would lose and go back unhappy. Disgruntled elements amongst them, wanting to settle scores may raise frivolous allegations. The Trial Judiciary also has tremendous work pressure and works under trying working conditions. Large number of cases are listed in a day and most of the Judicial Officers give their very best while discharging their duties.
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 28 noting that:
Instances have also emerged from different parts of the country, where not just disgruntled parties but some mischievous elements in the Bar have also resorted to intimidatory tactics against the members of the Trial Judiciary by engineering false and anonymous complaints. Strict and strong action in accordance with law should be taken against such individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint against a judicial officer and/or if found to be engineering the false and frivolous complaints. Such proceedings would include in appropriate cases, proceedings for contempt of court. In case the person filing or engineering false and frivolous complaints is a recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart from proceedings for contempt of court, reference to the bar council should be made for disciplinary action. Bar councils, on receipt of such references, have to dispose of the matter expeditiously.
While continuing in the same vein, the Bench observes in para 29 that:
Equally, if the complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer is prima facie found to be true, prompt action to initiate disciplinary proceeding should be taken and no leniency should be shown if the charges are established. Not only this, in appropriate cases where criminal prosecution is warranted against a judicial officer, the High Court should not hesitate to have the same initiated. That is the only way to weed out black-sheeps sullying the fair name of the judiciary. Due care and caution must be exercised by the High Court in initiating such proceedings. It should be ensured that only because an order is wrong or there is an error of judgment, without anything more, a judicial officer is not put through the ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution.
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 40 that:
Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant has been held guilty of misconduct only based on certain judicial orders granting bail without anything more. We say so for the following reasons:
- The complaint, as originally filed by Jaipal Mehta, was primarily against Anil Joshi, the stenographer who had been working in Khargone for a long time, even before the appellant assumed office in Khargone.
- The complaint neither set out any particulars nor referred to any judicial order. It was general in nature.
- The complainant was not examined in the inquiry. The witness examined in support of the charge, Gendalal Chauhan, did not support the charge.
- The prosecutor who appeared in each of the 18 bail orders was examined on behalf of the defence. He deposed that the State accepted the orders granting bail without mounting any challenge in the higher court. He categorically stated that the orders were absolutely proper and were passed on valid grounds.
- A perusal of the four orders shows that reasons were given, though there was no express mention of Section 59-A(2) of the Excise Act. In one bail order, the appellant referred to the filing of the challan and the likelihood of the trial consuming a considerable amount of time. In fact, the appellant relied on Article 21, though it was not expressly mentioned. In the other bail orders, reference was made to the applicants being rural farmers and not flight risks.
- There was absolutely no material placed on record to show circumstances from which an inference could be drawn that extraneous considerations actuated the passing of the bail orders. The hypothesis was drawn solely on the basis that the statutory provision was not expressly referred to.
- The finding that in 14 other orders reference was made to Section 59-A(2) of the Excise Act is, by itself, insufficient to infer misconduct in the passing of the four bail orders in question.
- It would be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments and orders which do not expressly refer to statutory provisions are, per se, dishonest judgments.
Most rationally, the Bench observes in para 41 that:
The High Court has erred in not interfering with the order. A valiant attempt was made by Mr. Arjun Garg to sustain the impugned order by contending that a writ court or this Court cannot act as an appellate court over the inquiry report and the only consideration was whether the inquiry had been fairly conducted. We are unable to accept the said contention. In our opinion, for the reasons stated above, the findings in the inquiry report are perverse and are not supported by findings on record. We make bold to record a finding that on the available material, no reasonable person would have reached the conclusion that enquiry officer reached.
Most commendably, the Bench directs and holds in para 43 that:
For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order of removal dated 02.09.2015, the order of Appellate Authority dated 17.03.2016 and the impugned order of the High Court are all set aside. The appellant shall be deemed to have continued in service till he attained the normal age of superannuation. Since the appellant has been kept out of service for no fault of his, we are of the opinion that full back wages with all consequential benefits should be given to the appellant. Let the monetary benefits be released within a period of eight weeks from today with interest @ 6 per cent. No order as to costs.
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 44 that:
Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to all the Registrar Generals of the respective High Courts in the country, so as to enable them to draw the attention of the Chief Justices of the High Courts to the same.
Be it noted, Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala in his separate but concurring order points out in para 1 that:
My esteemed brother Justice K.V. Viswanathan has penned an ineffable judgment. This judgment will go a long way in protecting judicial officers of the district judiciary from being subjected to departmental action for alleged wrong or incorrect exercise of discretion in passing orders of bail without anything more. Brother Viswanathan has put it very pithily, saying that if the complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer is prima facie found to be true then, in such circumstances, disciplinary proceedings must be taken, and no leniency should be shown if the charges are established. In an appropriate case, even criminal prosecution may be instituted against a judicial officer. Such action is necessary to weed out tainted judges from the judiciary.
It goes without saying that corruption in the judiciary at any level is intolerable, as corruption severely undermines the core of the administration of justice and erodes public trust in the rule of law. However, the High Court, which is vested with the supervisory control must keep in mind that a judicial officer of the district judiciary works mostly in a charged atmosphere. A mere wrong order or wrong exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without anything more, cannot be a ground to initiate departmental proceedings.
Most sagaciously, Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala underscores in para 2 holding that:
Initiation of departmental proceedings on mere suspicion is one of the primary causes why trial court judges are reluctant when it comes to exercising discretion for the purpose of grant of bail. It should not happen that because of the lurking fear in the mind of a trial court judge, of some administrative action being taken that even in a deserving case, well within the principles of law, bail is declined. This is one reason why the High Courts are flooded with bail applications.
The same is the scenario even so far as the Supreme Court is concerned. Over a period of time, the trial court judges have exhibited tendency to shirk from their solemn judicial function and responsibility when it comes to exercising discretion in matters relating to bail. Courts of the district judiciary wield powers necessary for the functioning of the justice delivery system in India and when their autonomy is compromised by higher courts and fear takes precedence over judicial duties, democracy and the rule of law suffer.
Finally, Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala in his concluding para propounds in para 3 holding that:
For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. As held by this Court in M.S. Bindra versus Union reported in (1998) 7 SCC 310 while evaluating the materials the authority should not altogether ignore the reputation in which the officer was held till recently. The maxim Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus (no one becomes dishonest all of a sudden) is not unexceptional but still is a salutary guideline to judge human conduct, particularly in the field of Administrative Law. The authorities should not keep the eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which the delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those who were supervising him earlier.
To dunk an officer into the puddle of doubtful integrity it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification to ram an officer with the label ‘doubtful integrity’.
In sum, we thus see that Apex Court very rightly held that fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent judiciary. While considering the appeal by a judicial officer challenging his removal after 27 years of unblemished service on account of 4 judicial orders that did not refer expressly to Section 59-A of the MP Excise Act and by which he enlarged certain parties on bail, the Apex Court allowed the appeal reasoning that it will be a dangerous proposition to hold that judgments and orders which do not refer expressly to statutory provisions are per se dishonest judgments. Absolutely right!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh
