While striking the right chord and making no bones about lawyers not succumbing to pressure by litigants of callous allegations of bias, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chandigarh in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Dinesh Chand Bansal V/s State of Haryana and another in CRM-M-72601-2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:PHHC:013845 that was reserved on 21.01.2026 and then finally pronounced and uploaded on 30.01.2026 has minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that judicial officers should not succumb to pressure by litigants who make callous allegations of bias against them. It must be mentioned that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sumeet Goel made the key observation while dealing with a case that sought the transfer of a defamation complaint that was pending before a Judicial Magistrate in Panchkula district of Haryana to a different Judge, due to alleged bias. The Bench while taking note of the serious aspersions cast on the Judge and the counsel in the present case, the Chandigarh High Court dismissed the transfer plea with costs of Rs 50,000.
At the very outset, this robust judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sumeet Goel of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Chandigarh sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The petition in hand has been preferred by the petitioner under Section 528 read with Section 447 of BNSS, 2023 laying challenge to the order dated 08.08.2025 (hereinafter referred to as impugned order) vide which an application preferred by the petitioner (herein) under Section 448 of BNSS, 2023 (erstwhile Section 408 of Cr.P.C.), (hereinafter referred to as application in question) for transfer of his case from the Court of current learned Presiding Judicial Officer, has been dismissed.
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on the facts of the case stating that:
The relevant factual backdrop of the lis in hand is adumbrated thus:
(i) A criminal complaint under Section 500 IPC was filed by respondent No.2 (herein) before Judicial Magistrate, Panchkula, Haryana. The essence of the complaint, as set out in the petition, is that the complainant (respondent No.2 herein) is a well-known and respected businessman in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector and has also served as District Governor of Rotary International, District 3080 for the year 2017–18. The complainant was unanimously nominated for the post of District Governor for the year 2017–18 and was duly appointed by Rotary International after the nomination process was found to be valid.
It has been alleged that the accused (petitioner herein), who was a rival candidate, & was dissatisfied with his defeat, started initiating repeated objections, complaints and litigation to challenge the selection of the complainant. Despite multiple reviews by the Rotary International, the accused (petitioner herein) continued filing civil suits and appeals before the Courts.
It has been further alleged that the actions of the accused (petitioner herein) were found to be without merit and several cases were dismissed with adverse observations against him. As the accused (petitioner herein) had approached the Courts without exhausting the Rotary International’s internal remedies, his Rotary Club membership was eventually terminated in accordance with Rotary policy. Subsequently, the accused (petitioner herein) got an FIR registered through another person alleging tampering of ballots, in which the complainant was summoned. Thereafter, the complainant complied with the directions of the Court and was extended the concession of bail on the same day as per the orders of the Hon’ble Uttarakhand High Court.
Furthermore, with the intention to harm the reputation of the complainant, the accused persons conspired together and circulated a misleading and false letter among Rotary members and WhatsApp groups. It has been alleged therein that the complainant was taken into custody in order to create a false and damaging impression. On the account of the same, the complainant got distressed as also demands for clarification and pressure from Rotary officials. It has been further alleged in the complaint that the accused had no authority or locus to circulate such communication especially when his Rotary membership had already been terminated.
As per the complainant, the deliberate circulation of false and defamatory material had caused irreparable damage to his reputation, dignity and standing in society as well within the Rotary International which necessitated him to file the instant complaint seeking prosecution of the accused under Section 500 IPC and compensation for the loss suffered due to their malicious and defamatory acts.
(ii) The application in question was filed by the petitioner (herein), seeking transfer of trial arising out of the above-said criminal complaint, relevant whereof reads thus:
5. That the applicants are more than 88 years old and suffering from several ailments i.e. knee, liver, kidney and heart problems and living around 250 KM away from Panchkula at Dehradun (UTTRAKHAND) and it takes 5 to 6 hours continuous travelling for reaching Panchkula. But the presiding officer in connivance with the complainant and just to harass or humiliate fixing the matters twice in a week. That the LD magistrate has duly been approached by the opposite party i.e. complainant.
6. That the complainant is publicly claiming that he has paid an high amount to the Ld JMIC through his counsel sh. xxxxx, Advocate and that the verdict of the above said complaint will come in his favour.
7. That the petitioners/applicants came to know through his known Rotarian past District Governor xxxxx that the complainant himself told him that he had approached to the presiding officer through his Advocate and the presiding officer assured to convicts the both accused persons i.e. applicants. It is clear ground which shows that the presiding officer is biased and cannot expect free and fair trial from the same presiding officer. The petitioner now have clear doubt on the authenticity and reliability of the presiding officer.
8. That during the course of the trial the learned Magistrate had tried several times to harass and made to stand and kept waiting the applicants for three to four hours in front of the court. It is also pertinent to mention here that the complainant and his counsel usually comes at court after 12 PM. The counsel for the applicants brought this issue in the notice of the presiding officer but the presiding officer neither paid any heed nor gave any directions to the counsel as well as complainant to come on or before time which gives grounds to believe that the Court is prejudiced against the Petitioners/applicants.
(iii). Vide the impugned order, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the transfer application, relevant whereof reads thus:
This case pertains to the year 2019 and one among the cases under action plan 2024-2025. It appears from the circumstances, that it is the applicants/accused who are trying to delay the proceedings on the one or the other pretext. In case, any order favourable to the applicants/accused has not been passed by the Court concerned, they are at liberty to seek their remedy as per law and they have already taken the appropriate remedy. Simply by expressing apprehension that justice will not be done to the applicants/accused, is not a sufficient ground to transfer the case.
iv) It is in this factual backdrop that the petition in hand has come up for hearing before this Court.
Most forthrightly, the Bench propounds in para 13 holding that:
There is yet another aspect nay vital aspect of the lis in hand which craves attention of this Court. This court is acutely cognizant of an increasingly pervasive and deleterious trend wherein litigants, in a bid to manipulate the judicial process, cast unfounded and scurrilous aspersions upon learned counsel representing the rival side. Such allegations, frequently suggesting an untoward influence over the Court without a shred of cogent or corroborative material, represent an assault on the integrity of judiciary. It must be emphasized that the Indian Judicial System, operating primarily on an adversarial framework, inherently relies on the advocates of rival parties to facilitate the effective conducting of judicial proceedings. This system entrusts; the responsibility of presenting facts, evidence and legal arguments; upon the advocates, who act as intermediaries between their clients and the Court.
The role of the judiciary is not confined to determining which party has presented its case more effectively or persuasively; rather, it is committed to the higher objective of dispensing justice in accordance with law, equity and the principles of fairness. This justice-oriented approach necessitates that the Court receives adequate assistance from rival sides, enabling it to reach decision that aligns with the ends of justice. Advocates play a pivotal role in this process, acting as essential instruments in the administration of justice. A judge, often likened to the charioteer of justice, requires the support of well-informed and legally skilled advocates who function as the wheels of the chariot, ensuring its smooth and effective movement. Without such assistance, the judicial process risks being impaired, leaving the Court ill-equipped to address the complexities of disputes brought before it.
The adversarial judicial system in our country is fundamentally dependent on the competence, integrity and ethical conduct of advocates. By conferring the nearly exclusive right to represent parties in Court upon qualified professionals, the Advocates Act, 1961 ensures that the judiciary is supported by individuals who possess the requisite legal knowledge and professional commitment. Advocates, as officers of the Court, bridge the gap between the parties and the judiciary, providing the Court with the assistance it needs to fulfill its constitutional mandate of delivering justice.
This partnership between the bench and the bar forms the backbone of the judicial process, fostering a system where justice prevails, not through the rhetorical prowess of one party over another, but through a fair and informed adjudication of disputes. The role of advocates in this system, therefore, transcends mere representation; it is integral to the preservation of the rule of law and the realization of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of a judgment titled as Dr. D.C. Saxena vs. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, 1996(5) SCC 216, while elucidating the salutary nay indispensable role of Advocates in our justice dispensation system; has held thus:
35. Advocacy touches and asserts the primary value of freedom of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech which holds so dear in a democracy of ability to express freely. Freedom of expression produces the benefit of the truth to emerge. It aids the revelation of the mistakes or bias or at times even corruption. It assists stability by tempered articulation of grievances and by promoting peaceful resolution of conflicts. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity, equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the protection of other fundamental human rights. Legal procedure illuminates how free speech of expression constitutes one of the most essential foundations of democratic society.
Freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practicing the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. As stated hereinbefore they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary.
Any unsubstantiated attack on the professional conduct of a counsel, particularly involving the Court/judicial officer(s), is, in essence, an attack on the majesty of law itself. The tendency to vilify counsel representing the opposing side, as a tactical manoeuvre to secure a transfer, must be met with iron hands. The Court(s) must detest and discourage such practices with utmost sincerity to ensure that the judicial process is not held hostage to the whims of disgruntled litigants.
As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 14 that:
As a squitter to the above rumination, the following principles emerge:
(i) The exercise of power under Section 408 Cr.P.C./448 BNSS is quintessentially a judicial function and must be exercised with circumspection and only where accentuating circumstances exist and ends
of justice would otherwise be defeated.
(ii) An application for transfer cannot be allowed upon a mere asking or the subjective whims or imaginary anxieties of a litigant. The applicant must bring forth reasonable and non-illusory grounds, substantiated by cogent material, demonstrating a legitimate threat to the purity of the trial.
(iii) Judicial error is not synonymous with judicial partiality and hence mere passing of an unfavourable order, or even an order subsequently set aside by a superior Court, does not ipso facto establish a foundation for bias or prejudice.
(iv) To prevent the abuse of process and the practice of forum shopping, the Sessions Court must strictly enforce the provisions of Section 408 (3) Cr.P.C./448(3) BNSS, imposing costs on any party preferring frivolous or vexatious transfer application.
(v) No universal guidelines or parameters can possibly be enumerated for exercise of power of transfer jurisdiction of the Sessions Court as every case has its own unique factual conspectus.
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 15 that:
Now this Court reverts to the factual milieu of the petition in hand to ratiocinated thereupon. The transfer of the present proceedings arise out of Complaint Case No. COMI/84/2019, titled Tarsem Kumar Ruby vs. D.C. Bansal & Another, filed on 07.08.2019 before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Upon filing of the complaint, the Court below, after preliminary consideration, summoned the petitioner (herein) vide order dated 05.09.2019. The petitioner appeared before the Court in compliance with the said order and on 15.11.2019, the petitioner was granted the concession of bail by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula. The proceedings thereafter continued in accordance with law. In the meantime, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing CRM-M-47186-2019, titled D.C. Bansal & Another vs. State of Haryana & Another, challenging the summoning order and the proceedings arising therefrom. After hearing the learned counsel for the rival parties, the said petition was dismissed vide order dated 20.05.2024. Thereafter, on 19.02.2025, the petitioner, citing loss of confidence in the fairness of the proceedings and alleging prejudice, filed an application before the District Judge, Panchkula under Section 448 BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to Section 408 Cr.P.C.), seeking transfer of the complaint case from the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula, to another competent Court within the same district. While the said transfer application was pending consideration, the matter was listed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Panchkula on 24.02.2025. On that date, the petitioner filed an application seeking exemption from the personal appearance, supported by a medical report, stating that he was not keeping good health. On the same date, i.e. 24.02.2025, the trial Court issued non-bailable warrants against the petitioner in the complaint case. Aggrieved by the issuance of non-bailable warrants, the petitioner approached this Court by filing CRM-M-12764-2025. This Court, vide order dated 20.11.2025, quashed the order whereby
non-bailable warrants had been issued against the petitioner. Thereafter, the transfer application filed by the petitioner came to be decided by the Sessions Judge, Panchkula, who, vide impugned order dismissed the application in hand. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the said transfer application, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present petition seeking setting aside of the impugned order and transfer of the complaint case to another competent court within the Sessions Division, Panchkula.
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 16 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that:
The power of transfer is indubitably discretionary in nature and is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. Transfer of proceedings cannot be ordered on the basis of mere apprehension, surmises or dissatisfaction of a party with the manner in which the trial is proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to place on record any cogent material to establish any likelihood of bias or prejudice on the part of the Court below. The allegations raised by the petitioner are general in nature and do not inspire confidence so as to warrant transfer of the proceedings. The mere fact that the complaint has been pending since 2019 is also not sufficient, by itself, to justify transfer particularly when the delay cannot be attributed solely to the complainant or the trial Court. Therefore, from the totality of the facts of the case in hand, no perversity, illegality or jurisdictional error has been pointed out warranting interference by this Court.
16.2. The unscrupulous attempt, by the petitioner, in casting aspersions on the learned trial Judge as also learned opposite counsel, inter alia, by reliance upon the order dated 02.08.2024 deserves to be deprecated and responded with abhorrence. This Court, however, refrains from imposing exemplary costs upon the petitioner keeping in view, inter alia, the factum of the petitioner being a man aged 83 years with no antecedents regarding raising such scandalous issue(s) earlier.
Finally and far more significantly, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 17 that:
It is thus, directed that:
(i) The petition in hand; seeking quashing/setting aside of the impugned order dated 08.08.2025 seeking transfer of complaint bearing No. COMI/84/2019 titled as Tarsem Kumar Ruby vs. DC Bansal and another from the Court of current Presiding Judicial Magistrate to another Court of competent jurisdiction at Panchkula; is dismissed.
(ii) The petitioner is saddled with costs of Rs.50,000/-, out of which Rs.25,000/- shall be deposited by him with the Haryana State Legal Services Authority, Panchkula within two weeks from today and remaining Rs.25,000/- shall be deposited before the Chief Judicial Magistrate CJM), Panchkula to be remitted to learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 (herein)-complainant before the trial Court within two weeks from today. In case, the said costs are not deposited by the petitioner as directed for; the CJM, Panchkula is directed to intimate the Deputy Commissioner, Panchkula who shall have such costs recovered from the petitioner including but not limited to as arrears of land revenue and upon realization thereof, the Deputy Commissioner, Panchkula shall have the same submitted to CJM, Panchkula, for further remittance thereof to the quarter(s) concerned. A compliance report be sent by CJM, Panchkula as also Deputy Commissioner, Panchkula to this Court accordingly.
(iii) Any observations made and/or submissions noted hereinabove shall not have any effect on the merits of the case and the trial Court shall proceed further expeditiously, in accordance with law, without being influenced with them.
(iii) Pending applications), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
In a nutshell, we thus see that the Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed a plea that sought transfer of a 2019 defamation case holding that unproven allegations against a judge and counsel amount to an attack on the majesty of law. While deprecating the unproven allegations, the Chandigarh High Court also imposed a Rs 50,000 penalty on the 89-year-old petitioner and directed the Trial Court to proceed expeditiously. It was also underscored by the Court that although the right to a fair trial is part of Article 21 of the Constitution, the power to transfer cases must be exercised with great caution and only in rare and exceptional situations. It was also made abundantly clear by the High Court that Judges shouldn’t succumb to the pressure by the litigants of callous allegations of bias. Very rightly so!
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut – 250001, Uttar Pradesh
