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Introduction
Who are the persons of inherence of the rights under Article 30 of the
Indian Constitution? This right secures to religious and linguistic
minorities a right to establish and administer educational institutions
of their choice. Whenever, therefore, a group seeks its protection by
challenging a law or executive action before a court, the foremost
question that the court must dispose of a preliminary step is whether
the group seeking protection is in fact a minority definable in terms of
the article. The probe would require an enquiry into two questions, (i)
What is a minority? (ii) How is minority to be ascertained in a given
situation?
The Constitution nowhere defines the
terms 'minority', nor does it lay down sufficient indicia to the test
for determination of a group as minority. Confronted, perhaps, with the
fact that the concept of minority, lie its problem, was intercalate, the
framers made no efforts to bring it within the confines of a
formulation. Even in the face of doubts being expressed over the
advisability of leaving vague justiciable rights to undefined
minorities, the members of the Constituent Assembly made no attempt to
define the term while article 23 of the Draft Constitution,
corresponding to present articles 29 and 30, was being debated, and,
presumably left it to the wisdom of the courts to supply the omission.
However, as the following would
show, the opinions of the courts on the first question appear to be the
result of a half-hearted attempt, and, only indicate the futility of
depending on them in any search for an answer to the second question.
What is a
Minority?
The word minority has not been defined in the Constitution. The Motilal
Nehru Report (1928) showed a prominent desire to afford protection to
minorities, but did not define the expression. The Sapru Report (1945)
also proposed, inter alia, a Minorities Commission but did not define
Minority. The U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities has defined minority as under:
1) The term 'minority' includes only those non-documents group of the
population which possess and wish to preserve stable ethnic, religious
or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different from
those of the rest of the population;
2) Such minorities should properly include the number of persons
sufficient by themselves to preserve such traditions or characteristics;
and
3) Such minorities should be loyal to the state of which they are
nationals.
The initial courtroom attempt to
answer the first question was made in In re Education Bill where the
Supreme Court, through S.R. Das C.J., suggesting the techniques of
arithmetic tabulation, held that the minority means a "community, which
is numerically less than 50 percent" of the total population. This
statistical criterion prevail with the Kerela High Court also which, in
A.M.Patroni v. Kesavan , defined minority
to mean the same thing as it meant to the Supreme Court.
The 'definition' refers to group of
individual who are particularly smaller as the majority in a defined
area. It however does not indicate as to what factor of distinction,
subjective or objective are to be taken as the test for distinguishing a
group from the rest. Thus, while considering 'minority', a numerically
smaller group, as against the majority in a defined area, some place
emphasis upon certain characteristics commonly possessed by the members
constituting the minority and, to them, these characteristics serves as
objective factors of distinction. In this sense the term used to cover
"racial, religious or linguistic sections of the population within a
State which differ in these respects from the majority of the
population."
Minority in other sense also means,
a group constituting a minority group have a feeling of belonging to one
common unit, a sense of akinness or community, which distinguishes from
those belonging to the majority of the inhabitants. They are "group held
together by ties of common descent, language or religious faith and
feeling themselves different in these respects from the majority of the
inhabitants of the given political entity." There are also those who
define minority in terms of relationship between the dominant groups and
minority. To them it is much more important "to understand the genesis
of the relationship between dominant group and minority then it is to
know the marks by the possession of which people is identified as member
of either." Rose defined minority as a "group of people differentiated
from others in the same society by race, nationality, religion, or
language - who both think of themselves as a differentiated group and
are though of by others as a differentiated group with negative
connotation."
Thus most of the definitions
explained above place emphasis either upon certain common
characteristics present among the members of the groups which serve as
the marks of distinction and such objective test, and it is only in some
cases that the factor of relationship between the dominant and non
dominant group is regarded as the main determinant of minority status
which, in turn, at least some cases, renders relative numbers in and out
of the group concerned as irrelevant for definitional purpose.
A 'consciousness' of the difference
with the majority on the basis of certain characteristics is, therefore,
considered as a distinguishing mark, and as such a subjective element.
thus, the definition which lays emphasis upon certain subjective factors
such as 'feeling' or 'consciousness' provide a test which is too vague
and uncertain, and more psychological in nature than real. Every
situation may not necessarily involve the assumption that the group in
order to deserve the title of 'minority' must be distinguishable from
the majority by the presence of the feeling or consciousness of its
being different from the majority. A group distinguishable from others
by the possession of certain objective characteristics, such as
language, may not have a feeling or consciousness of its distinct status
of being counting as minority. The most acceptable definitions, given by
the Human Rights Commission, is not beyond the reach of argument. That
definition appears to be confined to those non dominant groups only
which, apart from having certain objective characteristics that are
distinctively of their own, wish to preserve the distinctive identities
and are not willing to be assimilated with the rest of the population.
No definition comes out to be
comprehensive to cover all the varied situations, illustrates the
difficulty experienced in assigning limits to concept of minority. This
must remain the possible explainable reason why courts have not ventured
to formulate a general definition.
Indeed, as far as the limited
purpose of article 30 is concerned, such a venture would have been
rather unnecessary too. For, religion and language being the criteria
indicated in article 30, a pre-condition for the latter acceptability,
the Constitution itself tends to confine the tasks of the courts to the
ascertainment whether the group claiming constitutional protection is
the group identifiable by the characteristics of religion or language
and is numerically non dominant. The courts have therefore, only to be
sure for themselves that the basis of claim to protection is ether
religion or language.
Interpreting the words, "based on
religion" in article 30, the Delhi High Court rightly pointed out that
the words would mean that "the only or the principal basis pf the
'minority' must be their adherence to one of the many religions…and that
the other features of the minority are subordinate to the main feature,
namely, its separateness because of the religion." A similar
interpretation can also be placed on the words 'based on language'. That
being so, it can be concluded that for the purpose of article 30, a
majority means a non-dominant collectively distinguishable from the
majority of population by the objective factors of religion or language
or language or a combination of both.
Constituent
Assembly Debate
The whole debate in the Constituent Assembly on article 23 of the Draft
Constitution which later assumed the shape of the present article 29 and
30, revolve round this issue: what rights could or should be conceded to
minorities? The reference to minorities was a reference to none other
than Indian minorities existing in India. The original draft of the
fundamental rights submitted to the Constituent assembly on April 16,
1947 by the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights did not contain any
provision corresponding to article 30(1) and did not even refer to the
word minority. The letter submitted by K.M. Munshi to the Minorities
Sub-Committee on the same date when, along with some other rights, the
rights now forming part of article 30(1) was proposed, made a reference
on the term "national minorities".
The Drafting committee, however,
sought, to make a distinction between the rights of any section of the
citizen to conserve its language, script or culture and the right of the
minorities based on religion or language to establish and administer
educational institutions of their choice and for this the committee
omitted the word 'minority' in the earlier part of the draft article 23
corresponding to article 29, while it retained the word in the latter
part of the draft article 23 which now forms part of the article 30(1).
Ambedkar sought to explain the
reason the reason for substitution in the Draft Constitution of the word
minority by the words "any section" observing:
It will be noted that the term
minority was used therein not in the technical sense of the word
'minority' as we have been accustomed to use it for the purpose of
certain political safeguards, such as representation in the Legislature,
representation in the service and so on. The word is used not merely to
indicate the minority in the technical sense of the word, it is also
used to cover minorities which are not minorities in the technical
sense, but which are nonetheless minorities in the culture and
linguistic sense. That is the reason why we dropped the word "minority"
because we felt that the word might be interpreted in the narrow sense
of the term when the intention of this House….was to use the word
'Minority' in a much wider sense so as to give cultural protection to
those who were technically not minorities but minorities nonetheless.
Ambedkar's explanation that the right was available not only to
minorities in the 'technical sense' but also to minorities in the 'wider
sense' has an obvious reference only to that part of Draft article 23
which now forms part of article 29(1) and not to that which is now
clause (1) of article 30. His expiation, therefore, may be taken to be
an attempt to broaden the scope of clause (1) of article 29 only so as
to include within the term 'minority' other minority groups also, as
contemplated and illustrated by him, and thus to confine article 30(1)
to those minorities which he described as minorities in the technical
sense, were politically recognized and the most prominent amongst them
were represented in the Constituent Assembly also.
The whole problem, as far as this
part of constitution is concerned, that engaged considerable time and
efforts of the framers was to achieve a consensus an a constitutional
arrangement, between the numerically dominant majority considered as
such on the national scene and the minorities referred to above- a
solution which could give the minorities a feeling of security against
discrimination, and security against interference with those
characteristics which had divided them apart from the majority. And, it
is too obvious to be noted that, at no stage was any section of this
majority ever treated as 'minority'.
If these assumptions as accepted as
truly reflecting the intention of those who drafted and incorporate
these provision in the constitutional document, with a wishful hope that
they were rendering a constitutional solution to the problem of Indian
minorities, it may be argued that where a minority is the historical or
national context and its claim is based on religion it must be defined
and ascertain in terms of the population of the whole country,
irrespective of its being in numerical majority in any particular state;
and, where a group in not a minority considered as such in the national
context, but is still definable as 'minority' under Ambedkar's stretched
meaning of the term, it may be ascertained with reference to the
population of the state concerned. The argument is correct, it is
submitted, if the provision in the question are viewed against the
historical prospective in which they were adopted, and are construed to
carry into effect the true spirit and intention of the constitution.
Protection
of Interest of Minorities
Article 29 of the Constitution of India defines the protection of
interest of minorities: -
1) Any section of the citizen residing in the territory of India or any
part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own
shall have right to conserve the same.
2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution
maintained by the State receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
Clause (1)
Clause (1) gives protection to every section of the citizens having
distinct language, script or culture by guaranteeing their right to
conserve the same. If such section desires to preserve their own
language and culture, the state would not stand in their way. A minority
community can effectively conserve its language, script or culture by
and through educational institutions and therefore necessary concomitant
to the right to conserve its distinctive language, script or culture and
that is what is conferred on all minorities by article 30(1). But
article 29(1), neither controls the scope of article 30(1) nor is
controlled by that article. The scope of the two is different. Article
29(1) is not confined to minorities but extends to all sections of
citizens. Similarly article 30(1) is not confined to those minorities,
which have 'distinct language, script or culture' but extends to all
religious and linguistic minorities. Further, article 30(1) gives only
the right to establish and administer educational institutions of
minorities' choice while article 29(1) gives a very general right 'to
conserve' the language, script or culture. Thus, the right under article
30(1) need not be exercised for conserving language, script or culture.
Clause (2)
Clause (2) relates to admission into educational institutions, which are
maintained or aided by state funds. No citizen shall be denied admission
in such institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language
or any of them. Article 15 prohibits discrimination against citizen on
ground of religion, etc. but the scope of two articles is different.
Firstly, article 15(1) protects all citizens against the state where as
the protection of article 29(2) extends to the state or anybody who
denies the right conferred by it.
Secondly, article 15 protects all
citizens against discrimination generally but article 29(2) is a
protection against a particular species of wrong, namely, denial of
admission into educational institutions maintained or aided by the state
. Finally, the specific grounds on which discrimination is prohibited
are not the same in two articles. 'Place of birth' and 'sex' do not
occur in article 29(2), while 'language' is not mentioned in article 15.
The right to admission into an
educational institution is a right, which is an individual citizen, has
as a citizen and not as a member of a community or class of citizen.
Hence a school run by a minority, if it is aided by state funds, cannot
refuse admission to children belonging to other communities. But the
minority community may reserve up to 50 percent of the seats for the
members of its own community in an educational institution established
and administered by it even if the institution is getting aid from the
State. The state, however, cannot direct minority educational
institutions to restrict admission to the members of their own
communities. Article 29(2), however, does not confer a legal right on
the members belonging to other communities to freely profess, practice
and propagate their religion within the precincts of a college run by a
minority community . Article 29(2) cannot be invoked where refusal of
admission to a student is on the ground of his not possessing requisite
qualifications or where a student is expelled from an institution for
acts of indiscipline.
To overcome the conflict with
article 15 as well as article 29 the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,
1951, added clause (4) to article 15 to the effect that nothing in
article 15 and article 29(2) shall prevent state from making any special
provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizen or for the schedule caste and the schedule tribes.
The state is empowered to reserve seats in state colleges for socially
and educationally backward classes of citizen or for SC and ST.
Rights of
Minority to Establish and Administer Educational Institutions
Article 30 of the Constitution of India defines Rights of Minority to
Establish and Administer Educational Institutions: -
1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the
right to establish and administer educational institutions of their
choice.
[1-A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any
property of an educational institution establish and administered by a
minority, referred in clause (1), the State shall ensure that the amount
fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such
property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed
under that clause.]
2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions,
discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it
is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or
language.
Clause (1)
Clause (1) gives rights to all minorities based on religion or language
the right to establish and administer educational institution of their
own choice. Article 29 and 30 are grouped together it will wrong to
restrict the rights of minority to establish and administer educational
institution concerned with language script and culture of the
minorities. The reasons are: Firstly, article 29 confers the fundamental
rights on any section of the citizen which will include the majority
also where as article 30(1) confers all rights on all minorities.
Secondly, article 29(1) is concerned with language, script or culture,
whereas article 30(1) deals with minorities based on religion or
language. Thirdly, article 29(1) is concern with the right to conserve
language, script or culture, whereas article 30(1) deals with right to
establish and administer educational institutions of the minorities of
their choice. Fourthly, the conservation of language, script or culture
under article 29(1) may be by means wholly unconnected with educational
institutions, and similarly establishment and administer educational
institutions by a minority under article 30(1) may be unconnected with
any motive to conserve language, script or culture. A minority may
administer an institution for religious education, which is wholly
unconnected with any question of conserving language, script or culture.
It may be that article 29(1) and article 30(1) overlap, but the former
cannot limit the width of the latter. The scope of article 30 rests on
the fact that right to establish and administer educational institution
of their own choice is guaranteed only to linguistic or religious
minorities, and no other section of citizens has such a right. Further
article 30(1) gives the right to linguistic minorities irrespective of
their religion. It is, therefore, not at all possible to exclude secular
education from article 30.
The expression 'minority' in article
30 remains undefined though the court has observed that it refers to any
community which is numerically less than 50 percent of the population of
a particular state as a whole when a law in consideration of which the
question of minority right is to be determined as a State law. A
community, which is minority in specific area of the State though a
majority in the state as a whole, would not be treated as minority for
the purpose of this article. A minority could not also be determined in
relation to entire population of the country. If it was a state law, the
minorities must be recognized in relation of that state. But the fact
that the expression minority an article 30(1) is used to distinct from
'Any section of citizen' in article 29(1) lends support to the view that
article 30(1) deals with national minorities or minorities recognized in
the context of entire nation. In that case, however, article 30(1) would
become inapplicable to the national majority even if it is a minority in
any particular state, e.g., Hindus in Punjab or Jammu and Kashmir.
Although article 30(1) does not
speak of citizens, the minority competent to claim the protection of
that article must be a minority of person residing in India. 'The
minority under article 30 must necessarily mean those who farm a
distinct and identifiable group of citizen in India'. Article 30(1) does
not confer upon foreigners not residents in India the right to set up
educational institutions of their choice. The right conferred on
minorities is to establish educational institutions of their choice. It
does not say that minority based on religion should establish
educational institutions for teaching of their own language alone. The
article leave it to their choice to establish such educational
institutions as will serve both the purpose, namely, the purpose of
conserving their religion, language, or culture, and also the purpose of
giving a thorough general education to their children. Minorities are,
however, not entitled to have educational institutions exclusively for
their benefit.
In D. A. V.
College v. State Of Punjab , it was observed that, a linguistic
minority for the purpose of art. 30(1) is one which must at least have a
separate spoken language. It is not necessary that that language should
also have a distinct script for those who speak it to be a linguistic
minority. Religious or linguistic minorities should be determined only
in relation to the particular legislation which is sought to be
impugned, namely that if it is the State Legislature these minorities
have to be determined in relation to the population of the State. Arya
Samajis have a distinct script of their own, namely Devnagri therefore
they are entitled to invoke the right guaranteed under art. 29(1)
because they are a section of citizens having a distinct script and
under art. 30(1) because of their being a religious minority.
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of s. 4 do not in our view offend by themselves
any of the rights of the petitioners either under art. 29(1) or art.
30(1) of the Constitution. Nowhere there is a mandate for compelling
Colleges affiliated to it either to study the religious teachings of
Guru Nanak or to adopt in any way the culture of the Sikhs.
Thus religious or linguistic
minorities should be determined only in relation to the particular
legislation which is sought to be impugned, namely that if it is the
State Legislature these minorities is to be determined in relation to
the population of the State.
It was held that, religious
instruction is that which is imparted for inculcating the tenets, the
rituals, the observances, ceremonies and modes of worship of a
particular sect or denomination. To provide for academic study of life
and teaching or the philosophy and culture of any great saint of India
in relation to or the impact on the Indian and world civilizations
cannot be considered as making provision for religious instructions. The
State of Punjab is created as a unilingual State with Punjabi as its
language and if provision is made for study of Punjabi language that
does not furnish a ground for discrimination nor can the provision for
study of the life and teachings of Guru Nanak afford any cause for
complaint on grounds of violation of art. 14 of the Constitution. The
right to form association implies that several individuals get together
and form voluntarily an association with a common aim, legitimate
purpose and having a community of interest. The right extends inter alia
to the formation of an association or Union. Section 5 of the impugned
Act does not effect the right of D.A.V. College Trust and Society to
form an association. Therefore, there is no infringement of art.
19(1)(c).
The right conferred on minorities is
to establish educational institutions of their choice. It does not say
that minority based on religion should establish educational
institutions for teaching of their own language alone. The article leave
it to their choice to establish such educational institutions as will
serve both the purpose, namely, the purpose of conserving their
religion, language, or culture, and also the purpose of giving a
thorough general education to their children. Minorities are, however,
not entitled to have educational institutions exclusively for their
benefit.
Clause (2)
Clause (2) is only a phase of non-discrimination clause of the
constitution and does not derogate provisions made in clause (1). The
clause is expressed in negative terms: the state is therefore enjoined
not to discriminate in granting aid to educational institutions on the
ground that the management of the institutions is in the hands of
minority, religious or linguistic. The clause does not mean that the
state is competent otherwise to discriminate so as to impose
restrictions upon the substance of rights to establish and administer
educational institutions by minorities. The rights established by
article 30 (1) is intended to be a real right for the protection of the
minorities in the matter of setting up of education institution of their
choice.
Kerla
Education Bill Case
The article first came up for interpretation before a seven judge
Constitution Bench constituted to consider the reference made by the
President under article 143 in In re Kerla Education Bill sponsored by
the Communist Government of the state which was stoutly opposed by
Christians and Muslims. Chief justice S.R. Das delivered the majority
opinion. He spoke for six judges- the sole dissent by justice
Venkatarama Aiyar being confined to the question whether minority
institutions were entitled also to recognition and state aid as part of
the right guaranteed by article 30(1). C. J. Das held, inter alia:
a) An institution, in order to be entitled to the protection, need not
deny admission to members of other communities.
b) It is not necessary that an institution run by religious minority
should impart only religious education or that one run by the linguistic
minority should teach language only. Institution imparting general
secular education is equally protected. The minority has a right to give
"a thorough, good general education".
c) Grant of aid or recognition to such institution cannot be made
dependent on their submitting to such stringent conditions as amount to
surrendering their right to administer to them. However the right to
administer does not include the right to misadministration reasonable
regulations can be made.
d) Regulation prescribing the qualifications for teachers was held
reasonable. Those relating to protection and security of teachers and to
reservation in favor of backward classes which covered government
schools and aided schools alike, were "perilously near violating that
right", but "at present advised" were held to be permissible
regulations. Provision centralizing recruitment of teachers through
State Public Service Commission and taking over the collection of fees
etc. were held to be destructive of rights of minorities to manage the
institutions.
Clauses of the Bill, which
authorized the taking over of management in the event of specified
failings, in effect, annihilated the minorities' right to administer
educational institutions of their choice.
Minority
Rights flow from Articles 14,15,19(1)(2) 21, & 26 (a)
Thus while it is true that it is only the minorities whose right to
establish and administer educational institutions is mentioned n article
30(i) it dos not follow the same is denied to the majority communities.
It was considered necessary like a special mentioned for the right of
minorities by way of extra assurance to it is not correct to say that
minorities were considered backward and needed concessions though
article 30(i) to bring them up. The object was to make that they will
not be discriminated against. It was not intended to pamper as favored
communities. It should follow therefore form articles 14 and 15 majority
communities have right to similar treatment at the hands of the in the
matter of recognition affiliation government aid or non displacement
management in respect of educational institutions established by
majority as accorded to minority institutions of course condition can
and to be imposed in regard to aid, affiliation and recognition in order
to ensure standard of teaching but the same have to be uniformly onerous
and not be so drastic as to involve surrender by the community or
founder or management of its right to establish and administer the
institution.
The thesis that the majority in a
system of adult franchise hardly needs any action it can look after
itself and protect its interests any measure wanted by majority can
without much difficulty be brought on the statute book because majority
can bet that done by giving a mandate to the elected representatives
only the minorities who need protection is with the utmost respect to
the anguished judge to naive to command acceptance. Modern parliamentary
democracy are run on a party system which in India the more so in the
post mandal is built largely on the basis of caste and communal
co9nbination Government are returned to power not on the basis of issues
or mandates. Managements functional institution do not for a vote bank
wile their teachers do the. Religions majority namely Hindus are not a
homogeneous monolith. It is a much-divided society. There are caster and
sub caste division and the same court defense to the legislative and
executive wisdom on article has no made things easier electoral
arithmetic has led to all sorts of and combination.
Apart from articles 15 and 15(I)
this right to establish and administer educational institutions also
flows as seen above form articles 19(i) (g) and 26(a), which make no
distinction between majority and minority communities. The right of
students to education as a fundamental right under article 21, also
simples that they as well as their parents have the right to choice of
institutions in which they would like the former to be educated. Every
community has a right to found and administer educational and other
charitable institutional and to run them according subject perceptions
of what is best of the community and for the institution subject of
perceptions of what is best for the community and for the distinction
for religion or language minority or majority.
The only consequence of this will be
that provisions relating to displacing of managements through statutory
schemes of administration or through take over of institutions and
appointment of authorized controllers and also those divesting the
management of the powers of appointment and discipline pertaining to
teachers will have to be treated as unconstitutional in so far as they
relate to majority institutions too to the same extent as they have been
treated vis-à-vis minority institutions and it will not be such a bad
thing from the educational angle either the ground reality is that just
as nationalization of many private industries on ground of mismanagement
by industrialists has proved counter productive. so also has the taking
over of the management institutions. The cause. for interference in each
case was the acts of mismanagement and dissipation on the party of
private mil owners or school college managers. But the bureaucrats
displacing them have by and large not felt any commitment to the
industry institution at all and have succumbed to political pressures
with the result that things have only worsened instead of improving.
That is why they are now being re-privatized it is only though de
politicization of control over the institutions that the management can
be better and more evenly disciplined. Deprivation of management of
their power in regard to appointment and discipline of teachers has
likewise led to a steep fall in discipline and standard. Many teachers
do not care to listen even to their principal or head of department what
to say of the management. Absenteeism indulgence in private tuitions and
running of coaching schools are the order of the day. Of course
regulatory provision to the same extent not more noels as have been
accepted to be necessary for the protection of teacher of minority
institutions would in any case continue in relation to teachers of
majority institutions also. The trend the work over is now for less and
less of government. If misadministration can be prevented in the case of
minority institutions without emasculating the management the same
should be minority institution too. As per Ray C.J. in St. Xavier's and
per Jag Mohan Reddy J. all institution irrespective of any
denominational distinction should be places of workshop of learning for
students
Conclusion
The courts, however, seem to have been persuaded by practical compulsion
rather than be swayed away by a feeling of faithfulness to the spirit.
Their course of opinion seems to have been determined by some of the
followings:
i. That provisions in question seeks to protect minorities against state
action, which term includes laws and also under them, executive actions.
ii. That ours being a federal democratic system, political and
legislative processes operate not only from the national center of power
but also from the states.
iii. That these states are autonomous in their respective legislative
spheres-and laws are passed by majority votes.
iv. That minorities, considered as much on the national level, do
constitute numerical majority in some states.
v. That these majorities may, by their laws, deny the protection to the
non-dominant group which the Constitution so emphatically seeks to
secure.
vi. That these majorities may, by their numerically strength,
overshadowed the distinct shadow the distinct characteristics and
individuality of the non-dominant groups, and the latter may have to
live under a psychological fear of being discriminated and overwhelmed.
vii. That it was this fear in some sections of some minorities at least,
which had pervaded the politics the politics of pre-partition India, and
that it was on this premise that minority rights were demanded and
conceded in Constitution Assembly.
viii. That it is this fear, which still continues to be the core
component of the minority component.
ix. That the assurance to protection for minorities can tell its true
meaning only when a non-dominant group in a state is define and
ascertain as 'minority' where the law in question is a state law, eve
though the group happens to be a part of the 'majority', considered a
majority in the context of the whole country.
x. That the same reason that became the basis for article 29 and 30 to
find a place in the category of justiciable Fundamental Rights must be
valid in this situation also.
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