It is the most unpalatable truth on earth that none other than the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur has itself acknowledged in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Jagat Mohan Chaturvedi vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others in Writ Petition No. 15070 of 2016 that was pronounced as recently as on July 14, 2025 has minced absolutely just no words to underscore that district judiciary is working in perpetual fear of High Court acting like “invertebrate mammals”. It drew a stark comparison, likening the relationship between High Court Judges and the district judiciary to that of a feudal lord and a serf. It must be also noted that the Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Atul Sreedharan and Hon’ble Mr Justice Dinesh Kumar Paliwal used the analogy to highlight the “perpetual fear” that was experienced by the Trial Court Judges when interacting with High Court Judges.
By the way, we need to also note that the Division Bench was most forthcoming to hold unequivocally conceding that:
The dismal relationship between the Judges of the High Court and the Judges of the District Judiciary is one between a feudal lord and serf. The body language of the Judges of the District Judiciary when they greet a Judge of the High Court stops short of grovelling before the High Court Judge, making the Judges of the District Judiciary the only identifiable species of invertebrate mammals.” Most unfortunate indeed and a most telling commentary on the stark reality of the state of affairs in judiciary which cannot be swept under the carpet any longer now!
By all accounts, this definitely merits prompt redressal for which Centre and lawmakers and so also our Parliament must immediately take most prompt action in this regard as it brooks no more delay any longer now! It merits just no reiteration that Judges of the District Court definitely cannot be left entirely at the mercy of High Court and their removal thus must be made more difficult and cumbersome so that they don’t remain entirely at the whims and fancies of High Court Judges which cannot be afforded any longer for the smooth and effective functioning of the district judiciary which forms the backbone of our judicial system! Of course, this will help Judges of District Court to function more effectively and independently which is undoubtedly the crying need of the hour also!
It thus merits just no reiteration that each and every Supreme Court Judge and so also all our lawmakers must definitely make it a point to surely read this most commendable judgment to understand in-depth the ground reality prevailing in our District Courts and how the Judges of District Courts are treated so shabbily by the Judges of High Courts which is laid bare by none other than the Division Bench of the High Court Judges themselves which all the more underscores how alarming the situation on ground is which warrants immediate serious and effective surgery right now without anymore dilly-dallying! Of course, there can be just no gainsaying that the earlier reforms are made in this direction by lawmakers, the better it shall be!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment that has been so sagaciously authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Atul Sreedharan for a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Dinesh Kumar Paliwal sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner, who was a Judge working as Special Judge (SC/ST) at the relevant point of time with District Judiciary of Madhya Pradesh and his service was terminated by the impugned order dated 19.10.2015, passed by Respondent No.1, pursuant to a Full Court decision taken by the Respondent No.2, and the statutory appeal preferred by him was dismissed by order dated 01.8.2016.”
To put things in perspective, the Division Bench while elaborating on the facts of the case then envisages in para 2 that:
The brief facts of the case are as follows :-(i) The Petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge Class II on 30.10.1987 and was confirmed on the said post in the year 1990. He was promoted to the post of Civil Judge Class I on 13.5.1994 and was further promoted to the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate on 09.09.1998. On 31.7.2000, the Petitioner was promoted to the post of Higher Judicial Service (Entry Grade) and was given Selection Grade on 20.08.2008. In paragraph 5.5 of the petition, it is averred that the service record of the Petitioner was blemish less and in his entire career, not a single punishment was awarded to him and never ever was even a notice issued to him in relation to the discharge of his official duties or otherwise. It is relevant to state here that both the Respondents have not given para-wise rebuttal to the averments made in the petition.
Under the circumstances, the averment made in Para 5.5 of this petition stands uncontroverted. (ii) On 24.02.2015, a charge sheet was issued to the Petitioner in respect of certain misconduct. The said charge sheet is Annexure P/1. On 11.3.2015, the Petitioner submitted his reply to the charge sheet and specifically answered the charges levelled against him in respect of grant of bail to students, who were involved in the case of VYAPAM and he also explained the facts and circumstances under which the bail of co-accused was rejected.
It is further the case of the Petitioner that he released the accused/students on anticipatory bail on 29.01.2014, 30.01.2014 and 31.01.2014 under Sections 419 and 420 of the IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Pariksha Adhiniyam (triable by the JMFC), in view of absence of any material available against the accused/ medical students and that all the offences were triable by the Court of the Magistrate and the maximum sentence that could be imposed in those cases were three years imprisonment, with the exception of S. 420 which was punishable with a maximum sentence of seven years.
Thereafter on 14.2.2014, 20.2.2014 and 28.2.2014, some bail applications relating to FIR’s registered at P.S Jhansi Road, Gwalior, were dismissed as offences under Ss. 467, 468, 471, 120B and 201 of the IPC were registered against the applicants in those cases and the said offences were triable by the Court of Sessions. A copy of the reply submitted by the Petitioneris Annexure P/2.(iii) In the departmental enquiry held against the Petitioner, only one witness by the name of Jor Singh Bhadoria was examined and the Petitioner says that not a single document was exhibited by the prosecution witness and the enquiry was closed.
The averment made in paragraph 5.8 has not specifically been controverted by the Respondents in their reply. However, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 has stated that in a departmental enquiry, the strict rules of evidence do not apply and therefore, a document which has been relied upon in the course of the enquiry, which was not exhibited by the Investigating officer through Jor Singh Bhadoria, the sole witness examined in this case, was not fatal to the case of the Respondent No.2. The written defence of the Petitioner is Annexure P/4. (iv) The Enquiry Officer submitted a detailed enquiry report holding that the charges against the Petitioner as proved. A copy of the enquiry report is filed as Annexure P/5 to the petition. Against the enquiry report, the Petitioner filed his reply. (v) Thereafter, on 19.10.2015, the impugned order was passed by Respondent No.2 whereby, the Petitioner was dismissed from service without considering the reply filed by him as so averred in the petition. Against the order of termination, the Petitioner preferred an appeal under Rule 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and the same was dismissed on 01.08.2016, without assigning any reasons, as so stated by Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner. A copy of the appeal and the order passed therein are part are Annexure P/8 and P/9 to the petition.”
Notably, the Division Bench notes in para 16 that:
The instant case reveals a malady that cannot be addressed effectively on account of the social structure existing in the State. The feudal state of mind that still exists in the State, results in its manifestation in the judiciary also. It is precisely cases like this that result in a large number of bail applications pending before the High Court as also the Criminal Appeals. Experience at Bar gives this Court the wisdom to arrive at the opinion that the District Judiciary functions under the perpetual fear of the High Court. Like this case, where the Petitioner was terminated from service on account of passing bail orders in favour of the applicants, the message that goes down to the District Judiciary by such acts of the High Court is that acquittals recorded in major cases or bails granted by the Courts below the High Court, can result in adverse action against Judges passing such orders, though they are judicial orders.”
Most significantly, the Division Bench then encapsulates in para 17 what constitutes the “cornerstone” and “heartbeat” of this notable judgment postulating precisely that:
The dismal relationship between the Judges of the High Court and the Judges of the District Judiciary is one between a feudal lord and serf. The body language of the Judges of the District Judiciary when they greet a Judge of the High Court stops short of grovelling before the High Court Judge, making the Judges of the District Judiciary the only identifiable species of invertebrate mammals. Instances of the judges of the District Judiciary personally attending to Judges of the High Court (as desired by them) on railway platforms and waiting on them with refreshments, are commonplace, thus perpetuating a colonial decadence with a sense of entitlement. Judges of the District Judiciary on deputation to the registry of the High Court are almost never offered a seat by the Judges of the High Court and on a rare occasion when they are, they are hesitant to sit down before the High Court Judge. The subjugation and enslavement of the psyche of the Judges of the District Judiciary is complete and irreversible, so it seems. The relationship between District Judiciary and the High Court in the State is not based on mutual respect for each other but one where a sense of fear and inferiority is consciously instilled by one on the subconscious of the other. At a subliminal level, the penumbra of the caste system manifests in the judicial structure in this state where those in the High Court are the savarn as and the shudras are the les Misérables of the District Judiciary this is reflected in the abject supineness of the Judges of the District Judiciary. All this adds up to the passive subjugation of the District Judiciary leaving it psychologically emaciated, which ultimately reflects in their judicial work where bails are not granted in even the most deserving cases, convictions are recorded in the absence of evidence by giving the prosecution the benefit of doubt and charge is framed as though the power to discharge simply doesn’t exist. All this in the name of saving their job, for which the Petitioner in this case suffered, for thinking and doing differently.”
Most forthrightly, most fearlessly and so also most alarmingly, the Division Bench points out in para 18 that:
The extent of the rule of law existing in any state is reflected by the independence and fearlessness of its District Judiciary, the first tier of the justice administration system, and not the High Court to which, a large number of citizens find it difficult to access. But an overbearing High Court, ever willing to excoriate the District Judiciary for the most innocuous of its errors, ensures that District Judiciary is kept under perpetual and morbid fear of punishment. The fear of the District Judiciary is understandable. They have families, children who go to school, parents undergoing treatment, a home to be built, savings to be accumulated and when the High Court terminates his service abruptly on account of a judicial order passed him, he and his entire family is out on the streets with no pension and the stigma of facing a society that suspects his integrity. A District Judiciary which is compelled to work perpetually under this fear cannot dispense justice and instead shall dispense with justice.”
Be it noted, the Division Bench notes in para 19 that:
In this particular case, the Petitioner granted anticipatory bail in certain cases and refused in some others so called similarly situated persons, arising from the same crime number which Respondent No.2 has concluded was on account of corrupt and extraneous reasons. It is also relevant to mention here that not a single person who had suffered an adverse order from the Petitioner has ever made a complaint to the High Court stating that his application for grant of bail which was identical to others who were granted bail by the same Judge, were dismissed because such applicants could not meet the extraneous demands of the Petitioner. Even otherwise, the allegation of corruption or extraneous motive finds its place only in Charge No.3. Charge No.1, 2 and 4 merely state what the Petitioner has done without alluding any imputation of dishonesty to him. It is also relevant to mention here that the sole witness who was examined in this case in the enquiry was Investigating Officer in this case who has stated that the cases in which the Petitioner had granted bail where the once in which incriminating material was yet to be unearthed against those applicants. It is also relevant to mention here that in most of the cases offence was triable by the Court of Magistrate being under Section 420, 419 and Section 3 and 4 of the State Act where, with the exception of Section 420, all the other offences were punishable with a maximum punishment of three years.”
Most remarkably, the Division Bench propounds in para 20 underscoring that, “If the Respondent No.2 on the administrative side is going to question the exercise of discretion under Section 438 and 439 (or the corresponding Sections of the BNSS) by the Judges of the District Judiciary in favour of the applicant, where the question of corruption is merely an imputation by the enquiry officer, unsustainable by any material on record, the injustice done would be such that cannot be reversed later on. The judicial conservatism of the District Judiciary resulting in the denial of bail and unsustainable convictions which, even if reversed by the High Court in appeal after the appellant has completed fourteen years of his sentence, is a sham, masquerading as justice, and all this is merely the symptom. The feudal mindset of the High Court governing its relationship with the Judges of the District Judiciary, is the untreatable disease. The High Court would do well to introspect and realise that in the era of unbridled social media and unmoderated expression of public opinion, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander and as we sow, so shall we reap.”
It is worth noting that the Division Bench then notes in para 21 that:
The case of the Petitioner is one such. His service has been terminated two years before he was to superannuate after a blemish less career of almost 28 years. It is not the contention of learned counsel for Respondent No.2 that during this period there were any complaints against him or that his general reputation or his ACRs had any entry which makes his conduct as a Judge of the District Judiciary, questionable. It is only because of his blemish less reputation that the Petitioner at the relevant point of time was holding the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act but yet, the applications for bail in these matters were listed before him, considering his reputation and integrity. It is also essential to state here that none of these bail orders have been reversed on the judicial side by this Court and if the Court on the administrative side felt that the orders were passed because of extraneous consideration, these orders could have been taken suo moto on the judicial side also and set aside, but such a course of action was never adopted by this Court.”
Most rationally and as a corollary, the Division Bench then directs in para 22 holding that:
Under these circumstances, the petition is allowed. Impugned order is quashed. The Petitioner has superannuated in the meanwhile from service. However, on account of gross injustice suffered by him, this Court, besides restoring his pensionary benefits, also directs that he should be given back wages from the date on which he was terminated till the date he would have otherwise superannuated with 7% interest. The same shall be complied within a period of 90 days from the date on which this order is uploaded on the web site of the Respondent No.2, failing which the Petitioner shall be entitled to file a contempt petition against Respondents for enforcement of this order. In view of the specific facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of injustice suffered by the Petitioner, the hardships he and his family were subjected to, the humiliation in society that he had to face, only on account of passing judicial orders, without an iota of material coming on record to even establish corruption even on the anvil of preponderance of probability, this Court deems it essential to impose a cost of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. Five Lacs) which shall be paid to the Petitioner, to be shared between the Respondents.”
Finally, the Division Bench then concludes by holding in para 23 that:
The petition stands disposed of.”
Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut-250001, Uttar Pradesh
