It is most significant to note that while ruling on a very key issue pertaining to the educational qualification of PM Narendra Modi, the Delhi High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled University of Delhi and other connected matters in W.P. (C) 600/2017 & Connected Matters and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:DHC:7273 that was pronounced just recently on 25.08.2025 has in the fitness of things very rightly set aside an order of the Central Information Commission (CIC) directing the Delhi University (DU) to disclose information in detail with respect to the Bachelor’s degree of PM Narendra Modi while holding it to be “personal information” and ruling out any “implicit public interest” in it. It must be noted that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Sachin Datta who reserved the judgment on February 27, 2025 was acting on Delhi University’s plea challenging the CIC order. It may be recalled that following an RTI application by one Neeraj, the CIC on December 21, 2016 had allowed the inspection of records of all students who cleared the BA exam in 1978 which was the year PM Narendra Modi had also passed.

It was made absolutely clear by the Delhi High Court that the RTI Act was stated to have been enacted to promote transparency in government functioning and not to “provide fodder for sensationalism”. It may be recalled that the Delhi High Court had stayed the CIC order on January 23, 2017. The Delhi High Court found no implicit public interest with respect to the information sought under the RTI application and said the educational qualifications were not in the nature of any statutory requirement for holding any public office or discharging official responsibilities.

It was most sagaciously held by the Bench that:
This court cannot be oblivious to the reality that what may superficially appear to be an innocuous or isolated disclosure could open the floodgates of indiscriminate demands, motivated by idle curiosity or sensationalism, rather than any objective ‘public interest’ consideration.” Very rightly so!

It is high time and needless furore just for scoring very small brownie points on this must end right now which is possible only if a rational and pragmatic approach is shown by one and all and not only just by the Opposition parties on it because Delhi High Court has most commendably taken the most courageous decision to put a lid finally on all the baseless and groundless rumours swirling around the educational qualifications of PM Narendra Modi! There can be just no gainsaying that if there was a mandatory minimum educational qualification for becoming an MP then definitely things would have been much different and the matter involving the educational degree of PM Narendra Modi would definitely have been far more serious! But that is not the case in the present scenario!

At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Sachin Datta of the Delhi High Court sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that:
The present application for intervention is filed in W.P. (C) No. 600 of 2017, wherein the petitioner has challenged the order dated 21.12.2016 passed by the Central Information Commission (CIC). The applicants seek to intervene in order to assist the Court in the adjudication of the legal issues arising in the context of the concerned RTI application in that case.”

As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 2 that:
It is submitted that the applicants are eminent RTI activists. It is submitted that the present case raises questions of significant public importance, hence the applicants seek an opportunity to be heard in the present matter.”

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 7 that:
Having considered the submissions advanced, this Court finds no cogent legal basis or rationale to allow the applicants to intervene in the present case. The petition in question involves a challenge to order/s passed by the CIC in the context of certain RTI application/s. Only the concerned parties would be entitled to agitate the issue of legality (or otherwise) of the impugned order/s. The present petitions do not partake the character of ‘public interest litigation’. The applicants cannot be permitted to join these proceedings since no personal cause of action has accrued in their favour.”

It would also be instructive to note that the Bench then hastens to add in para 8 noting that:
This Court is, therefore, of the view that the applicants have no locus standi to intervene and that the application has been filed only to project themselves into a lis in which they have neither a legal right nor any enforceable interest. Allowing such an intervention would unduly expand the scope of the proceedings and open the floodgates to unconnected third parties.”

Do note, the Bench notes in para 65 that:
The use of the expression “Subject to the provisions of this Act” in Section 3 makes it abundantly clear that the right to information under the RTI Act is not unfettered and is subject to the exemptions and conditions prescribed therein, including those under Section 8 of the RTI Act.”

It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 88 that:
These provisions make it evident that the University is obligated to issue results exclusively through official mark sheets and transcripts to the concerned student. The provisions indicate issuing of results to the student/s, not to the public. The framework does not permit the disclosure of marks/grades to any third party. There is an implicit duty of trust and confidentiality in handling students’ academic records.”

Quite significantly, the Bench then propounds in para 98 holding clearly, concisely, cogently and convincingly that:
Insofar as data/information as regards details/particulars of degrees, results, mark sheets etc. of students (which is the subject matter of the impugned RTI applications) is concerned, the matter is put beyond the pale of doubt by virtue of Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act. In terms thereof, such data/information, indubitably constitutes “personal information” which is specifically exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.”

Do also note, the Bench notes in para 104 that:
Thus, it is unambiguously clear that the ‘marks obtained’, grades, and answer sheets etc. are in the nature of personal information and are protected under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, subject to an assessment of overriding public interest.”

It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench points out in para 108 that:
As noticed, the Supreme Court has categorically held in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra) that marks, grades, answer-sheets etc. are inherently personal information and are entitled to protection on the touchstone of privacy and personal information, save and except in situations where there is a demonstrable larger public interest justifying disclosure.”

It also cannot escape our unremitting attention that the Bench notes in para 114 that:
In light of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that information pertaining to an individual’s educational qualifications, including degrees and marks, falls within the ambit of “personal information” under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.”

Needless to say, the Bench then observes rationally in para 123 stating that, “Applying the aforesaid test in the present case, it is apparent that the mark sheets/results/degree certificate/academic records of any individual, even if that individual is a holder of public office, are in the nature of personal information. The fact that a person holds a public office does not, per se, render all personal information subject to public disclosure.”

While adding a caveat, it would be worthwhile to note that the Bench for clarity clarifies in para 124 stating that:
As mentioned, it would be a different matter where a particular educational qualification is a criteria or prerequisite for holding a public office or any post. However, in the present case, no public interest is implicit in the disclosure of the information as sought vide RTI application, which is the subject matter of W.P.(C) 600/2017.”

While continuing in the same vein, the Bench then hastens to add in para 125 observing aptly that:
Likewise, there is no implicit public interest in respect of the information sought vide RTI Application, which is the subject matter of W.P.(C) 1051/2017. Again, the concerned educational qualifications are not in the nature of any statutory requirement for holding any public office or discharging official responsibilities.”

Most remarkably, we see that the Bench then expounds in para 126 postulating precisely that:
Public interest under Section 8(1)(j) requires an element of overriding necessity for disclosure to protect or promote a significant public cause. It needs to be emphasized that disclosure of academic details sans any overriding public interest, would amount to an intrusion into the personal sphere which is constitutionally protected post K.S. Puttaswamy (supra). The fact that the information sought pertains to a public figure does not extinguish privacy/confidentiality rights over personal data, unconnected with public duties.”

Most significantly, we see that the Bench then encapsulates in para 127 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment mandating most elegantly, eloquently and effectively that:
This Court cannot be oblivious to the reality that what may superficially appear to be an innocuous or isolated disclosure could open the floodgates of indiscriminate demands, motivated by idle curiosity or sensationalism, rather than any objective “public interest” consideration. Disregarding the mandate of Section 8(1)(j) in such context would inexorably lead to demands for personal information concerning officials/functionaries spanning the entire gamut of public services, without any real “public interest” being involved. The RTI Act was enacted to promote transparency in government functioning and not to provide fodder for sensationalism.”

On a practical note, the Bench points out in para 138 that:
Further, it was observed that indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under the RTI Act for the disclosure of ‘all and sundry information’ (unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities and eradication of corruption) would be counterproductive, as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the administration. The relevant observations are as under:

“66. The right to information is a cherished right. Information and right to information are intended to be formidable tools in the hands of responsible citizens to fight corruption and to bring in transparency and accountability. The provisions of the RTI Act should be enforced strictly and all efforts should be made to bring to light the necessary information under clause (b) of Section 4(1) of the Act which relates to securing transparency and accountability in the working of public authorities and in discouraging corruption. But in regard to other information [that is, information other than those enumerated in Sections 4(1)(b) and (c) of the Act), equal importance and emphasis are given to other public interests (like confidentiality of sensitive information, fidelity and fiduciary relationships, efficient operation of Governments, etc.).

67. Indiscriminate and impractical demands or directions under the RTI Act for disclosure of all and sundry information (unrelated to transparency and accountability in the functioning of public authorities and eradication of corruption) would be counterproductive as it will adversely affect the efficiency of the administration and result in the executive getting bogged down with the non-productive work of collecting and furnishing information. The Act should not be allowed to be misused or abused, to become a tool to obstruct the national development and integration, or to destroy the peace, tranquillity and harmony among its citizens. Nor should it be converted into a tool of oppression or intimidation of honest officials striving to do their duty. The nation does not want a scenario where 75% of the staff of public authorities spends 75% of their time in collecting and furnishing information to applicants instead of discharging their regular duties. The threat of penalties under the RTI Act and the pressure of the authorities under the RTI Act should not lead to employees of a public authorities prioritising “information furnishing”, at the cost of their normal and regular duties.””

Further, the Bench mentions in para 145 that:
The respondent contends that since the information pertains to a period beyond 20 years, Section 8(3) mandates disclosure, rendering the exemptions under Section 8(1)(e) and Section 8(1)(j), inapplicable.”

It is worth paying attention that the Bench clearly holds in para 146 that, “This Court is not inclined to accept the said contention. In the post K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (supra) era, the Right to Privacy has been unequivocally recognized as a Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is no longer tenable to assert that personal information loses its protected status solely on account of the passage of time. Privacy/confidentiality of personal information is not time bound, and mere passage of twenty years does not obliterate constitutional protection.”

Do further note, the Bench notes in para 147 that:
In K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), a 9-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while holding that the Right to Privacy is subsumed within Article 21 of the Constitution of India and is intrinsic to life and personal liberty, also held that privacy includes informational privacy.”

Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 148 that:
The Right to Privacy, as recognized in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), does not diminish with the passage of time. Section 8(3) of the Act cannot be construed in a manner so as to reach the conclusion that mere a flux of 20 years would convert inherently personal information into public property.”

Adding more to it, the Bench observes in para 149 that:
The constitutional Right to Privacy, as recognized in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), continues to operate as a shield for confidential and personal information, even beyond the period referred to in Section 8(3) of the RTI Act. Section 8(3) must be interpreted harmoniously with Article 21 so that the lapse of time does not infringe upon privacy rights.”

While continuing in the same vein, the Bench notes in para 150 that:
The mere efflux of time does not justify overriding privacy in the absence of compelling necessity linked to a legitimate aim.”

Most rationally, the Bench directs and holds in para 152 that:
Thus Section 8(3) does not automatically override the exemption under Section 8(1)(j) when the information sought is inherently personal and protected under the right to privacy. The statutory provision must be interpreted in harmony with constitutional guarantees, and no disclosure can be directed unless a demonstrable and compelling public interest clearly outweighs the privacy right in question.”

More to the point, the Bench candidly concedes in para 154 holding that:
It is evident that the entire approach of the CIC in the impugned order was thoroughly misconceived. The conclusion that information relating to degree/marks/results of any particular individual is in the nature of ‘public information’, is in direct and utter contravention of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (supra).”

As a corollary, the Bench holds in para 163 that:
In the circumstances, the impugned orders which are the subject matter of W.P.(C) 600/2017 and W.P.(C) 1051/2017, being inconsistent with and de-hors the provisions of RTI Act, cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside.”

Furthermore, the Bench directs and holds in para 164 that:
Consequently, the aforesaid writ petitions stand allowed.” Very rightly so!

Sanjeev Sirohi, Advocate,
s/o Col (Retd) BPS Sirohi, A 82, Defence Enclave,
Sardhana Road, Kankerkhera, Meerut - 250001, Uttar Pradesh